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One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute
law. What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine.
Junius1
I. Introduction
In an important recent article on prodefendant developments in
products liability during the late 1980s, James Henderson and Theodore
Eisenberg discuss areas of products liability law in which, during the
early 1980s, new plaintiff breakthroughs had seemed imminent.2 One of
these areas involved "[t]he imposition of liability on manufacturers of
prescription drugs and other toxic substances based solely on epidemio-
logical evidence of causal links between those products and plaintiffs' in-
juries... ." -3 Among the products believed most likely to lead to such a
breakthrough was the drug Bendectin, a widely prescribed morning sick-
ness remedy alleged to cause birth defects in the children of mothers who
had taken it. Given the sympathetic early reaction of several courts to
plaintiffs' presentation of epidemiological proof of causation 4 the expec-
tation that Bendectin cases would produce the next breakthrough for
plaintiffs was more than reasonable.5 Yet, as Henderson and Eisenberg
note, by the end of the decade early plaintiff victories were replaced by
general defeat, "now mak[ing] it unlikely that Bendectin-related claims
have a promising future."'6
What occurred in the intervening years to lead to this altered assess-
ment? This Article addresses the question through an in-depth examina-
tion of the legal and scientific history of Bendectin. While Henderson
and Eisenberg use the Bendectin litigation as an example of general
trends in products liability law, the cases can be understood at a micro
level as well. The failure of the Bendectin cases to usher in a new era of
causal proof based solely on statistical data is due as much to factors
specific to the drug as it is to large-scale changes in tort law. The
Bendectin cases are not simply a random group of otherwise independent
1. DEDICATION TO THE ENGLISH NATION, THE LETTFs OF JUNIUS [1769-1771], re-
printed in FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1001 (John Bartlett ed., 13th ed. 1955).
2. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990).
3. Id at 486.
4. See, ag., Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100, 1107-14 (D.C.
1986) (testimony of expert witness that drug used during pregnancy caused child's birth de-
fects sufficient to carry case to jury where testimony was based on four different types of scien-
tific studies).
5. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 491.
6. Id.
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products liability cases that happen to involve the same drug. Rather,
they are a collection of cases that, over time, have interacted in varied
ways. Robert Emerson 7 and, more recently, Marc Galanter8 have dis-
cussed the nature of these interactions. Like other mass torts, the cases
concerned with Bendectin are usefully thought of as a unit-the Bendec-
tin Cases. This "congregation" of cases, to use Galanter's term,9 has a
beginning, a middle, and apparently a rapidly approaching end.
The topic of this Article is the life cycle of the Bendectin Cases. In
Part II, I review Emerson's and Galanter's thoughts as to how the exist-
ence of a congregation affects the way individual cases are processed and
resolved. Part III provides some background on Bendectin and its man-
ufacturer, Merrell Dow. The Bendectin litigation, like that of most mass
torts, revolves around a body of scientific evidence employed to demon-
strate that the product does or does not cause the harm alleged. Part IV
surveys the science on Bendectin, examining it from a congregation per-
spective as well. In Part V the attention turns to the law and legal pro-
cess surrounding Bendectin. I examine plaintiff and defense efforts to
mobilize resources and fight for position in the early stages of the congre-
gation. After presenting an overview of the Bendectin litigation's life cy-
cle, this Part concludes by discussing how the judiciary procedurally and
substantively rations adjudicatory resources to large congregations such
as the Bendectin Cases.
The Article concludes with some general thoughts about the rela-
tionship between judicial rationing and case congregations and the ways
in which case studies such as this one help us understand the larger
trends in tort law uncovered by Henderson and Eisenberg. In the
Bendectin Cases, the judiciary has played a much more active role in
rationing its resources than anticipated by Galanter. I discuss the factors
that compel the judiciary in this direction when it is confronted with
congregations of mass tort cases. Efficiency, stability, and consistency
become relatively more important as a congregation matures, and the
judiciary becomes more willing to intervene in the fact-finding process to
achieve these goals. Case congregation analysis also helps explain the
trend in products liability cases observed by Henderson and Eisenberg.
The micro processes that create incentives for procedural and substantive
rationing cumulatively create a macro effect of greater judicial willing-
7. See Robert M. Emerson, Holistic Effects in Social Control Decision-Making, 17 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 425 (1983).
8. See Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
371 (1990) [hereinafter Galanter, Case Congregations].
9. Id at 371.
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ness to intervene in the trial process, and this in turn tends to generate
prodefendant outcomes.10
II. Case Congregations
In a common-law system the individual case is usually the primary
unit of analysis. In keeping with the doctrine of stare decisis, lawyers
strive to differentiate the present case from adverse precedents and align
it with favorable ones. The tendency is to view each prior case as stand-
ing on its own-a unique combination of law and fact. Likewise, the
disposition of each current case is thought to be governed by the idiosyn-
cratic combination of lawyers, jurors, and judges who develop and decide
it.
Even when cases are aggregated, it is most frequently according to
legal principle or doctrine. Cases are viewed as links in a chain of con-
ceptual development, as pieces in the precedent puzzle. From this per-
spective, the individual case remains the basic unit of analysis. The case
is put into a larger picture as a brick is put into a wall; one discrete entity
is combined with others to construct a larger edifice. Because the case is
the law's basic unit of analysis and because each case is factually and
procedurally distinct, we are easily led to adopt this narrow perspective.
More often than we might suppose, however, the study of the legal
process will benefit from a different perspective. As Emerson has ob-
served, this is most surely true of those circumstances in which the par-
ties themselves do not "examine and dispose of cases as discrete units,
treating each on its own merits independently of the properties and orga-
nizational implications of other cases."11
A. Beyond the Individual Case
Emerson describes three "holistic" frameworks that shape the way
legal actors approach each individual case.12 First, there are "case
streams," against which individual cases often are assessed by reference
to what is "normal" for the stream.13 Those who must routinely process
similar cases develop typification procedures that help them to channel
normal cases into the proper stream and allow them to devote extra at-
tention to abnormal cases. 14
10. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 491.
I1. Emerson, supra note 7, at 425.
12. Id. at 427.
13. Id. at 426.
14. See generally RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 43-58 (1986) (explaining components of typification process); H. LAU-
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Second, there are "caseloads." 15 Legal actors are influenced by the
number of cases they are required to process. When, as frequently oc-
curs, caseloads overwhelm resources, decisions must be made regarding
the time and energy to devote to each case. The focus is not on the
individual case, but on the actor's responsibility for an entire caseload.
Caseload effects are most apparent when cases that admittedly deserve
attention are nevertheless given little or none because other cases are
considered more serious. 16
When legal actors on both sides of a case face like caseloads and
case streams, as in the criminal courts, they may well move beyond a
process of comparison, into active horse-trading of case outcomes.
Emerson gives as an example a typical multiple case bargaining session
between prosecutor and defense attorney (reported by Feeley):
After they have discussed a few, the prosecutor might say rhetorically,
"Jesus, I've already given you three nolles today, do you want me to go
out of business?". . . Conversely, the prosecutor might hear a defense
attorney plead, "You've put me through the wringer this morning; give
me a break on this one!" 17
Third, Emerson notes the holistic effects of sequence and precedent.
Cases that are recognized as "first cases" will be treated differently from
later ones. For example, the first offense a teacher encounters in a school
year may be treated more harshly than later infractions because the
teacher wants to "set a precedent" by making an example of the of-
fender.18 In this situation the first case is the most important, but this
will not always be true. For instance, the legal actors might simply be
unaware that a case is first or that the sequence of cases to come will
prove important. At some point, however, the parties19 may recognize
RENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS AD-
JUSTMENT (1970) (insurance claims adjusters value claims by comparison with stereotyped
fact patterns); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SOCIAL PROBS. 255 (1965) (concluding that typification is crucial to
everyday decisionmaking by all parties in the public defender system).
15. Emerson, supra note 7, at 426.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 445 (quoting MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HAN-
DLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 192-93 (1979)).
18. Id. at 427 (citing GERALD LEVY, GHETTO SCHOOL: CLASS WARFARE IN AN ELE-
MENTARY SCHOOL (1970)).
19. There are situations where only one party may view a case as part of a congregation.
A defendant searching for the best case to take up on appeal may view a group of cases as a
congregation, while each plaintiff sees its case in isolation. This broader perspective allows the
defendant to "play for rules" in the appellate process (that is, to obtain a favorable appellate
opinion, allowing the party to win future cases). This is one of the advantages Galanter attrib-
utes to parties who repeatedly litigate an issue. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
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they are involved in a sequence of cases and that earlier trial verdicts and
settlements have important consequences for those coming later.
20
Each of these case aggregations reflects Emerson's basic point that
since the work of legal actors sometimes focuses on a larger whole, the
individual case is not always the most appropriate unit of analysis. 2I In
most of the examples discussed by Emerson, each aggregation's individ-
ual cases are related to each other only because of the organizational
structure of the legal system. They are connected procedurally and
structurally, but are factually discrete. In some situations, the connec-
tion goes beyond procedure and organization to substance. When this
occurs, substance and legal organization interact, creating even stronger
relationships among cases.
B. Case Congregations and Mass Torts
One area in which substantive interrelationships occur involves the
mass tort. "Mass tort" is a slippery phrase. Here I mean injury to multi-
ple parties allegedly caused by a single product or event. One frequent
type of mass tort involves an event such as an airplane crash.22 Perhaps
less frequent in number, but often involving many more actual and po-
tential plaintiffs are mass torts involving toxic substances or defective
products. These product-caused mass torts include injuries resulting
from exposure to substances such as asbestos and Agent Orange, 23 as
well as injuries caused by products such as the Ford Pinto, Firestone 500
tires, or the Dalkon Shield.24 A third group of product-related mass tort
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 98-103 (1974)
[hereinafter Galanter, Limits of Legal Change].
20. A failure to recognize early on that a case or set of cases is the first in a large congre-
gation can prove expensive for defendants if they settle the early cases for substantial sums or if
they lose at trial; jury verdicts and settlement values of first cases are likely to become the
baseline from which all future bargaining begins. This occurred with respect to the asbestos
cases. See Francis McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litiga-
tion, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 440,488 (1986). Past judgments are also playing a role in the Dalkon
Shield bankruptcy proceedings. Under the Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust Plan, claimants
who elect Option III and show that the Shield caused their injury will be offered settlement
amounts based on historic settlement values. 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1034 (Feb.
14, 1990). For a general discussion of this and other ways of establishing the monetary value
of cases in mass tort situations see MARK PETERSON, NEw TOOLS FOR REDUCING CIVIL
LITIGATION EXPENSES (1983).
21. Emerson, supra note 7, at 454.
22. Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 779, 780-81 (1985) [hereinafter Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives].
23. Id.
24. See generally Sandra Kinghoru, Corporate Harm-A Structural Analysis of the
Criminogenic Elements of the Corporation (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Michigan) (reviewing the history of each of these mass torts).
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cases arises from exposure to drugs such as Thalidomide, DES, and
Bendectin. 25 While there are many differences between'these various
types of mass torts,26 all are characterized by the fact that their compo-
nent cases share a single underlying type of harm; further, all the parties
to the litigation recognize this fact.
A mass tort is a physical event, but it is also a social construct. The
cases are quickly recognized as a group by the parties, the courts, and
frequently by the public at large. The term "asbestos cases" or "Dalkon
Shield cases" comes to have meaning outside the courthouse as well as
within it. Not only are the cases arising from a mass tort connected sub-
stantively and procedurally, they have this important additional prop-
erty: ultimately they share a common legal fate.27
In this respect, mass tort cases are an example of what Galanter
calls a case congregation; that is, "a group of cases that. .. share com-
mon features, that are shaped by a common history, that are subject to
shared contingencies, and that lean into a common future."' 28 The cen-
tral observation about case congregations is that they have careers; that
over time, the volume and nature of cases change in an orderly fashion
according to particular qualities of the congregation. 29
Galanter discusses several general factors that influence case ca-
reers. First, there is the volume of underlying activity that gives rise to
certain types of cases. For example, the number of selective service cases
filed in the federal courts mirrored the progress of the Viet Nam War.
As the War ended so did the "draft" cases. 30
Second, there are several ways in which the legal system itself influ-
ences the career of a case congregation, at both an individual and a more
holistic level. At the individual case level, early cases can generate mo-
bilization efforts by potential claimants andpreventive measures by poten-
tial defendants that ultimately alter the volume and the outcome of
further suits (sometimes by altering the level of the underlying activ-
ity).31 Thus, as Galanter points out, confronted with the ruling in
25. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 22, at 780-81.
26. For example, toxic tort claims usually seek compensation for chronic injuries and
diseases, whereas product claims usually seek recompense for traumatic injuries.
27. This does not mean, of course, that every case in the congregation has the same out-
come. The outcome of an individual case is influenced by, among other factors, where it oc-
curs in the life-cycle and whether it is swept into procedural rationing devices such as class
actions.
28. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 372.
29. Iae at 373.
30. Id. at 374 fig. 1.
31. Id. at 379-84.
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Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,32 that under certain
circumstances therapists have a duty to protect third parties from vio-
lence at the hands of their patients, therapists have responded by "giving
more warnings, initiating more involuntary hospitalizations and taking
more notes."'
33
On a more holistic level, the cases begin to interact with and affect
each other. When cases become known as a collection, parties begin to
share information and to coordinate efforts. 34 These coordination net-
works are qualitatively different from the mobilization and prevention
activities discussed above because they specifically involve intercase ac-
tivities.35 Occasionally, coordination becomes institutionalized. For ex-
ample, information on school desegregation efforts was shared among
several special organizations, including the NAACP, the Legal Defense
Fund, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the
Harvard Center for Law and Education.36
Coordination networks represent one way in which parties may re-
spond to a case congregation. Courts also respond to groups of cases. A
fundamental holistic response of the courts is rationing.37 The most ex-
treme type of rationing is exemplified by worker's compensation statutes,
which attempt to close the courts to most work-related injury claims.
Less dramatic rationing efforts involve class actions, special masters, and
similar devices.38
A third holistic effect is depletion.39 As the easy cases are resolved,
a smaller and smaller group of cases, in which it becomes increasingly
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail, is left behind. Depletion is most obvious
in disasters such as airplane crashes, in which there is a known finite
number of victims; but it occurs in other situations as well, especially
32. 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) (depublished), vacated and
modified, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 135 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
33. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 380. See Daniel Givelber et al.,
Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv.
443, 472-83.
34. Marc Galanter, Lawyers' Litigation Networks, (unpublished paper presented to the
Conference on the Frontiers of Research on Litigation, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
September 20, 1985) [hereinafter Galanter, Litigation Networks].
35. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 387.
36. MARK CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 17-18, n.16 (1988).
37. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 385.
38. See, eg., Peter Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent
Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 347-48 (1986).
39. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 388.
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where defendants begin to take preventive measures to thwart future
claims.40
Finally, there are what Galanter calls outcome-stabilization effects. 41
Liability determinations and damage awards become more predictable as
more and more cases are tried. In the area of mass torts, perhaps the
most developed theory of outcome stabilization is Francis McGovern's
"cyclical theory of mass torts. ' 42 According to McGovern:
In the early stages of the cycle, defendants tend to win more cases than
plaintiffs because of strategic and informational superiority. If the liti-
gation has any merit, however, plaintiffs will eventually develop suc-
cessful information and strategies and win an extremely high
percentage of the cases tried. Next, the plaintiffs will bring cases for
trial that stretch the envelope of viable plaintiffs too far, and defend-
ants will create more effective counterstrategies, resulting in a reduced
percentage of plaintiff victories. Eventually, after full aggregation and
dissemination of information, crystallization of the law, and thorough
development of strategies, there will be a rough equilibrium of trial
results. Remaining variations will then be due to jury demographics,
attorney caliber, and random events during trials. Although perhaps it
is counter-intuitive, settlements will also reflect this equilibrium: the
average settlement amount will be virtually identical to the average
jury verdict. The variance, however, will be substantially different.
Settlements for similarly situated plaintiffs will be extremely similar;
verdicts will vary in accordance with idiosyncracies of the trial
process.43
As this theory suggests, the careers of some case congregations resemble
a life cycle. Early on there are a few immature cases. Slowly, a mature
and substantial body of litigation develops and a period of relative stabil-
ity ensues. Finally, there is a period of decline, as depletion and ration-
ing cause the cases to move out of the legal system. This Article
examines the life cycle of a particular case congregation: the Bendectin
Cases.
C. A Note on Case Studies
Because this Article explores hypotheses about the careers of case
populations through a detailed examination of one particular congrega-
tion of mass tort cases, some initial observations about such an enterprise
are in order. From one perspective, the case study is an inherently weak
form of hypothesis testing. Many unique features of the Bendectin Cases
have influenced the way the congregation has developed. It is difficult to
40. Id.
41. Id. at 389.
42. See McGovern, supra note 20, at 482.
43. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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disentangle these idiosyncratic features from the underlying processes.
Thus, the analysis of a single congregation of cases, no matter how de-
tailed, cannot alone support acceptance or rejection of general hypothe-
ses about case careers.
From another perspective, however, the case study is a particularly
useful methodology for examining the careers of case congregations. It
forces us to remain close to the evidence, and more importantly, it allows
us to adopt the perspective the parties had as they worked toward an
understanding of what they had on their hands.44 Case congregations
are "cultural categories created by an act of labeling." 45 Unlike the first
disciplinary problem of the school year, in which scenario the teacher
knows a priori that this is the first of a relatively well defined population
of cases, some first mass tort cases arise while yet unlabeled. The process
by which the contours of a congregation of cases are defined is crucial to
the ultimate development of the congregation. This definitional work
cannot be studied easily from a more general point of view. The case
study approach offers the opportunity to observe the micro processes
through which macro changes in litigation rates occur.4
I. Bendectin Background
A. The Firm47
The William S. Merrell Company, based in Cincinnati, Ohio, was
one of the oldest "ethical" (prescription) pharmaceutical companies in
the United States. In 1938 it was acquired as a wholly-owned subsidiary
by Vick Chemical, a recently formed Delaware Corporation. Vick's
product line was aimed at the symptomatic relief of the common cold
(Vicks Vapo-rub). Fearing a cure for the cold was at hand, it acquired
William S. Merrell for its prescription drug line. Bendectin was devel-
oped during the time William S. Merrell was a subsidiary of Vicks. In
1960 the Vick Chemical Company changed its name to Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc. (Vick had been founded by the Richardson family). A few
44. See generally BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DIscovERY OF
GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967) (arguing for theo-
ries "grounded" in the details of particular events).
45. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 373.
46. Joseph Sanders, The Interplay of Micro and Macro Processes in the Longitudinal
Study of the Courts: Beyond the Durkheimian Tradition, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 241, 248-54
(1990).
47. This history comes from personal correspondence from W. Glenn Forrester, attorney
for Marion Merrell Dow, to Joseph Sanders, (Aug. 23, 1990) (on file with author) and from
Carol Loomis, Richardson-Merrell Unswallows a Pill, FORTUNE, Jan. 12, 1981, at 54-56.
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years later, the William S. Merrell Company was merged into Richard-
son-Merrell and ceased to exist as a separate entity.
In 1981 a new company, Richardson-Vicks, became an independent,
publicly held corporation. It received all of Richardson-Merrell's busi-
ness and assets except its ethical pharmaceutical business. Richardson-
Vicks kept such products as Clearasil, NyQuil, Lavoris, and Oil of Olay.
All shares of what remained of Richardson-Merrell, including Bendectin,
were sold to Dow Chemical Company for $260 million. Dow was appar-
ently the high bidder among a number of potential buyers, including
G.D. Searle. At this time, Richardson-Merrell's name was changed to
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. In a sense, the 1981 transaction undid
Vick's 1938 acquisition of Merrell, as it once again separated the pre-
scription and non-prescription parts of the company. One result of these
transactions was to spin off the parts of Richardson-Merrell that were
least threatened by litigation, and sell the rest to Dow.
Dow Chemical became the parent of a subsidiary with outstanding
claims involving a number of products, including Bendectin,
Thalidomide, MER/29, DES, and the DPT vaccine. It was Bendectin
that presented the most serious threat to the new Merrell Dow. Paul
Oreffice, Dow Chemical's chief executive, said the Bendectin suits were a
"sobering negative," but were adjusted for in Dow's bid.48 (At the time,
Dow itself was embroiled in major products liability litigation involving
Agent Orange.)
Most recently, in 1989 Merrell Dow merged with Marion Laborato-
ries and became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marion. Marion's name
was changed to Marion Merrell Dow. Currently, Dow Chemical owns
almost 67% of Marion Merrell Dow's stock.
The checkered corporate history of Merrell has created several dif-
ferent named defendants in the Bendectin litigation. For simplicity, I
refer to the defendant as Merrell, the one word that has always been a
part of the corporate name of Bendectin's manufacturer.
B. The Drug
Bendectin and the Bendectin litigation must be understood in light
of two other drugs with which the Merrell Corporation was associated
during the time Bendectin was being developed and sold: Thalidomide
and MER/29. The obvious harm caused by these two drugs set the stage
for allegations that Bendectin, too, was a product that never should have
been marketed.
48. Loomis, supra note 47, at 55.
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(1) Thalidomide
Thalidomide was first synthesized in West Germany in 1953 by
Ciba. Because the drug had no pharmacologic effect on laboratory ani-
mals, the company discarded it.49 Another West German firm, Chemie
Griinenthal, then began to explore its uses. Because the drug's molecular
structure suggested it might be useful as a sedative, Griinenthal experi-
mented with it as an anticonvulsive for epileptics. The drug failed to
prevent convulsions, but did work as a hypnotic, providing a deep, natu-
ral sleep without a hangover. In 1960 the drug was given the trade name
Contergan and became the favorite sleeping pill in West Germany, avail-
able over the counter to anyone. The drug was combined with other
ingredients, including aspirin, to form compounds for colds, coughs, flu,
headaches, and asthma. In liquid form it was widely used to sedate chil-
dren. And as an antiemetic it was used for nausea during pregnancy.50
Thalidomide was marketed around the world, and was usually sold
without prescription. Merrell's Canadian branch sold the drug as
Kevadon. Merrell obtained rights to market it in the United States
under the same trade name and applied for FDA approval in September
1960. Shortly thereafter, the first reports of trouble began to surface in
Germany; patients complained of tingling hands, atrophy of the thumb,
and other forms of peripheral neuropathy. As a consequence, the drug
was made available only by prescription.51 In the summer of 1961 Ger-
man doctors first observed that an increasing number of babies were be-
ing born with arm and leg deformities.52 The full extent of the disaster
began to unfold. Ultimately, Thalidomide proved to be one of the most
potent human teratogens ever found.53
In the United States, large-scale disaster was narrowly averted. The
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 193854 required the seller of a new drug
49. Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.. 458, 459 (1986).
50. Id. at 460.
51. Id.
52. Id ; Helen B. Taussig, A Study of the German Outbreak of Phocomelia, 1180 JAMA
1106 (1962).
53. Sherman & Strauss, supra note 49, at 461. A teratogen is "[a] substance that pro-
duces abnormalities in the embryo or fetus by disturbing maternal homeostasis or by acting
directly on the fetus in utero." A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (John M. Last ed., 2d et
1988)). Sometimes the term is used in a narrower sense to describe substances that produce a
disruption during gestation that results in malformation of the fetus. Jennie Kline & Zena
Stein, Circumstances of Exposure and Reproductive Consequences, in EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 256, 262 (Leon Gordis ed., 1988).
54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938).
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to present convincing scientific evidence of the drug's safety. 55 Merrell
presented the existing data and was allowed to begin clinical investiga-
tion, but not widespread sale of Thalidomide. Approval might quickly
have followed had it not been for the tenacity of Dr. Frances Kelsey, a
physician and pharmacologist at the FDA who took notice of the earlier
German reports of adverse neuropathic effects. She also noted that the
drug was prescribed for morning sickness; from her earlier work with
quinine on a malaria project in World War II, she was acutely aware of
the pharmacological differences between fetuses and adults.5 6 She there-
fore requested more information from Merrell and withheld FDA
approval.5 7
Circumstances and the FDA saved Merrell from disaster, but just
barely.5 8 Moreover, Merrell did not come away with completely clean
hands. While awaiting FDA approval, Merrell had distributed the drug
for investigational use. The company engaged in what might charitably
be called extremely lax behavior. While Thalidomide was still under re-
view by the FDA, 2,500,000 tablets were distributed and given to nearly
20,000 individuals, including 624 pregnant women.5 9 Ultimately, at least
ten American babies were born with defects attributed to Thalidomide.60
55. Id. § 355.
56. Sherman & Strauss, supra note 49, at 461.
57. Id Ironically, the FDA's primary concern was that Thalidomide might cause pe-
ripheral neuropathy in adults, not birth defects in infants. One of the most active human
teratogens known had produced no teratogenic effects in mice, rats, or hamsters. Id. Terato-
genic effects of Thalidomide are observable in monkeys and rabbits, but finding an appropriate
animal model is not always an easy task. See id. at 464.
58. Richard E. McFadyen, Thalidomide in America: A Brush with Tragedy, 11 CLIo
MEDicA 79 (1976). Sherman and Strauss note that even today a product like Thalidomide
might slip through the FDA's safety net. Sherman & Strauss, supra note 49, at 464-65. If a
suitable animal model could not be found to indicate the potential for fetal injury, tests on
human subjects would not uncover the danger because current regulatory policy excludes wo-
men in the first trimester of pregnancy from randomized trials of new drugs. They conclude
that "[u]nder current FDA policy the only way to prevent another thalidomide disaster is to
forbid pregnant women from taking any but the most essential medications-a mode of pre-
vention well known and readily applicable before the 1962 regulations were instituted." Id at
465.
59. McFadyen, supra note 58, at 86.
60. Today, the exact way in which Thalidomide affects humans is still not entirely clear.
Sherman & Strauss, supra note 49, at 462. Moreover, the birth defects associated with the drug
are largely indistinguishable from birth defects arising from other causes. Id.; Janet McCredie,
Mechanism of the Teratogenic Effect of Thalidomide, 2 MED. HYPOTHEsES 63, 63 (1976). The
conclusion that Thalidomide causes these defects rests on the clinical evidence showing an
overwhelmingly greater likelihood of defects among children of women who ingested the prod-
uct in the early weeks after conception. The best estimates of what now is largely an unknow-
able figure is that if Thalidomide is taken between 35 and 50 days after menstruation, the risk
of malformation is over 50%. W. Lenz, Malformations Caused by Drugs in Pregnancy, 112
AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 99, 105 (1966); Sherman & Strauss, supra note 49, at 462.
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Merrell reached settlements with victims in the United States and Can-
ada ranging from $100,000 to $999,000.61
(2) MER/29
The second drug that is important to the Bendectin story is MER/
29. Merrell designed MER/29 to reduce the level of cholesterol in the
bloodstream. Between 1956 and 1959, tests were conducted on animals
(rats, dogs, and monkeys) and humans to explore its therapeutic and tox-
icologic effects. In June 1959 Merrell applied to the FDA for permission
to market the drug. The application was approved in April 1960, and
Merrell subsequently promoted MER/29 as the first drug to lower cho-
lesterol safely. In fact, the drug was anything but safe. In December
1961, when the drug had been used by approximately 400,000 individu-
als, Merrell mailed a letter approved by the FDA to all practicing physi-
cians. This so-called "Dear Doctor" letter warned for the first time that
MER/29's potential side effects included cataracts, baldness, and severe
dermatitis. In April 1962 Merrell voluntarily withdrew the drug from
the market. The withdrawal followed an FDA inspection of Merrell's
records that revealed the FDA had received incorrect animal data from
the firm. The following month, the FDA suspended the new drug appli-
cation for MER/29 based upon the clinical experience showing its dan-
ger to humans. 62
The following year Merrell, its parent Richardson-Merrell, and
three of Merrell's scientists were indicted under the federal False Writing
Statute 63 for withholding data from the FDA.64 For example: the FDA
had not been told that two laboratory dogs had developed cataracts, even
though this fact was noted on their autopsy sheets;65 results of tests on
monkeys had been altered; and falsified data had been presented to the
FDA.66 The defendants, including Dr. Evert van Maanen, Merrell's di-
rector of biological sciences, entered nolo contendere pleas. The firms
61. Gina B. Kolata, How Safe is Bendectin?, 210 SCIENCE 518, 519 (1980). At least one
case, McCarrick v. Richardson Merrell, went to trial in Los Angeles. 15 Jury Verdict Weekly
No. 38, at 43-44 (Sept. 17, 1971); 14 AM. TRIAL LAW ASS'N NEWSL. 410 (1971). In 1984,
over twenty years after they had begun, Merrell settled the last of the Thalidomide cases.
Francis J. Flaherty, Last Thalidomide Suits Settle to End Legal Era, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1984,
at 30.
62. Paul Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litiga-
tion, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 117-120 (1968) [hereinafter Rheingold, The MER/29 Story].
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1963).
64. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story, supra note 62, at 120-21.
65. Id. at 119.
66. Id.; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUS-
TRY 60-62 (1984).
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(Merrell and Richardson-Merrell) were fined a statutory maximum of
$80,000, and the scientists received suspended sentences. 67
In part, the defendants' pleas may have been an attempt to limit the
use of the criminal trial record in civil suits. Nonetheless, the first civil
suits were filed in 1961 and filings continued throughout the decade,
peaking in 1964. While MER/29 gave rise to many suits, each alleged
injury was relatively minor in comparison to those allegedly caused by
Thalidomide and Bendectin. According to one estimate, at least 5000
people were harmed by MER/29, and over 1500 suits eventually were
filed.68 Merrell won most of the early cases, in 1964 and 1965, but plain-
tiffs prevailed in several subsequent cases in 1966 and 1967.69 These
plaintiff victories increased the value of untried cases-it is estimated
that Merrell ultimately paid over $200 million in damages.70
The MER/29 episode gained widespread publicity. Numerous
books and articles were written about both the product and the company
that developed it. None was complimentary, and many vilified Merrell.
71
The company became one of the principal bad guys in an industry of bad
guys.
Merrell's experience with these two earlier drugs set the stage for
the Bendectin episode. While the litigation surrounding Thalidomide
and MER/29 is not legally relevant to the Bendectin litigation, it did
make Merrel a likely target for litigation. To employ a criminal law
metaphor, Merrell had one prior and on another occasion had been
found lurking around the scene of a crime. The MER/29 episode in par-
ticular raised questions concerning Merrell's testing program.72 When
hints of trouble emerged concerning Bendectin, many in the plaintiff's
bar must have concluded that, with respect to this firm, where there was
smoke there must be fire.
67. Rheingold, supra note 62, at 121.
68. Id
69. Id
70. See Kolata, supra note 61, at 519.
71. E.g., RALPH A. FINE, THE GREAT DRUG DECEPTION: THE SHOCKING STORY OF
MER/29 AND THE FOLKS WHO GAVE You THALIDOMIDE (1972); JOHN FULLER,
200,000,000 GUINEA PIGS (1972); PHILIP KNIGHTLEY ET AL., SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE
STORY OF THALIDOMIDE (1979); MILTON SILVERMAN, THE DRUGGING OF THE AMERICAS
(1976); Sanford Ungar, Get Away With What You Can, in IN THE NAME OF PROFIT (Robert
Heilbronner ed., 1973).
72. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 66, at 60-65.
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(3) Bendectin
In 1953 Dr. Raymond Charles Pogge, director of medical research
at Merrell, came up with the idea of using pyridoxine (Vitamin B-6) to
create an antinausea medicine to combat morning sickness among preg-
nant women. 73 After preliminary discussions with others at Merrell, in-
cluding Dr. Margaret Higgins Morson and D.B. Bowles, Dr. Pogge
proposed a drug made up of three ingredients, each of which had been
marketed separately: dicyclomine hydrochloride (an antispasmodic);
doxylamine succinate (an antihistamine acting as an antinauseant); and
pyridoxine hydrochloride. 74 The new drug was named Bendectin. Prior
to the Bendectin formulation, each ingredient had been prescribed singly,
and each alone had no recorded adverse effect on humans.
Bendectin was first marketed in 1956.7 5 In the United States, it was
available only by prescription. 76 In 1976, the drug was reformulated to
eliminate the first ingredient, dicyclomine hydrochloride, because it was
found not to add anything to the efficacy of the formulation.7 7 The possi-
bility that Bendectin might be a teratogen apparently was first brought to
73. The information regarding Bendectin's creation is taken from the testimony of Dr.
Pogge, Trial Transcript at 1513-1532, Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 649 F. Supp. 799
(D.D.C. 1986) (No. 83-3505) (deposition testimony of Dr. Pogge), aff'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 110 S. Ct 218 (1989), and from the court's opinion in Lynch v. Merrell
Nat. Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1191 (1st Cir. 1987).
74. Dicyclomine hydrochloride had been marketed under the name Bentyl. Doxylamine
succinate had been marketed under the name Decapryn. It is still marketed (though not by
Merrell) as Unisom, an over-the-counter sleeping aid. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
"Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. In
re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). Pyridox-
ine is Vitamin B6.
75. Milan Korcok, The Bendectin Debate, 123 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 922, 923 (1980).
76. Id. Bendectin is also known by the trade names Debendox, Lenotan, and Merbental,
and is available in many other countries. Id. In both Canada and Britain the drug was avail-
able over the counter, although usually dispensed by prescription. Id.
77. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, ADVISORY COMM., THE BENDECTIN
PEER GROUP REPORT (1975). This finding was based primarily on two studies. The first was
a four-way comparison of dicyclomine and doxylamine singly and in combination, versus a
placebo in 716 patients. The main effect of dicyclomine alone was greater than the placebo,
but not statistically significant. The effect of dicyclomine in the presence of doxylamine
showed similar results-a marginal but not statistically significant increase in efficacy when
compared to doxylamine alone.
The second study was a double-blind eight-way comparison of all three ingredients and
their combinations with a placebo in 2300 patients. While the study demonstrated the efficacy
of three ingredient Bendectin when compared to the placebo, it failed to demonstrate any
dicyclomine contribution. Doxylamine again was the major component, demonstrating a sig-
nificant effect on every response variable including physician assessments of patient nausea,
patient self-reports of nausea, eating habits, and daily activities. The study also demonstrated
for the first time in double-blind experimental conditions that pyridoxine did have a significant
effect on maternal self-reports of nausea when compared with all combinations lacking this
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public attention in 1969. Dr. Donald Paterson, a physician in British
Columbia filed a drug evaluation report ("DER") with the Canadian
Food and Drug Directorate and wrote a letter to the editor of the Cana-
dian Medical Association Journal questioning Bendectin's safety.78 The
same year, Merrell forwarded to the FDA physician reports of limb re-
ductions associated with the use of Bendectin, and physician letters ques-
tioning the drug's safety appeared in the British Medical Journal.7 9
Questions concerning the safety of Bendectin and whether it, like
Thalidomide, was a teratogen continued to accumulate; by the mid-
1970s, the FDA had on file over ninety physician reports noting defects
among children whose mothers had taken Bendectin. 80 By the end of the
decade, personal injury suits had been fied, the first going to trial in
January 1980.81 In 1980, following a number of reports in the popular
press that Bendectin was unsafe82 and under pressure from Congress to
investigate the drug,83 the FDA conducted a two-day hearing as to its
teratogenic effect. The FDA's conclusion, based on the report of its Fer-
tility and Maternal Health Drug Advisory Committee, was that "avail-
able data do not demonstrate an association between birth defects and
drug. Pyridoxine also had a marginally significant effect on physician evaluations of nausea
(p=.08). See also Korcok, supra note 75, at 923.
78. Thomas H. Bleakley & J. Douglas Peters, Bendectin, TRIAL, May 1980, at 56, 58.
79. Id.
80. Id. Several DERs were published simultaneously in 1978. See Dian Donnai & R.
Harris, Unusual Fetal Malformations After Antiemetics in Early Pregnancy, 1 BRIT. MED. J.
691 (1978); Kathleen Frith, Fetal Malformation After Debendox Treatment in Early Preg-
nancy, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 925 (1978); S. Mellor, Fetal Malformation After Debendox Treatment
in Early Pregnancy, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1055 (1978); C.J.G. Menzies, Fetal Malformation After
Debendox Treatment in Early Pregnancy, I BRIT. MED. J. 925 (1978); Richard W. Smithells &
Sheila Sheppard, Fetal Malformation After Debendox Treatment in Early Pregnancy, I BRIT.
MED. J. 1055-56 (1978). But see J.F. Corey & N.M. Newman, Debendox and Limb Reduction
Deformities, 1 MED. J. AUSTL. 417 (1981) (DER published several years later concluding
Debendox had no adverse effects).
81. See Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 711 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983). Mekdeci
was originally filed in June 1977, well before any other cases. The plaintiff's mother had
actively sought a reason for her son's defect and, on the basis of her own research, determined
that it was caused by Bende-tin. Id. Mekdeci is discussed in detail infra notes 204-22 and
accompanying text.
82. Mark Dowie & Carolyn Marshall, The Bendectin Cover-Up, MOTHER JONES, Nov.
1980, at 42; New Thalidomide-Type Scandal-Experts ReveaL ... COMMON DR UG CA US-
ING DEFORMED BABIES, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 9, 1979.
83. See, for example, a letter from California Representative Don Edwards to Jere
Goyan, FDA commissioner, expressing his "strongest concern over the FDA's inaction re-
garding the drug Bendectin." The congressman concluded, "I believe that.., the substantial
amount of new evidence linking Bendectin to fetal malformations mandate [sic] the immediate
removal of this harmful drug from the marketplace." Letter from Representative Edwards to
FDA Commissioner Jere Goyan (May 7, 1980) (on file in the offices of the Environmental Law
Liability Program, University of Houston Law Center).
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Bendectin, ... but [the drug] should be used only when conservative
treatment fails." 84 The drug was allowed to remain on the market. Nev-
ertheless, in response to the increasing number of lawsuits and the de-
cline in sales caused by negative publicity, Merrell voluntarily withdrew
Bendectin from the market in 1983.85 The litigation has continued to the
present. Thus far, over 2100 Bendectin claims have been made against
Merrell. This figure includes almost 1700 suits brought by children who
suffer from a wide variety of birth defects,8 6 allegedly because their
84. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN Svcs. NEWS, Oct. 7, 1980. In response to the question,
"[d]o the animal and human data reviewed by you and presented to you support the conclu-
sion that Bendectin is associated with an increased risk for human birth defects?" the Advisory
Committee answered: "No, the data presented to date do not demonstrate an association of
increased risk for human birth defects with the use of Bendectin. The committee notices with
concern two studies that suggest an association between Bendectin and certain anomalies.
Therefore, a residual uncertainty regarding a possible relationship does exist." FDA, UNED-
ITED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE FERTILITY AND MATERNAL HEALTH
ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Sept. 15, 1980).
85. For a brief history of the circumstances leading up to the drug's withdrawal, from
one critical of this result, see David Williams, How Nader Campaign Killed a Beneficial Drug,
HUM. EVENTS, January 14, 1984, at 10-11. At the time, the withdrawal met with widespread
criticism. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal concluded:
[T]here's something terribly askew with a legal system that cannot distinguish be-
tween a thalidomide and a Bendectin. Let us hope that the withdrawal of Bendectin
is not a harbinger of other products being driven from the market by legal costs, even
when the weight of medical evidence suggests they haven't been at fault.
WALL ST. J., June 15, 1983, at 34. Bendectin's fate has influenced the development of case law
in the products liability area. For example, the California Supreme Court cited the withdrawal
of Bendectin as one reason why it should reject a design defect analysis in prescription drug
cases, declaring instead that all prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe products as de-
scribed in comment k of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. Brown v. Superior
Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). The court
commented:
The possibility that the cost of insurance and of defending against lawsuits will di-
minish the availability and increase the price of pharmaceuticals is far from theoreti-
cal .... For example, according to defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., Bendectin,
the only antinauseant drug available for pregnant women, was withdrawn from sale
in 1983 because the cost of insurance almost equalled the entire income from sale of
the drug. Before it was withdrawn, the price of Bendectin increased by over 300
percent.
Id. at 1064, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (citations omitted).
86. Over 800 claims were disposed of at a single common issues trial in Ohio in 1985 (the
Common Issues Trial). The jury in the Common Issues Trial was asked to consider whether
Bendectin causes eight different categories of birth defects:
1. Musculoskeletal Defects: Defects in the muscles, bones and cartilage of a child,
including limb defects.
2. Central Nervous System Defects: Defects in the brain, spinal cord and nerves.
3. Heart Defects: Defects in the heart and circulatory system.
4. Head Defects: Defects in the head and face.
5. Respiratory Defects: Defects in the larynx, trachea, bronchi, and lungs.
6. Gastrointestinal Defects: Defects in the esophagus, stomach, and intestines.
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mothers used the drug during pregnancy.87 Because every state presum-
ably has childhood disability provisions in its statute of limitations,88 new
suits may be brought into the next century.8 9
7. Genitourinary Defects: Defects in the reproductive organs, kidneys, ureters, ure-
thra, and bladder.
8. Death: Includes spontaneous abortions, stillbirths, and neonatal deaths resulting
from life-threatening birth defects.
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1267 app.
D (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). A report to plaintiffs' counsel by the lead counsel committee in
June 1984 reported the following breakdown of types of injuries represented in the Common
Issues Trial:
Unilateral Limb Defects Involving the Arm 71
Unilateral Limb Defects Involving the Leg 21
Bilateral Limb Defects Involving the Arm 17
Bilateral Limb Defects Involving the Leg 25
Quadrilateral Limb Defects 18
Musculoskeletal Defects 13
Central Nervous System Defects 35
Congenital Heart Defects 35
Cleft Lip/Cleft Palate 17






Materials Prepared by Plaintiff's Lead Counsel Committee for January Meeting with all Plain-
tiffs' Counsel with respect to Common Issues of Liability Trial § 8 (June 11, 1984) (on file in
the offices of the Environmental Liability Law Program, University of Houston Law Center).
As the report indicates, although claims have been based upon many types of injuries, the
majority involved musculoskeletal defects--specifically limb reductions. As I discuss below,
this tendency is much more pronounced when only those individual cases that have gone to
trial are examined. See infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
87. Letter from Alfred Schretter, attorney for Merrell-Dow, to Sanford Gaines (August
9, 1989) (on file in the offices of the Environmental Law Liability Program, University of
Houston Law Center). For nearly identical figures as to the child-plaintiff cases see U.S. GEN.
AccT. OFF., PRODUT LIABILITY: ExTENT OF "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL
COURTS QUESTIONED 35 (January 1988) [hereinafter GAO, "LITIGATION EXPLOSION"
QUESTIONED].
88. E.g., TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 16.001 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
89. Because of these disability provisions, the Bendectin Cases have a "long tail": a long
period between the time when a product is distributed in the market and the time after which a
suit may not be brought. Some have argued that the long tails of many products liability
claims have led to an unravelling of insurance markets. E.g., George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1582-90 (1987). Insurance compa-
nies have responded to long-tailed risks by being less willing to write "occurrence" policies
covering all injuries that occur during a time period. Instead, they have turned to "claims-
made" policies that cover only claims made while the policy is in effect. This, in turn, has led
the attorneys general of several states to sue a number of insurance companies. See Joseph
Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races" The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process,
27 Hous. L. REV. 207, 215 n. 33 (1990).
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With this background in place, the next two Parts of this Article
examine the science and the law surrounding the Bendectin litigation. In
each Part, tle primary objective is to take a "life cycle" perspective.
Neither the science nor the law is analyzed as a collection of autonomous
studies or cases, but rather as part of a larger, interactive whole. As shall
become clear, both the science and the law have been fundamentally al-
tered by their interaction with each other.
IV. The Science
Science is discussed first because it was, in a sense, a leading indica-
tor of what was to happen in the Bendectin trials. To know the science
was, to some extent, to be able to predict what would come. On the
other hand, the law, especially as reflected in appellate opinions, was a
lagging indicator-a reflection of what already had occurred.
A. Background
Bendectin was already in the marketplace when Merrell experienced
problems with Thalidomide and later with MER/29. In part because
Bendectin was comprised of existing drugs, the compound had not un-
dergone substantial testing when introduced. 90 At that time, FDA stan-
dards did not require testing for teratogenicity, and Merrell did not test
Bendectin for teratogenicity until after the Thalidomide disaster in
1961.91 Indeed, the Thalidomide disaster acted as an important catalyst
for reformation of the Food and Drug Act.92
In the aftermath of that disaster, Merrell began investigating the
safety of Bendectin. As is typical, early research involved in vitro and in
vivo studies. Later, when questions arose regarding Bendectin's safety,9
3
new in vivo studies were undertaken, and researchers conducted a series
of epidemiological studies assessing Bendectin's effect on human fetuses.
Because the relative probative value of various types of data became a
determining factor in the Bendectm cases, the next sections provide an
overview of each type of research: in vitro, in vivo, and epidemiological.
94
90. Trial transcript at 20-21, Mekdeci v. Merrell Natl Lab., No. 77-255 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
30, 1980) (testimony of Dr. Pogge).
91. Id. at 42.
92. Id. at 56-57; Sherman & Strauss, supra note 49, at 463-64.
93. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
94. In addition to using these three types of studies, toxicologists also draw inferences
regarding a drug's effects from its structure. If the molecular structure of a suspect compound
is similar to that of a known teratogen, there is some reason to suspect that the compound will
have similar effects. C.T.G. King et al., Antihistamines and Teratogenicity in the Rat, 147 J.
PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 391-98 (1965); Michael Green, Expert
January 1992] MASS TORTS
Following this, I discuss the scientific findings and how they changed as
the Bendectin litigation matured.
(1) In Vitro Studies
In vitro studies expose single cells, organs, or even whole embryos,
maintained in a culture to some substance and examine the biochemical
events. 95 Organ cultures of embryonic limb buds are the most frequent
subjects of in vitro studies testing for teratogenicity. 96 Experiments indi-
cate that embryonic mouse limbs developing in a culture exhibit patho-
logical responses to several teratogens similar to those developing in
vivo. 97 An important advantage of in vitro studies is cost.98 There also is
an as yet unrealized longer term advantage: by using animal and human
cell cultures, in vitro studies allow direct comparisons across species of
the effects of cell and organ exposure to drugs. Ultimately, such compar-
isons may enable us to make better cross-species extrapolations of in vivo
study results.99 There are, however, many aspects of teratogenicity that
cannot be investigated through in vitro studies, and extrapolation to live
animals, not to mention humans, is difficult at best.
(2) In Vivo Studies
In vivo studies examine the effects of a drug on various animal spe-
cies thought to be similar to humans in their response to certain drugs. I00
Different protocols are employed depending on the type(s) of injuries for
Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent
Orange and Bendectin Litigation (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Doxy-
lamine succinate is an antihistamine, see supra text accompanying note 74, and some antihista-
mines are known teratogens. Proplaintiff experts in Bendectin trials have often pointed to this
structural similarity as part of the evidence that the drug is a teratogen. However, even slight
changes in molecular structure can produce very different effects. King et al., supra at 397.
95. Stuart Freeman et al., Post-Implantation Embryo Culture for Studies of Teratogenesis,
in BIOCHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 83, 102 (K. Snell & B. Mullock
eds., 1987).
96. Jeanne Manson et al., Teratology Test Methods for Laboratory Animals, in PRINCI-
PLES AND METHODS OF TOXICOLOGY 141, 159 (A. Wallace Hayes ed., 1982).
97. Id.
98. One article, which discusses the procedures of in vitro tests for teratogens using rat
embryo cell cultures, estimates that one technician can test between 250 and 300 compounds
per year. O.P. Flint, An In Vitro Test for Teratogens Using Cultures of Rat Embryo Cells, in
IN VITRO METHODS IN TOXICOLOGY 339, 356 (C.K. Atterwill & C.E. Steele eds., 1987).
99. G.B. Leslie & P. Johnson, Introduction to IN VITRO METHODS IN TOXICOLOGY,
supra note 98, at 1, 3. See infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
problems that currently attend extrapolation from in vivo animal testing results to humans.
100. Robert E. Menzer, Selection ofAnimal Models for Data Interpretation, in TOXIC SUB-
STANCES AND HUMAN RISK: PRINCIPLES OF DATA INTERPRETATION 133 (R. Tardiff & J.
Rodricks eds., 1987) [hereinafter Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HUMAN RISK].
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which one is testing. Today the protocols for teratogenic effects testing
are fairly well standardized 01 and call for tests on at least two species at
two dose levels.10 2 For each species a minimum N consists of two test
groups and one control group, each containing twenty rodents or ten
rabbits. Because of the nonnormal distribution of teratological events,
nonparametric tests are often employed, with the litter, not the fetus, as
the unit of analysis.10 3 The percentage of fetuses affected within a litter is
the basic estimate of statistical effect. l 4 By the mid-1970s, around the
time Bendectin's safety came into question, approximately 2000 chemi-
cals (mostly drugs) had been tested for teratogenic effects. Of those
tested, approximately one third had shown some teratogenic effect.105
Perhaps the central issue with respect to in vivo teratology studies is
the degree to which the results can be extrapolated from animals to
humans.10 6 Because many substances produce an adverse effect in only a
small percentage of organisms when ingested at a rate similar to that
encountered in the environment or prescribed by a physician, it takes a
large number of animal subjects to detect a given substance's effects with
any reliability. Smaller samples would generate an unacceptably large
number of false negatives (failure to detect an effect when it exists).
Thus, animals are generally administered high doses of the drug in hopes
of maximizing the incidence of effects.107 If there is a positive result,
101. See, eg., IAN NISBET & NATHAN KARCH, CHEMICAL HAZARDS TO HUMAN RE-
PRODUCTION 74 (1983); Manson et al., supra note 96, at 141-84, 156-57. Advisory Committee
on Protocols for Safety Evaluation: Panel on Reproduction, U. S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Report on Reproduction Studies in Safety Evaluation of Food Additives and Pesticides Residues,
16 TOxICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 264 (1970).
102. Testing for teratogenicity requires that drugs be administered during the critical pe-
riod encompassing organogenesis, the time when cells and tissues migrate and associate to
form organ rudiments. It is during this period that the fetus is most vulnerable to structural
defects. Manson et al., supra note 96, at 143. In humans, organogenesis occurs from the third
to the eighth week of fetal development. In rodents, it occurs earlier and lasts for fewer days.
Id. For example, organogenesis occurs between days 6 and 15 for rats and between days 6 and
18 for rabbits. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEv., OECD SHORT TERM
AND LONG TERM TOXICOLOGY GROUPS (1979).
103. Typical tests are the Mann-Whitney U-test for two groups and the Kruskal-Wallis
test for comparisons among more than two groups. Manson et al., supra note 96, at 156. For a
general discussion of appropriate statistical analyses for toxicological studies see Shayne C.
Gad & Carrol S. Weil, Statistics for Toxicologists, in PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF TOXICOL-
OGY, supra note 96, at 273.
104. Manson et al., supra note 96, at 179.
105. JAMES L. SCHARDEIN, DRUGS AS TERATOGENS 5 (1976).
106. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR EVALUATING THE ToxIc-
Yr OF CHEMICALS: PART 1, at 35-41 (1978).
107. While dose-response effects are generally important in determining the toxicity of
drugs, this relationship is quite complex in the case ofteratogenic effects. For example, high
dose rates may increase fetal death and resorption and thus decrease the number of observed
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toxicologists must then extrapolate a predicted incidence at a more real-
istic lower rate. Unfortunately, there is no single agreed upon extrapola-
tion model for dose-rate effects, and competing models generate widely
differing predictions at low response rates.10 8 Extrapolation is particu-
larly difficult in the case of teratogenic effects. 109
Once a dose rate extrapolation has been made, a second extrapola-
tion is necessary to adjust across species. Again, unfortunately, there is
no uniformly accepted formula for the adjustment. Two common formu-
las respectively compare either the body weight or the surface area of the
animal with the corresponding human measurement. 110 The use of these
different scaling factors can lead to widely divergent estimates of effects
on humans. 11
Finally, it is important to emphasize the different role animal studies
play when they are used to regulate risk versus when they are used to
defects. Moreover, a drug's effects may vary depending on when it is given during organogene-
sis. Thus, dose variations over the entire period of organogenesis may produce different results
than dose variations on a single day of gestation. Manson et al., supra note 96, at 149-51.
108. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 89, 98 (1988). For example, carcinogenic effects often are measured on a dose scale
that defines a base dose rate as the dose necessary to produce cancer in 50% of a sample of test
animals. David S. Salsburg, Statistics and Toxicology: An Overview, in SCIENTIFIC CONSIDER-
ATIONS IN MONITORING AND EVALUATING TOXICOLOGICAL RESEARCH 123, 127-29 (Ed-
ward J. Gralla ed., 1981) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS]. Several statistical
models, including log-normal, log-logistic, and single-hit models are used to extrapolate to
lower dose rate effects. All of the extrapolation models produce similar estimates when the
dose rate is relatively close to 50%, but they produce widely divergent results at low doses.
For instance, at a dose that is 1/1000 of the 50% dose, the single-hit model gives an estimated
response rate 200 times greater than the log-normal model. OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45
Fed. Reg. 5001, 5184-5185 (1980).
109. Hogan and Hoel note that when compared to carcinogenic or mutagenic effects, tera-
togenic effects are "perhaps the most difficult to address in terms of species extrapolation and
quantitative risk assessment." Michael D. Hogan & David G. Hoel, Extrapolation to Man, in
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF TOXICOLOGY, supra note 96, at 711, 724. The biologic mecha-
nisms underlying teratogenic responses are poorly understood, partly because the basic unit of
the experiment is not really one organism, but two-the mother and her offspring. Id. This
greatly increases the difficulty of extrapolating from high to low dose rates.
110. James P. Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcin-
ogens, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rv. 86, 98-99 (1980). Implicit in these formulas is an assumption
that animals and humans respond similarly to the substance.
111. For example, the National Academy of Sciences estimated the incidence of cancer in
humans exposed to Saccharin using different formulas to extrapolate from animal data. A
body-weight scale predicted 210 cases per million people exposed. A surface-area scale pre-
dicted 1200 cases. A third formula using a total lifetime dose conversion scale predicted 5200
cases per million. Id In general, comparisons between cancer risk estimates based on extrapo-
lations from animal data and actual human epidemiological data indicate that estimates have
been accurate for only half the substances examined. See Jack L. Landau & W. Hugh
O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility ofAnimal Studies to Prove Causation in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L. REv. 521, 547-548 (1988-89).
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prove causation in a tort case. When testing a new drug, the critical
question is whether there might be a teratogenic effect in humans even
though no effect is detected in test animals.1 12 (Recall that Thalidomide
did not produce effects in rats or hamsters.)' 13 When we move from the
laboratory to the courtroom, however, the question changes subtly. In
the courtroom the crucial issue becomes whether a known effect in a test
animal is probative of causation in humans. On the first question, a 1980
FDA report indicated that of thirty-eight compounds known to produce
human birth defects, all but one have produced a positive result in at
least one animal species and 80% are positive in more than one spe-
cies.' 14 Thus, the Thalidomide experience notwithstanding, negative in
vivo tests on two species are relatively strong evidence that a drug will be
safe for humans.
As to the second question, the answer appears to be that the rela-
tionship is weaker and somewhat dependent on the species used to prove
causation. 1 5 According to the FDA study, of 165 compounds for which
no human teratologic effects had been reported only 28% appeared nega-
tive in all animal species tested, and 50% appeared negative in multiple
species.' 6 On the other hand, over 41% of the compounds appeared to
be positive in more than one animal species. 117 In a species-by-species
analysis, the FDA found that a negative response to substances for which
human teratologic effects have not been reported was observed only 35%
of the time in mice and hamsters, 50% in rats, 70% in rabbits, and 80%
in monkeys." 8 Compounding the problem of what to make of positive
112. Because there are no commonly accepted models for extrapolation, one technique is
to employ some arbitrary safety factor when scaling up to humans. Hogan & Hoel, supra note
109, at 711-12. For example, one technique for establishing safe doses for humans is to find
the maximum dose level that may be administered without causing an observed effect in ani-
mals and then multiply this by a safety factor of 100 to determine a "safe level" for humans.
Id; Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 111, at 536. There appears to be no theoretical basis for
choosing a factor of 100. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 111, at 536 n.66.
113. See supra note 57.
114. NISBET & KARCH, supra note 101, at 98 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 69, 823). The FDA
reports that known or suspected human teratogens produced positive teratologic responses
85% of the time in mice, 80% in rats, 60% in rabbits, 45% in hamsters, and only 30% in
monkeys. Id.
115. Id. at 105.
116. Id (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 69, 823)
117. Id
118. Id. For similar results, see EDWARD J. CALABRESE, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL Ex-
TRAPOLATION 237-38 (1983); Gary P. Carlson, Factors Modifying Toxicity, in Toxic SUB-
STANCES AND HUMAN RISK, supra note 100, at 47, 49. These results are subject to an
important qualification. It is impossible to be certain that any of the compounds that appear
not to be teratogenic or carcinogenic in humans are, in fact, completely without teratogenic or
carcinogenic effect. Leape, supra note 110, at 92. A relatively rare human effect may not have
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animal findings is, again, the problem of dosage. At sufficiently high
dose levels most, perhaps all, substances are teratogenic in some ani-
mals. 119 If the question is whether a finding that a substance is terato-
genic in mice constitutes strong evidence it is teratogenic in humans, the
answer is no.120
These limitations on our ability to extrapolate from animal research
to humans create what Weinberg has called "trans-scientific" uncer-
tainty: uncertainty concerning an issue that can be put in scientific terms
but for which scientific proof is unavailable.121 As Brennan notes, "we
accept that animal carcinogens are human carcinogens as a matter of
policy; this proposition cannot be proven given our present understand-
ing of carcinogenesis." 12 2 A similar statement could be made about in
vivo studies showing teratogenesis. 123
(3) Epidemiological Studies
A third type of scientific research involves epidemiological studies of
human subjects. 124 Epidemiological studies compare the incidence of
birth defects among those exposed and those not exposed to a drug.
There are two general ways of making such comparisons: cohort studies
and case-control studies. Cohort studies compare the incidence of de-
been detected in studies using relatively small sample sizes. Thus, even in a study of 1000
individuals, a negative finding means only that the excess incidence of adverse effects due to
the drug under examination is not more than 1%. NISBET & KARCH, supra note 101, at 92.
119. Bernard A. Schwetz, Monitoring Problems in Teratology, in SCIENnFIC CONSIDERA-
TIONS, supra note 108, at 180. As one author notes: "Most teratologists accept the principle
that any agent can be shown to be teratogenic in an animal providing enough is given at the
right time. For instance, both sodium chloride and sucrose have been shown to produce
animal teratogenicity." Thomas H. Shepard, Human Teratogenicity, 33 ADVANCES IN PEDI-
ATRICS 225, 227 (1986).
120. Nevertheless, rodents are particularly attractive candidates for in vivo testing, in part
because of their relatively low cost and ease of handling. Bernard L. Oser, The Rat as a Model
for Human Toxicological Evaluation, 8 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH1 521, 522 (1981).
121. Alvin Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
122. Troyen Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alter-
native Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 1, 23 (1989).
123. One commentator notes that there is often a period between the time when animal
studies indicate a substance may be dangerous and the time when epidemiological studies indi-
cate whether it is, in fact, dangerous to humans. Wendy E. Wagner, Note, Trans-Science in
Torts, 96 YALE L.J. 428, 432-34 (1986). She proposes that during the interim period liability
standards be revised so as to facilitate plaintiff recovery. Id. at 442-49.
124. Still another source of information about a drug's effects are the previously men-
tioned DERs filed by physicians when they observe some adverse effect associated with the
drug. Though DERs are helpful in bringing potential problems to the attention of the manu-
facturer and regulators, their usefulness as a source of systematic data on the effects of a drug
is severely limited by their anecdotal nature.
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fects in groups of persons exposed to the drug to the incidence in groups
of persons not exposed.1 25 Case-control studies match a group of persons
who have the defect in question ("cases") against another group that
does not have it ("controls"). The two groups then are compared with
regard to the frequency of exposure to the drug.1 26 Epidemiological
studies typically measure risk by using the concepts of relative risk, 1 27
odds ratio, 128 and attributable risk.129
Epidemiological studies also vary in the way they collect their
data-prospectively or retrospectively. All case-control studies are ret-
125. Leon Gordis, Estimating Risk and Inferring Causality in Epidemiology, in EPIDEMI-
OLOGY AND HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 53, at 51, 52.
126. Id.; Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demon-
strating Cause-In-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 432 & n.22 (1983).
127. The relative risk is the risk of defect in exposed individuals divided by the risk of
defect in those not exposed. Gordis, supra note 125, at 52. For example, imagine that 20% of
mothers in a particular area ingested Bendectin during pregnancy. If we drew a sample and
found that of 1000 children whose mothers were exposed to Bendectin, 60 have a defect, while
of 4000 children whose mothers were not exposed to Bendectin, 160 have a defect, the relative
risk associated with Bendectin ingestion would be (a/(a + b)) / (c/(e + d)) = (60/(60 +
940)) / (160/(160 + 3840)) = .06.04 = 1.5.
128. The odds ratio is the cross-product in a 2 X 2 table. In a cohort study examining
exposed and unexposed individuals, it equals the ratio of the odds of injury if the person was
exposed, to the odds of injury if the person was not exposed. Id.
Odds Ratio in a Cohort Study
Injured Not Injured
Exposed a b a/b ad
Not Exposed c d -7" -F
Id. at 53 fig. 5-1. For example, using the data from the preceding note, the odds ratio would be
ad/be = (60 X 3840)/(940 X 160) = 1.53.
In a case-control study comparing a group of cases (people with the injury) to a group of
controls (people without the injury), the odds ratio is the ratio of the odds that the cases were
exposed to the odds that the controls were exposed. Id at 52.
Odds Ratio in a Case-Control Study
CASES CONTROLS
(Injury) (No Injury)
History of Exposure a b a/c _ ad
No History of Exposure c d 57"d BEE
See id. at 53 fig. 5-2. Note that cohort and case-control studies differ in how they are con-
ducted, but not in how the odds ratio is computed.
With case-control studies we know the risks of exposure, but we usually do not know the
risk of injury. The odds ratio is a good approximation of relative risk when, with respect to
their history of exposure, both the cases and the controls are representative of the population
from which they are drawn, and when the disease or defect is rare in the population. Id. at 52,
54 fig. 5-3; see HAROLD KAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EPIDEMIOLOGIC METHODS 46 (1983).
129. Attributable risk is an assessment of the differences in the risks of exposed and unex-
posed populations. It is calculated by subtracting the level of risk of the unexposed population
(the background risk) from the level of risk of the exposed population. Gordis, supra note 125,
at 53-54. Thus, if the background risk of contracting cancer is 25% while the risk for those
who spend a lifetime employed at a commercial nuclear reactor is 28%, the attributable risk of
working at the site is 3%.
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rospective; indeed, the term "retrospective study" is sometimes used as a
synonym for case-control study. Similarly, the term "prospective study"
is sometimes used as a synonym for cohort study, even though some co-
hort studies do collect data retrospectively. 130 An important limitation
of all studies using retrospectively collected data is that the data may be
affected by recall bias.131 Mothers who have children with birth defects,
for example, are likely to search their pasts carefully, trying to find the
cause of their child's injury. Consequently, they are more likely to recall
the drugs ingested during pregnancy than are mothers of healthy chil-
dren. The dangers of bias presumably increase with the passage of time.
Researchers employ a number of strategies in an attempt to overcome
these dangers. 132
a. The Primacy of Epidemiology?
Because epidemiological studies are done on human subjects, they
are sometimes thought to be the preferred evidence of environmental
risk.133 As Erdreich notes, at least in situations where the proposed ef-
fect of a drug does not have a long latency period, "descriptive epidemio-
logic data ... will settle the uncertainty associated with even the best
animal data." 134 Occasionally, epidemiological evidence has been said to
trump all other types of information. Thus, Judge Weinstein, in his opin-
ion granting summary judgment against opt-out plaintiffs in the Agent
Orange Case, said the epidemiological studies "are the only useful studies
having any bearing on causation. All the other data supplied by the par-
ties rests on surmise and inapposite extrapolations from animal studies
and industrial accidents."1 35
130. KAHN, supra note 128, at 39-40.
131. Recall bias is but one of many sources of potential bias in epidemiological research.
For a useful discussion, see David L. Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32 J. CHRONIC Dis-
EASES 51, 56 (1979).
132. In one study of Bendectin, for example, the researchers conducted an in-depth inter-
view with each mother and in most cases corroborated the interview results with exposure
information in the mother's obstetric record. Sally Zierler & Kenneth Rothman, Congenital
Heart Disease in Relation to Maternal Use of Bendectin and Other Drugs in Early Pregnancy,
313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 347, 347-48 (1985).
133. Michael L. Dourson & Jerry F. Stara, Regulatory History and Experimental Support
of Uncertainty (Safety) Factors, 3 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 224, 234 (1983).
134. Linda Erdreich, Combining Animal and Human Data: Resolving Conflicts, Summa-
rizing the Evidence, in EPIDEMIOLOGY AND HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 53, at
197, 198.
135. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487
U.S. 1234 (1988).
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On the other hand, epidemiological studies do have limitations. Not
infrequently, they contain methodological or data collection shortcom-
ings that undermine their findings. Thus, some experts would disagree
with Judge Weinstein's conclusion that he could disregard in vivo studies
and other types of evidence that contradict epidemiological findings.
1 3 6
Moreover, when epidemiological findings are inconsistent or unclear, the
animal studies take on greater importance. Even if an epidemiological
study indicates that there is a correlation between a product and a defect,
the question remains whether the product caused the problem.
b. Causal Inference
Because we often may not understand the mechanisms by which a
drug causes human injury, epidemiological correlation alone does not
constitute proof of causation. Epidemiologists have developed a set of
additional criteria to assist in determining whether an injury is the result
of exposure to a particular product. 137
The first criterion is temporal order. Cause precedes effect. If the
effect came before the cause, there can be no causal relationship. Ambi-
guity as to causal order undermines the ability to make causal
arguments.
Second, there is the strength of association. The stronger the statis-
tical association (usually measured by relative risk or the odds ratio) and
the greater the level of statistical significance (usually measured by a chi
square test) the more willing epidemiologists are to attribute a causal
relationship. 138
136. See Erdreich, supra note 134, at 198; cf PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 279 (1986); Bert Black & David Lilienfeld, Epidemi-
ological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 776 (1984); Dore, supra
note 126, at 436; Kristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Re-
sponse to Mr. Dore, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 448 (1983); Richard E. Hoffman, The Use
of Epidemiologic Data in the Courts, 120 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 190, 192 (1984).
137. MERVYN SUSSER, EPIDEMIOLOGY, HEALTH AND SOCIETY: SELECTED PAPERS 69-
80 (1987); Erdreich, supra note 134, at 203; Thomas H. Shepard, Human Teratogenicity, 33
ADVANCES PEDIATR. 225, 230-34 (1986).
138. Herein lies the complex question of when it is appropriate to reject the null hypothe-
sis that there is no relationship between the treatment and the effect. For a general statistical
discussion of calculating relative risks, chi squares, and confidence intervals see KAHN, supra
note 128, at 3-10. The literature on the role statistical evidence and statistical significance
should play in legal assessments of liability is voluminous. Among the more interesting arti-
cles are: Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 595
(1988); Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 136; Harold Ginzberg, Use and Misuse ofEpidemiologic
Data in the Courtroonv Defining the Limits of Inferential and Particularistic Evidence in Mass
Tort Litigation, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 423 (1986); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Bur-
dens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986); Ora
Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of
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The third criterion is the specificity of the relationship. There can
be specificity in the causes and in the effects. Perfect specificity is
achieved when a cause is a necessary and sufficient condition for one sole
effect. If exposure to a certain product leads to a "signature disease," as
is the case with asbestosis, causal inferences are easier. But as causes
come to have multiple results and as effects come to have multiple
sources, causal arguments become indeterminate. Not infrequently,
causal hypotheses have been attacked because a cause has multiple ef-
fects. 139 Almost all epidemiologists agree, however, that while lack of
specificity in the effects of a cause may make a causal relationship inde-
terminate, it does not disprove the existence of such a relationship. 140
Similarly, while specificity in the causes of a given effect strengthens the
plausibility of a causal relationship the absence of specificity alone does
not refute the existence of a causal relationship. 141
Fourth, there is consistency on replication. Multiple replications,
especially when they use a variety of methods and are done in a variety of
circumstances, support causal arguments by diminishing the probability
that results are spurious or the product of methodological flaws. When-
ever it is impossible to implement an experimental design fully, unmea-
sured confounding factors threaten the accuracy of the results. 142
Finally, there is the coherence of the evidence. A finding is more
likely to support a causal interpretation when it fits within a known body
of facts or an existing theoretical framework. One type of coherence is
biological plausibility; that is, an understanding of the mechanisms
through which a cause may lead to an effect. Another type of coherence
that increases the plausibility of a causal relationship is a finding of a
dose-response relationship; that is the higher the dose, the greater the
response. 143
Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909 (1986); David Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Rele-
vant?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1333 (1986); David Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of
Persuasion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 13; Richard Lempert, Statistics in the
Courtroonv Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1098 (1985).
139. The best known example of this type of argument involves the correlation between
cigarette smoking and disease, because smoking does not cause a specific ailment.
140. SUSSER, supra note 137, at 79.
141. Susser notes that as knowledge accumulates specificity may be improved because we
come to a clearer understanding of the differences between previously undifferentiated causes
or effects. Id. at 87. For example, as we come to appreciate the differences in the types of
asbestos fibers we may be able to make more specific statements about the relationship of these
fibers to certain diseases. Moreover, as specificity improves, so may strength of association.
Here as elsewhere, the criteria for making causal inferences overlap.
142. See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DE-
SIGN & ANALYSIS FOR FIELD SETrINGS 37-94 (1979).
143. Manson et al., supra note 96, at 150. The lack of a linear dose-response relationship
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The history of the Bendectin litigation has been marked by ques-
tions concerning the relative probative value of each type of evidence and
the causal inferences that can be drawn from statistical correlations.
B. The Bendectin Studies
Against this background, the next sections present the Bendectin
research. The purpose here is not to determine whether Bendectin is a
teratogen; rather, it is to examine the flow of science over the life cycle of
the Bendectin litigation. In mass tort cases, the importance of the sci-
ence cannot be overemphasized. Without in vitro, in vivo and epidemio-
logical findings, and experts prepared to present them, the plaintiff has
no case. In order to understand the litigation, something first must be
known about the science. Further, there are two other issues suggested
by the idea of a congregation of cases. First, the science, like the law, of
a case congregation develops and matures; the science also experiences a
life cycle. 144 We should expect that the science will be relatively poorly
developed in the early stages of litigation, but that over time the mobili-
zation efforts of the parties will produce a richer body of scientific
evidence.
This leads to the second point: We should anticipate that the sci-
ence itself is influenced by the legal process. As the congregation of cases
grows and matures, it creates its own gravity field, attracting and dis-
torting the science that comes near it.145 In turn the science affects the
law. Ultimately, science and law interact in complex ways to produce
unique patterns of development in various case congregations. In the
following three sections, I show how the science developed in the
Bendectin Cases.
(1) In Vitro Studies
While probably all Bendectin cases have contained some testimony
on in vitro research, the number of studies on point is limited. In a recent
letter published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr.
does not necessarily detract from an analysis, since sometimes the cause may not operate in a
linear fashion. Id.
144. See Michael Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Liti-
gation, 76 CAL. L. Rrv. 965, 975 (1988) (arguing that knowledge of the dangerousness of toxic
substances generally improves with time).
145. In this regard, Sackett notes that research may be susceptible to what he calls the
"hot stuff bias": "When a topic is hot, neither investigators nor editors may be able to resist
the temptation to publish additional results, no matter how preliminary or shaky ...... " Sack-
ett, supra note 131, at 61. For a period of time in the 1980s, Bendectin was hot stuff. See infra
text accompanying notes 198-99.
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Stuart Newman cites six in vitro studies that examine Bendectin or its
antihistamine component, two of which were published in 1989.146
Compared to in vivo or epidemiological research, in vitro studies are
the least accessible to the lay person. Summarizing the findings is diffi-
cult. One study that is damaging with respect to Bendectin's safety is by
Budroe, Shaddock, and Casciano, who conclude that Doxylamine may
be a weak DNA-damaging agent. 147 Hassell and Horigan report that
Bendectin inhibits limb bud mesenchyme cell differentiation.1 48 Dr.
Newman interprets the other studies as indicating doxylamine also cur-
tails the formation of embryonic cartilage. 149 The authors of these stud-
ies, however, apparently do not conclude that their research indicates
that Bendectin or doxylamine is teratogenic. 150 Cumulatively, the evi-
dence suggests that Bendectin's antihistamine component may have some
adverse effects on embryonic cell development, but there is relatively lit-
tle research, and the findings are not clear cut.
This circumstance is not surprising since the purpose of most of
these studies is not to prove or disprove that Bendectin causes specific
types of developmental defects in animals or children. Instead, most ap-
pear to have a different purpose: to study a group of known teratogens
alongside a group of known nonteratogens and determine whether the
146. Stewart A. Newman, Bendectin-Birth Defects Controversy, 264 JAMA 569, 569
(1990) (letter to the editor). As the journal editor noted, Dr. Newman has provided expert
advice and testimony (for plaintiffs) in Bendectin cases. For a listing of the in vitro studies, see
Appendix B.
147. John D. Budroe et a., A Study of the Potential Genotoxicity of Methapyrilene and
Related Antihistamines using the HepatocyteiDNA Repair Assay, 135 MUTATION RES. 131,
136-37 (1984).
148. John R. Hassell & Elizabeth A. Horigan, Chrondrogenesis: A Model Developmental
System for Measuring Teratogenic Potential of Compounds, 2 TERATOGENESIS, CARCINOoEN-
ESIS, AND MUTAGENFSis 325, 331 (1982). Using a unit of measure called the "teratogenic
potential," they found Bendectin inhibited cell differentiation at a dose of .05 mg/ml. This
dose was approximately 1.5 orders of magnitude smaller than the amount of caffeine necessary
to produce a similar effect (2.3 mg/ml). On the other hand, the Bendectin dose was 3.5 orders
of magnitude larger than the amount of vitamin A required to produce a similar effect
(.000013 mg/ml). Id. at 330. Hassell and Horigan do not express an opinion in the article as
to whether Bendectin is dangerous to humans when taken at normal therapeutic doses.
149. Newman, supra note 146, at 569.
150. See, eg., M. Guntakatta et al., Development of a Mouse Embryo Limb Bud Cell Cul-
ture System for the Estimation of Chemical Teratogenic Potential, 4 TERATOGENESIS, CARCI-
NOGENESIS, AND MUTAGENESIS 349, 362 (1984) ("responses observed for each of these
chemicals ... were statistically insignificant"); J.Y. Renault et al., Limb Bud Cell Culture for
In Vitro Teratogen Screening: Validation of an Improved Assessment Method Using 51 Com-
pounds, 9 TERATOGENESIS, CARCINOGENESIS, AND MUTAGENESIS 83, 88-89 (1989) ("[i]n
contrast with... patterns of specific inhibitory activity [produced by two known teratogens],
treatment with Doxylamine (succinate), a known nonteratogen, resulted in a concomitant inhi-
bition of proliferation and differentiation ... signifying nonspecific toxicity").
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procedure used in the study is in fact able to differentiate the two groups
of drugs. If a procedure is able to distinguish known teratogens from
known nonteratogens then it will be a better predictor as to whether a
new compound will in fact be teratogenic in humans. To return to the
distinction developed earlier between studies used to regulate risk versus
studies used to prove causation in a tort case,151 the primary goal of most
of these in vitro studies appears to have been the development of tech-
niques that will be most helpful in regulating risk.
Perhaps this is why, in comparison to the in vivo and epidemiologi-
cal research discussed below, relatively little Bendectin-specific in vitro
research has occurred. As a consequence, the in vitro data is second best
evidence when used in the courtroom to demonstrate that Bendectin is a
teratogen.
(2) In Vivo Studies
In the aftermath of the Thalidomide disaster, the first in vivo tests of
Bendectin were conducted by Merrell employees in 1963, using rabbits
and rats. The principal investigator, Dr. Robert Staples, concluded that
the study did not reveal teratogenicity. However, he noted some malfor-
mations in rabbits given the highest doses, and therefore recommended
further research be conducted at higher dose rates.' 52 In 1966 and 1967
further tests were done on the individual components of Bendectin by
two other Merrell employees, Drs. James Newberne and John Gibson.
These results were published in 1968.153 Since that time there have been
surprisingly few published in vivo studies designed to explore the terato-
genic effect of Bendectin or its constituent ingredients. Table 1154
151. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
152. Hagan v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 334, 338 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Merrell
did not immediately follow up on this recommendation, nor did it submit the findings to the
FDA until three years later. This type of behavior on Merrell's part helped fuel speculation by
plaintiffs that if they only dug deeply enough, they would find a cover-up. Id
153. See John P. Gibson et al., Teratology and Reproduction Studies with an Antinauseant,
13 TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 439, 441 (1968).
154. Table 1 is found in appendix A. For a listing of the in vivo studies, see Appendix C.
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presents a summary of the published studies, 155 plus two unpublished
ones, in chronological order 1 56
The table is useful for indicating the development of the literature.
The first thing to note is the erratic nature of the research-bursts of
activity separated by several years during which no research occurred.
In fact, the pattern reflects the regulatory purpose of most in vivo studies
and, later,. the demands of the Bendectin litigation. The early 1967 re-
search represents Merrell's response to Thalidomide. It was followed by
a long period of quiet. The mid-1970s work reflects the impact of the
epidemiological effectiveness study that found two ingredient Bendectin
to be as effective as the three ingredient version.157 Subsequently, Mer-
rell conducted in vivo studies to test the safety of the new formulation on
animals. The final and largest wave of studies, from the early 1980s to
date, reflects the need for new evidence regarding the drug's safety,
driven largely by the interest in and demand for information resulting
from the Bendectin litigation.
The table is somewhat misleading as an indicator of the total volume
of animal research. Gibson's 1968 study reported on six separate experi-
ments that had examined the effects of doxylamine succinate, di-
cyclomine hydrochloride, and three ingredient Bendectin on rats and
rabbits. Because these all were done in the same laboratory by Merrell
employees, however, they are inherently suspect.' 58 Studies 3 and 4 were
also done in Merrell's laboratories. They were designed to examine the
155. With regard to the number of mothers in experimental and control groups (column
3), it should be noted that the total number of fetuses examined may be much larger depending
on the species. For example, in the rat study by Tyl et al., the 116 experimental animals and
53 controls produced a total of 2007 fetuses. Rochelle W. Tyl et al., Developmental Toxicity
Evaluation of Bendectin in CD Rats, 37 TERATOLOGY 539, 546 (1988). Recall from the earlier
discussion that the preferred analysis focuses on the percentage of fetuses within litters that
have a defect. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104. The relatively greater cost of
rabbit and monkey studies is in part a function of the smaller litter sizes of these species.
156. Several additional unpublished studies should be mentioned as well. Merrell con-
ducted a number of studies, most, but not all of which are summarized in Gibson's 1968
article. See Gibson, supra note 153, at 440. In addition, there are studies by Roll &
Matthiaschk (1981), Roll (1982) (testing Bendectin on rats), and McClure (1982) (a small
monkey study showing no effect). Tyl et al. supra note 155, at 540. Table 1 does not include
these studies.
157. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
158. In all these experiments the authors interpreted the results as indicating no effect,
although there does appear to be both a higher incidence of contracted tendons in rabbits
receiving high doses of Bendectin and a higher incidence of focal hematomas in rats receiving
high doses of dicyclomine hydrochloride. Additionally, no statistical analyses are presented
for any of this study's findings. Plaintiff's experts have challenged the way those who con-
ducted the study coded certain animals and have claimed that if the data had been coded
correctly, these studies would indicate that Bendectin causes birth defects.
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teratogenic effects of the two ingredient Bendectin formulation. In addi-
tion, studies 6, 7, 9, and 10 were all conducted in a single laboratory at
the University of California, Davis by Hendrickx and colleagues. Papers
6 and 7 are, in fact, only abstracts of work in progress that is fully re-
ported in 9 and 10. If Hendrickx's studies are counted as one piece of
research, there turn out to be only six separate research projects in the
published literature, and one of these (study 5, involving chicken eggs) is
only marginally an in vivo study.
Several of the studies report some relationship between the drug and
a teratogenic effect,159 although the authors are generally cautious about
attributing causation. 160 The research on monkeys concludes that two
ingredient Bendectin causes heart defects. 161 One rabbit study (study 8)
concludes that doxylamine succinate causes limb and skeletal defects.162
The rat studies find, at most, minor teratogenic effects. 163 Several studies
159. See infra app. A, tbl.1, col. 5.
160. See infra app. A, tbl. 1, col. 9. Their caution is explained by a variety of factors: the
relationship is not statistically significant; the defect is one frequently found in the particular
strain of animal used; the effect is produced because of the drug's maternal toxicity; or there
are other, fortuitous explanations for the result.
161. The first epidemiological study to show a teratogenic effect in humans also involved
heart defects. See infra note 183. The defects exhibited by the monkeys (ventricular septal
defects) apparently are temporary. Bendectin causes a delay in the closure of the ventricular
septa, but it closes spontaneously by full term. The defect is not detectable in newborn
monkeys. A.G. Hendrickx et al., Evaluation of Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Non-Human Phi-
mates: Double-Blind Study in Term Cynomolgus Monkeys. 32 TERATOLOGY 191, 194 (1985).
162. Because the most seriously injured plaintiffs have suffered limb defects, the rabbit
studies are particularly relevant to the Bendectin litigation. Dr. McBride, the researcher who
found these defects, has been a central expert witness for plaintiffs in these cases. He has also
been at the center of considerable controversy, including serious charges of misconduct sur-
rounding research on a different drug, scopolamine. See Andrew Skolnick, Key Witness
Against Morning Sickness Drug Faces Scientific Fraud Charges, 26 JAMA 1468, 1468 (1990).
163. While the Tyl study did show a dose-related skeletal defect (reduced number of ossi-
fied caudal vertebral centra), on the basis of an analysis of covariance ("ANCOVA"), the au-
thors concluded that this and other fetal defects are best understood as the consequence of
reduced fetal body weight. Tyl, supra note 154, at 550-51. In general, the authors interpret
the defects detected in this study as the byproduct of maternal and developmental toxicity
resulting from the very high doses of Bendectin given to the experimental rats. The lowest
dose rate in the study (200 mg/kg/day) is approximately 300 to 600 times the therapeutic dose
taken by pregnant women. The highest dose rate was 800mg/kg/day. At this rate, Bendectin
caused profound maternal toxicity.
Tyl also reports that Roll and Matthiaschk conducted an experiment in 1981 finding tera-
togenic effects (diaphragmatic hernia) in rats; but that Roll was unable to replicate the results
in the same laboratory. Id. at 540.
Gibson's 1975 study indicates a relationship between Bendectin and dilated kidney pelvis
and subcutaneous hematomas. Both are said to be common to the strain of rat used in the
study, and the latter defects generally disappear within a few days in newborn rats. John
Gibson, Teratology Study With A New Antinauseant Formulation in Rabbits 3 (1975) (un-
published study, on file with author).
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find that high dose rates of Bendectin do produce maternal toxicity, and
this in turn injures the fetus. 164
One would expect that as the Bendectin litigation matured, so too
should the quality of the in vivo evidence have improved, allowing the
parties and the courts to reach a consensus regarding the drug's ter-
atogenicity. And there is some evidence that the quality of the research
did improve over time. Early studies rarely utilized any statistical analy-
sis of experimental results, while later ones employed some rather sophis-
ticated analytic tools. 165 Additionally, the sample sizes of the studies
have grown, and dose rates have been increased.1 66 Both of these meth-
odological changes increase a study's ability to detect minor defects. On
the other hand, the limited number of in vivo studies, which employed a
variety of test animals and tested a variety of component drugs, makes it
difficult to draw any conclusions as to whether Bendectin has a specific
teratogenic effect on humans.
How to account for the relatively limited number of in vivo studies,
as well as their relatively late appearance? The small number of studies
cannot be explained by a direct depletion effect. While Bendectin is no
longer available as a prescription drug, it remains available for laboratory
studies. Indeed, the most recent research occurred subsequent to Mer-
rell's withdrawal of Bendectin from the market. Nevertheless, the vol-
ume of published work is thin. Why?
In part, the answer is found in the relationship of this research to all
Bendectin research and to the ongoing litigation surrounding the prod-
uct. While in vivo studies in general are cheaper to conduct than epide-
miological studies, with respect to a particular drug the relative
advantage is lessened. Large scale epidemiological studies can be used to
investigate a wide variety of drugs simultaneously. Most of the epidemi-
ological research on Bendectin, for instance, uses data sets collected for
more general purposes. Animal studies, by contrast, must focus on the
drug in question. Consequently, there has been less interest in mobilizing
the resources necessary to conduct Bendectin-specific in vivo
experiments.
This has proven especially true since Bendectin was removed from
the market. Further study of the drug is of limited interest to people who
are not in some way involved with Bendectin as a legal, as well as scien-
164. See Tyl et al., supra note 155, at 550.
165. See id.
166. Tyl's 1988 rat study involved over 2000 fetuses, some of whose mothers had been
exposed to Bendectin at levels nearly three orders of magnitude greater than human therapeu-
tic doses.
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tific, issue. In other words, Merrell's decision to remove Bendectin from
the market did lessen demand for animal research. This fact is reflected
in the sponsorship of the published studies that do exist. Five separate
research projects are listed in Table 1 (Gibson, Khera, McBride, Hen-
drickx, and Tyl). The first (Gibson) was sponsored and conducted by
Merrell. The second (Khera) was done to explore the teratogenicity of
pyridoxine; it did not directly involve Bendectin. The third (McBride)
was independent. Hendrickx's work began independently, but the re-
search reported in the second 1985 article was funded by Merrell. 167
Tyl's study, the largest and most sophisticated in vivo study to date, was
undertaken by the National Toxicology Program at the specific request
of the FDA's Bureau of Drugs.168 Given the fact that MerreU was, by
far, more interested in such research than any other entity, its decision to
drop Bendectin naturally led to a decrease in animal studies of the drug's
teratogenicity.
If those not involved in the litigation had little interest in new re-
search, neither did the parties themselves have strong incentives to con-
duct new studies. Once litigation began, Merrell's incentive to continue
its own research was substantially diminished. New studies done by
Merrell scientists in Merrell laboratories were, from the company's point
of view, a lose-lose proposition. If they showed an effect, the studies
would be used against the company in subsequent litigation. If they
failed to show an effect, their persuasiveness would be seriously limited
by the fact that Merrell had conducted them. Any slight technical flaw
in the design or execution of the experiment would be exploited by plain-
tiffs to undermine Merrell's findings. 169 A similar analysis would apply
to research funded by Merrell, especially if it was conducted by someone
who had previously testified on the firm's behalf.170
167. Hendrickx, supra note 161, at 194.
168. Tyl, supra note 155, at 540.
169. Typically, this has happened with earlier Merrell animal studies. See In Re Bendec-
tin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 318 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied sub nom. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). In more recent trials, Merrell has relied much less on
its own animal or epidemiological studies, in part because it then does not have to defend
them. For example, in Hagaman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, No. 84-2202-5, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6124 (D. Kan. Jun. 26, 1987), Merrell moved to exclude the videotape deposition
of Isalene Smock, whose testimony cast doubt on an early Merrell epidemiological study. The
court granted the motion, stating: "In their brief, plaintiffs indicate that this deposition will be
offered because defendant relies heavily upon the Bunde-Bowles study. Defendant has indi-
cated that it does not intend to rely upon the study at trial. Accordingly, the court cannot find
any relevance in showing the videotape to the jury." Ido at *28.
170. The most noteworthy example of this problem in the Bendectin Cases arose with
respect to the epidemiological research done by Professor Richard Smithells for Merrell.
Plaintiffs were able to obtain a letter from Professor Smithells to Dr. Mark Hoekenga, an
January 1992] MASS TORTS
In this respect it is interesting to note that while the Hendrickx
study, which was funded by Merrell, did involve some risk of an adverse
finding, from the firm's perspective it had the benefit that it was con-
ducted by a non-Merrell employee who had previously concluded
Bendectin causes heart defects in monkeys. Merrell thus could hope to
make effective use of a negative finding in court. Even so, the researchers
used a double-blind design so as to minimize the potential that the study
might appear biased. 171 Even this strategy, however, did not shield Mer-
rell from the suggestion that because they funded the study its results
were suspect. 172
employee of Merrell, in which Smithells reports that he is attempting to publish findings
favorable to Merrell and asks Merrell to support his research with sums up to £15,000. He
concludes his request by stating:
Much clearly depends on the value of publication to Merrell-National Labs. If it
may save the company large sums in Californian Court [sic] (which is rather what I
thought when we undertook the study) [Merrell] may feel magnanimous. If with
passage of time the study is of no great significance I can only regard the figure you
suggest as generous and welcome.
Letter from Richard W. Smithells, Professor of Pediatrics, to Mark T. Hoekenga, M.D. (Jan.
26, 1977) (on file with author).
171. Hendrickx, supra note 161, at 191.
172. The first Hendrickx study had found that when fetuses from three species were sacri-
ficed after approximately two-thirds of their gestation period, those whose mothers had taken
Bendectin were more likely than those whose mothers had not to exhibit interventricular sep-
tal defect (the membrane separating the two sides of the heart, the septum, is not completely
closed). The second study, funded by Merrell, replicated the first study on one species but did
not sacrifice the fetuses until normal term. By then there was no apparent effect of Bendectin
exposure; apparently the membrane spontaneously closes by term. Id. at 194.
The following exchange took place between plaintiff's lawyer and plaintiff's expert,
Adrian Gross, with respect to the Hendrickx studies:
Q: All right. Let's talk about who pays for some of these things, then, Doctor.
Let's look at the Hendrickx study.
A: The first one was done under the sponsorship of the government with a grant
from the NIH.
Q: And the second one?
A: That was paid for by Merrell.
Q: Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 231. Have you seen this
before?
A: I think I have.
Q: Can you tell us what-whose letterhead it's on?
A: Merrell Research Center.
Q: Turn to the second page of that.
A: Yes, I have it.
Q: Is there a reference there to the Hendrickx study?
A: Yes.
Q: Hendrickx monkey study?
A: Right.
Q: The category is what?
A: Defense.
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It is not only the existence of litigation that alters the incentives to
conduct in vivo research; so too does the existence of a large body of
epidemiological data diminish the market for animal research. Inevita-
bly, the direct evidence on human effects provided by the epidemiological
evidence diminishes the demand for in vivo studies insofar as they are
designed to answer the question of whether a drug causes harm to
humans. Although there is considerable disagreement about the proper
role of in vivo studies in answering that question, many would agree they
are less probative than epidemiological evidence. As the following dis-
cussion shows, the Bendectin litigation and epidemiology eventually in-
teracted in a way that seriously undermined the worth of animal studies.
Increasingly, courts simply refused to rely on or even to admit in vivo
evidence. Considering the declining demand for in vivo research, it is not
surprising that the supply has been limited.
(3) Epidemiological Studies
The epidemiological evidence stands at the center of the Bendectin
cases. As noted earlier, a number of judges and scientists have argued
that a coherent body of epidemiological evidence trumps other
information. 173
a. Background
I have found and examined thirty-nine published epidemiological
studies that discuss Bendectin. 174 Table 2175 summarizes these studies. 176
Q: Defense. How much in thousands-
A: How much money?
Q: Is it listed there? Would you read that?
A: 200 and-excuse me. Let me get my eye helper here. 248.5.
Q: In thousands?
A: Yes.
Q: That's just phase one, though, isn't it, Doctor?
A: I'm sorry.
Q: That's just phase one of the study, isn't it?
A: Yes. Phase two was-
Q: What about phase two?
A: $60,000.
Q: So over $300,000 for defense?
A: Yes, that's true.
Trial Transcript at 54-55, Havner v. Merrell Dow, Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 41 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 1134 (D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1991).
173. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
174. These studies were found by reading Bendectin trial transcripts and exhibits, search-
ing for articles on Bendectin in MEDLINE, a CD/ROM index to medical publications and
periodicals, and collecting the references cited in each discovered article.
175. Table 2 is found in appendix A.
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In this section, I briefly discuss the epidemiological findings on Bendectin
and then examine how the research changed over time.
What do these studies show concerning the teratogenic effects of
Bendectin? Needless to say, much of the litigation in this and other drug
cases centers on varying interpretations of the epidemiological find-
ings.177 However, as with the in vivo studies, two summary facts are
worth reporting: (1) the authors' conclusions about the drug; and (2)
whether the study contains any objective indication that Bendectin has
adverse effects.
In no study did the authors clearly conclude that Bendectin does
have teratogenic effects. In six studies, the authors report at least one
significant correlation between Bendectin and some adverse effect and
conclude that while their findings alone are insufficient to support an at-
tribution of causation, one may exist. 178 In the remaining thirty-three
studies, the authors either draw no conclusion or conclude that there is
no statistical relationship.
Apart from the author's own conclusions, a second measure of
Bendectin's effect is the odds ratio or the relative risk reported in the
study. 179 For each study, I have attempted to extract the "most impor-
tant" odds ratio or relative risk.180 Either by using the statistic reported
176. Three known studies have been excluded from Table 2. One, M.M. Adams & J.
Mulinare, A Case-Control Study of Bendectin and Ventricular Special Defects (Abstract), 31
TERATOLOGY 61A (1985), is a brief abstract, and lacks sufficient information to be coded. The
authors report that they found three ingredient Bendectin to be correlated with a nonsignifi-
cant increased incidence of birth defects, but that the two ingredient version was significantly
related to a decrease in defects. No explanation is offered for this seemingly contradictory
finding. Another study, Robert L. Brent, Bendectin and Interventricular Septal Defects, 32
TERATOLOGY 317 (1985), does report some data comparing Bendectin sales over time with the
number of reported ventricular septal defects. However, this publication is primarily an edito-
rial discussing Hendrickx's monkey studies. A third study, Leslie L. Robinson et al., Maternal
Drug Use and Risk of Childhood Nonlymphoblastic Leukemia Among Offspring, 63 CANCER
1904 (1989), is excluded because it does not concern birth defects. It does report a relative risk
of 1.75 associated with the use of Bendectin or other morning sickness medication (P = 0.06),
and also indicates a significant elevation in risk associated with increased duration of usage.
Id. at 1906.
177. In a later paper, I will discuss the ways in which attorneys and experts for both
Merrell and plaintiffs interpreted the data.
178. The six studies are numbered 16, 23, 25, 26, 29, and 33 in Table 2. (A list relating the
number to a particular database appears in Appendix E.) Eskenazi and Bracken come closest
to saying Bendectin is a teratogen. They conclude that "these data suggest that the material
use of Bendectin is strongly associated with the occurrence of pyloric stenosis in the infant.
Whether this is a direct causal relationship is unclear." Brenda Eskenazi & Michael Bracken,
Bendectin (Debendox) as a Risk Factor for Pyloric Stenosis, 144 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 919, 924 (1982).
179. For a description of these two measurements, see supra notes 127-28.
180. "Most important" is a slippery term. Where the study reports a significant correla-
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or by calculating an odds ratio based on the raw data published, it was
possible to extract one or both measures in twenty-six of the thirty-nine
studies. In general, odds ratios and relative risks are not strictly compa-
rable-either with each other or across studies. But one crude type of
comparison that can be made is whether the statistic is greater or less
than 1. An odds ratio or relative risk greater than one indicates that
children whose mothers took Bendectin are more likely to have suffered a
defect than those whose mothers did not. An odds ratio or relative risk
of less than one indicates the opposite. If Bendectin truly has no effect,
given a large number of equally valid studies, half should produce statis-
tics greater than one and half should result in measures of less than
one. 181 With regard to the twenty-six studies for which I was able to
extract a value, in thirteen the most important measure is greater than
one and in twelve it is less than one. One study reports a relative risk of
exactly one. 182
b. The Evolution of Bendectin's Epidemiological Research
While the aggregate findings of the studies are critical to the ulti-
mate disposition of the Bendectin Cases as a group, the key point for this
analysis is that the studies, like the case law, evolved over time. In the
early years, the epidemiological research tended to parallel the in vivo
research. A number of investigations were conducted in the early 1960s,
partly in response to the Thalidomide disaster. Then the epidemiological
research virtually ceased for a number of years. In the late 1970s, a
tion between Bendectin and an adverse effect, the odds ratio for that effect was coded as most
important. Where there was no significant finding, I calculated the odds ratio using the aggre-
gated data.
181. WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 192-204 (1963).
182. Very similar conclusions were drawn by Sheffield and Batagol in their review of the
data. They present either odds ratios or relative risks for a total of 22 case-control and cohort
studies. Of these, 11 had ratios below one and 11 had ratios above one. Leslie J. Sheffield &
Ron Batagol, The Creation of Therapeutic Orphans-Or, What Have We Learnt From the
Debendox Fiasco?, 143 MED. J. AuSTL. 143, 144 (1985).
Meta-analysis offers a more sophisticated and rigorous method of combining the findings
of many studies. See generally FREDERIC M. WOLF, META-ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE
METHODS FOR RESEARCH SYNTHESIS (1986). I am aware of only one published meta-analysis
of the Bendectin studies. See Thomas R. Einarson et al., A Method for Meta-Analysis of Epide-
miological Studies, 22 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARMACY 813 (1988). Einarson
et al. included 17 studies in a meta-analysis examining whether first-trimester Bendectin inges-
tion caused any birth defect. The overall odds ratio was calculated to be 1.01, X2 = 0.05, p =
.815. They also conducted separate meta-analyses for cohort and case control studies. For
cohort studies (N = 12) the ratio was 0.95, X = 0.66, p = .418. For case control studies (N
= 5) the ratio was 1.27, X2 = 2.71, p = 0.10. Id. at 820. The authors conclude that these
meta-analyses confirm previous subjective analyses that Bendectin is not associated with
human teratogenic outcomes. Id. at 822.
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number of new studies were published, although it is important to note
that most of them did not target Bendectin specifically. Rather, they
reported the results of broad epidemiological studies of drugs taken dur-
ing pregnancy, including Bendectin and its constituent ingredients.
A turning point in the epidemiological research occurred in 1979
with the publication of the first article suggesting an association of
Bendectin with birth defects.183 The study was important for several rea-
sons: It was published in one of the leading American journals on epide-
miology; the analysis was relatively sophisticated; and the senior author,
Kenneth Rothman, was a professor in the Department of Epidemiology
in the Harvard School of Public Health. With the publication of the
Rothman study, Bendectin, like Thalidomide and MER/29 before it, be-
came epidemiologically suspect.
To demonstrate the importance of the Rothman study, I have coded
the thirty-nine studies as either pre- or post-1979; the results are con-
tained in Table 3.184 As the table indicates, prior to 1979 most of the
studies focused on teratogenicity in general, not Bendectin in particular.
The Rothman finding, plus the emerging litigation concerning Bendectin,
generated study after study of this particular drug. With this increased
focus came an increase in the sophistication and the power of the studies.
c. The Increase in Statistical Sophistication and Power
Table 4185 indicates that studies rarely reported more than a basic
Chi-square statistic prior to 1980, but uniformly began to report more
after that date. Most importantly, they began to report confidence inter-
vals for estimates and started to control for other factors through the use
of multiple regression techniques, most frequently logistic regression.
18 6
As time passed, the power of individual studies also increased. The
power of a study is its ability to detect a difference of some given
magnitude.
Epidemiological studies, like all statistical analyses, are vulnerable
to two types of errors. Type I errors occur if we reject the null hypothe-
sis when in fact it is true. In terms of this discussion, we would conclude
Bendectin causes birth defects when in fact it does not. Scientists, being
conservative, generally try to minimize Type I errors; that is, they de-
183. See Kenneth Rothman et al., Exogenous Hormones and Other Drug Exposures of
Children with Congenital Heart Disease, 109 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 433, 435 (1979).
184. Table 3 is found in appendix A.
185. Table 4 is found in appendix A.
186. See generally JOHN ALDRICH & FORREST NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT
AND PROBIT MODELS (1984).
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cline to find a causal relationship unless it is unlikely that the observed
results occurred by chance.
Traditionally and typically, the null hypothesis will not be rejected
unless the probability that a result occurred by chance is less than one in
twenty, or sometimes less than one in one-hundred. The Greek letter
Alpha is by custom used to designate this criterion. In other words, if the
probability of a result occurring by chance must be less than one in
twenty, Alpha must be less than .05.
Type II errors occur if we fail to reject the null hypothesis when in
fact it is false. In terms of this discussion, we would conclude that
Bendectin does not have a teratogenic effect when in fact it does. Science
has traditionally been less concerned with this type of error. Neverthe-
less, we would like to minimize the probability of this error (by custom
designated as Beta) as well. From the plaintiff's point of view, reducing
Type II errors is at least as important as reducing Type I errors. The
probability that we will reject the null hypothesis when some specific al-
ternative hypothesis is true is called the power of the test, and is equal to
1 minus Beta.
Given some level of Alpha, Beta is a function of several factors, one
of the most important being the sample size of treatment and control
groups. Ceteris paribus, the larger the sample the lower the Beta value.
It is thus worth investigating whether sample sizes increased substan-
tially before or after the Rothman study. However, in examining relative
sample size it is necessary to distinguish between cohort and case-control
studies. Because the power of a given test is contingent upon the sample
size of both the treatment and control groups, case-control studies can
achieve low Betas with much smaller samples than can cohort studies.
This is the case because birth defects are relatively rare in the population.
Thus, cohort studies exploring rare events require a large number of total
cases in order to obtain a significant number of individuals who have
experienced an injury. Case-control studies begin with a large number of
injuries, and thus need far fewer cases.
For example, assume that some birth defect occurs in 1 out of 1000
cases among children who were not exposed to Bendectin, and that 50%
of all prospective mothers take Bendectin during their pregnancy. If we
set Alpha at .05, in order to be able to detect a relative risk of 2.0 among
the children of Bendectin takers 90% of the time (Beta = .10) we would
need an N of 177 in a case-control study, but we would need an N of
31,444 in a cohort study. If we wished to detect a relative risk of 1.2
90% of the time, the case-control N would have to be 2535, while the
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Cohort study N would be an enormous 576,732 cases. 187 Consequently,
in examining sample sizes before and after 1979, it is important to distin-
guish between cohort and case-control studies. Within the Bendectin ep-
idemiological research, was there an increase in Ns in either type of study
or a shift from cohort to case-control studies?
The answer is that, while sample sizes did not change, the types of
studies did. There has been a trend toward relatively more case-control
studies after 1979 (38% before, 48% after). Moreover, the nature of the
case-control studies has changed substantially. I have coded each case-
control study for the nature of the cases, that is the type of defect they
represented. Early studies adopted a shotgun approach, in which the
cases were any type of birth defect. Three of the five case-control studies
conducted before 1979 were of this type. After 1979, however, the case-
control studies tended to test for specific types of birth defects. Of the
ten post-Rothman case-control studies, seven tested whether Bendectin
caused one or more specific defects. 188 Two looked for congenital heart
defects-the type of defect correlated with Bendectin in the Rothman
study. 189 One looked for pyloric stenosis. 190 Four studies examined the
187. On the other hand, if a phenomenon occurs frequently in the population, the relative
advantage of case-control studies is essentially eliminated. If a defect occurs in one out of ten
cases in the population, using the same assumptions as in the text, we would still need an N of
177 to detect a two-fold increase in relative risk 90% of the time in a case-control study. On
the other hand, to have the same probability of detecting this effect in a cohort study we would
need an N of only 266, not 31,433. KAHN, supra note 128, at 54.
188. The seven are: Jose Cordero et al., Is Bendectin a Teratogen?, 245 JAMA 2307
(1981); Diana Elbourne et al., Debendox Revisited, 92 BRrr. J. OBSTETRIcS & GYNAECOLOGY
780 (1985); J.S. Vivian Golding & J.A. Baldwin, Maternal Anti-nauseants and Clefts of Lip
and Palate, 1983 HUMAN ToxICOLOGY 63; Janet McCredie et al., Doxylamine/dicyclominel
pyridoxine and CongenitalLimb Defects, 140 MED. J. Ausm. 525 (1984); Allen Mitchell et al.,
Birth Defects Related to Bendectin Use in Pregnancy: L Oral Clefts and Cardiac Defects, 245
JAMA 2311 (1981) [hereinafter Mitchell et al., Bendectin 1]; Allen Mitchell et al., Birth De-
fects in Relation to Bendectin Use in Pregnancy: I1 Pyloric Stenosis, 147 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 737 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell et al., Bendectin I1]; Sally Zierler & Kenneth
Rothman, Congenital Heart Disease in Relation to Maternal Use of Bendectin and Other Drugs
in Early Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 347 (1985).
The most recent case control study, David J. Erickson, Risk Factors for Birth Defects
Data From the Atlanta Birth Defects Case-Control Study, 43 TERATOLOGY 41, 43-44 (1991),
does not report data for specific defects and, therefore, was not counted among the seven that
report on specific defects. It should be noted, however, that the author of the study offers to
send cross-tabulations reporting the relationship of Bendectin to 92 types of birth defects to
anyone who requests the information. Id. at 41.
189. See Mitchell et al., Bendectin I supra note 188; Zierler & Rothman, supra note 188.
190. This study, by Mitchell et al., failed to replicate the results of the study by Eskenazi et
al., in which the authors found a significant correlation between Bendectin and pyloric steno-
sis. See Mitchell et al., Bendectin II, supra note 188, at 741 (comparing the two studies).
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effect of Bendectin use on oral clefts, 191 and two looked for limb
defects. 1
92
This trend toward focused case-control studies makes sense.
Known teratogens tend to produce certain types of defects. 193 Thus, if
Bendectin were a teratogen, it would be unlikely to produce a similar
increase in all types of defects. Moreover, these focused studies also al-
lowed for relatively powerful analyses. With case sample sizes ranging
from the 90s to over 300194 they were unlikely to miss an effect if expo-
sure created a relative risk of 2 or greater. 195
In sum, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the quantity and qual-
ity of the epidemiological evidence on Bendectin improved dramatically.
The research focused on the drug and used increasingly sophisticated
methods to control for confounding factors. Specifically, it used a combi-
nation of increased sample size, a shift to case-control studies, and a fo-
cus on particular types of defects to greatly increase the power of the
research. During this period, the probability of making either Type I or
Type II errors was significantly reduced.
d. The End of Research
Suddenly, in 1985 with nearly three dozen studies in print, epidemi-
ological research on Bendectin came to a virtual halt. 196 As noted ear-
lier, in vivo research experienced a similar, contemporaneous decline.
197
Figure 1 shows the number of in vivo and epidemiological studies pub-
lished each year from the early 1960s to the present.
191. See Cordero et al., supra note 188; Elbourne et al., supra note 188; Golding & Bald-
win, supra note 188; Mitchell et al., Bendectin , supra note 188.
192. See Cordero et al., supra note 188; MeCredie et al., supra note 188.
193. Robert Brent, Methods of Evaluating the Alleged Teratogenicity of Environmental
Agents, in TERATOGEN UPDATE: ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED BIRTH DEFECT RIsKS 199,
200-01 (John Sever & Robert Brent, eds. 1986); Shepard, supra note 119, at 223.
194. The number of cases-as distinguished from the number of controls-ranged from a
low of 93 in Elbourne et al., supra note 188, at 780, to a high of 325 in Mitchell et al., Bendec-
tin I, supra note 188, at 737. The number of controls was usually larger than the number of
cases, sometimes substantially so. For example, there were over 3000 controls in the first study
by Mitchell et al. Ido
195. The advantage case-control studies have in detecting rare effects is offset, however, by
the fact that these studies must match cases and controls based on some criteria. Inevitably
there is a question whether the matching failed to control for some confounding factor that
explains observed differences between the groups.
196. As far as I know, there is only one post-1985 epidemiologic study (Erickson) specifi-
cally focused on Bendectin. That study includes Bendectin among 105 exposure-risk factor
variables that have been thought to cause birth defects. Aggregating across all defects, the
odds ratio associated with Bendectin is 0.87. Erickson, supra note 188, at 46.
197. See infra app. A, tbl. 1.
January 1992] MASS TORTS
Figure 1
Published Bendectin Epidemiological
and In Vivo Studies, by Year
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The figure illustrates two phenomena. First, and most important, it
clearly shows that the science was driven by the law. The study of
Bendectin became a hot topic and substantial resources were mobilized
to study it. This mobilization can be understood at several levels. Be-
cause Bendectin was a hot topic, articles on the subject were relatively
likely to find their way into print.198 Careerist concerns may have caused
academics to select topics that would lead to publication in prestigious
journals. Moreover, the federal government, through the FDA, en-
couraged research by offering grants to fund the study of Bendectin's
effects. Finally, the Bendectin litigation itself generated research, as par-
ties encouraged and even funded work on Bendectin.' 99 Legal needs
gave shape and direction to the epidemiological study of teratogenic ef-
fects. The volume and sophistication of studies focusing specifically on
Bendectin was, in large part, the result of the litigation.
198. See Sackett, supra note 131, at 51.
199. Plaintiffs' expert witnesses conducted a number of reanalyses of both the in vivo and
epidemiological evidence. See, eg., Trial Transcript at 965-86, In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
"Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (MDL No. 486) (testi-
mony of Dr. Swann), aff'd sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). It does not appear, however, that any of this work was ever
published in a refereed journal.
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Second, Figure 1 demonstrates the relatively sudden cessation of
studies in the mid-1980s. Galanter's hypotheses about holistic effects can
be extended to explain the decline of scientific investigations as well as
case congregations. Because Bendectin was removed from the market in
1983, and because its sales had plummeted in the preceding year or two,
there eventually were no new data bases to exploit. By withdrawing the
product from the market Merrell created an epidemiological depletion
effect as well as the intended case depletion effect.
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the decline of Bendectin
studies entirely to depletion effects. Two other factors were also at work.
The scientific community seems to have reached something close to a
consensus concerning the drug. While no study can remove all residual
uncertainty regarding Bendectin's safety, if the drug is a teratogen, it is a
relatively mild one (having effects too subtle to be measured reliably with
existing techniques). As a result, many felt that Bendectin had been
overstudied. There arose the desire to ration Bendectin studies and save
limited resources to study other drugs. As Lewis Holmes notes in an
influential essay:
While we can always wish for more and better studies, two issues must
be borne in mind. First, well-designed and extensive epidemiologic
studies are expensive. Where will the funds to support these studies
come from in this period of limited funding? Second, in view of the
extensive data cited above on Bendectin and the limited data available
on many other commonly used drugs one can argue that well-designed
studies of other drugs would be of greater value to the public at this
time.2 o
(4) The Life Cycle of the Bendectin Science
The preceding analysis of the research regarding Bendectin demon-
strates that the science has followed a life cycle of its own. There was a
substantial mobilization of resources devoted to the study of Bendectin,
much of it apparently in response to the litigation and concomitant polit-
ical pressure. The quantity and quality of epidemiological research in-
creased dramatically in the 1980s, to the point where people like Holmes
concluded that we knew more about the teratogenic potential of this drug
200. Lewis B. Holmes, Teratogen Update: Bendectin, 27 TERATOLOGY 277, 280-81
(1983). Holmes, however, cannot be called a completely disinterested observer. In January
1983 Merrell Research Center provided Dr. Holmes with a grant of $147,318 to fund proposed
research on "The Use of Major and Minor Malformations to Evaluate the Putative Terato-
genic Effects of Bendectin." Letter from J.W. Newberne, Vice President, Drug Safety Assess-
ment at Merrell Research Center, to Ronald W. Lamont-Havers, Deputy to the General
Director for Research Policy and Administration, Massachusetts General Hospital (Jan. 27,
1983) (on file with the Houston Environmental Law Liability Program).
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than nearly any other. The extent of the epidemiological literature
stands in contrast to the paucity of in vivo studies. In part, this may be
understood as a consequence of the fact that there were few if any basic
science questions to be answered through the study of Bendectin, and as
a legal resource the in vivo studies were of increasingly little value in the
face of a mounting body of epidemiological evidence. In a sense, epide-
miology drove out animal studies.
Finally, in the mid-1980s came the end of new epidemiological stud-
ies as well. 20 1 The combination of depletion effects and an emerging sci-
entific consensus that if Bendectin has any teratogenic effects they are
virtually undetectable by existing methods together led to the cessation
of iesearch. The leading indicator, published scientific articles, had stabi-
lized at an essentially prodefendant conclusion. But while the science
was winding down, the law was just getting into full swing. It is to the
development of the law in this congregation of cases that this Article now
turns.
V. The Law
In this Part, I focus upon the legal aspects of the Bendectin congre-
gation. The first section examines the early stages of the life cycle,
describing plaintiffs' efforts to mobilize resources and the problems the
"first plaintiff" faces in a mass tort case. It also examines the defendant's
efforts to avoid early adverse precedents that would facilitate other plain-
tiffs' efforts in future cases. Finally, it notes the importance of the battle
in the early cases to establish the "going rate" for injuries.
The second section examines the flow of Bendectin filings and trials
over time. As we shall see, the number of filings grew through 1985, but
then collapsed in the aftermath of a defense victory in the Common Is-
sues Trial in Ohio.20 2 The number of trials, however, continued to grow
over the next two years, but then quickly began to diminish, and today
most litigation seems to be behind us. A depletion effect has in fact oc-
curred. As Galanter notes, however, depletion is not simply a product of
the underlying rate of injury. It is also a product of the legal experience
of a congregation of cases in court.20 3
201. Only one animal study and two epidemiological studies were published after 1985.
See infra app. A, tbls. 1, 2.
202. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212
(S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
203. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 388.
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The third section examines this experience. It turns away from the
behavior of the parties and concentrates on the behavior of the judiciary.
Of primary interest is the judiciary's efforts to ration legal resources. In
the Bendectin Cases, the judiciary's efforts have followed a two-part pro-
cess: first, the use of traditional consolidation devices; and second, the
willingness to make and act upon independent determinations regarding
the scientific evidence. As we shall see, in attempting to ration resources,
the courts are confronted with a dilemma: how are they to maximize
judicial efficiency without unduly subverting the interest of individual
plaintiffs in a full and fair trial of their lawsuits? Before addressing this
thorny problem, I turn to the early stages of Bendectin's legal life cycle.
A. Mobilization
When parties begin litigation concerning a new product, they start
without scientific or legal resources. The first task is to begin to mobilize
these resources. This difficult task falls disproportionately on the "first
plaintiff" who must connect an injury with a product, find a lawyer who
will represent her and then amass sufficient scientific evidence to prove
the product causes the injury in question.
(1) The "First Plaintiff" Problem
David Mekdeci, like many plaintiffs to follow, was born with a limb
defect; his consists of malformed and missing fingers and a missing pecto-
ral muscle.2°4 From the beginning, David and his parents faced many
aspects of the first plaintiff problem. No lawyer came knocking on the
Mekdeci's door asking to take their case. Instead, David's mother, Eliza-
beth Mekdeci, made extensive efforts' to discover possible causes of his
defects. After several years of talking to medical experts and reading
documents and government studies, she became convinced that one of
the drugs she had taken during pregnancy had caused David's injury.
Ultimately, she contacted Melvin Belli, a famous San Francisco plain-
tiff's personal injury lawyer, and persuaded him to take the case. He also
referred the Mekdecis to Florida counsel. As the case developed, based
on the time of ingestion and other evidence, the Mekdecis and their law-
yers focused most of their attention on Bendectin. 20 5 A complaint nam-
ing Merrell as defendant was filed on behalf of David and his parents in
204. This defect is commonly called Poland's Syndrome although plaintiffs' experts have
disagreed with this diagnosis.
205. Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 711 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983). Shortly before
the trial began, Mr. Belli informed the other counsel that he would not personally appear, and
left the local attorneys to try the lawsuit. Id. at 1516.
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June 1977. In January 1980, approximately five years after David's
birth, Mekdeci v. Merrell Natl Lab. went to trial in United States Dis-
trict Court in Orlando, Florida.
The trial lasted two months, and after three days of deliberation, the
jury reported itself to be "hopelessly deadlocked." 206 After receiving fur-
ther instructions from the court, it returned a verdict awarding the
"plaintiff" $20,000, the amount the parties had stipulated to as the par-
ent's medical expenses. The jury wrote "nothing" as the amount of com-
pensatory damages due David individually. 20 7 The plaintiffs sought a
new trial on the damages question only, but the trial judge declared the
jury's award to be a compromise verdict and ordered a new trial.28 The
jury's uncertainty, reflected in the apparent compromise verdict, also re-
flects another aspect of the first plaintiff problem: the difficulty of amas-
sing sufficient scientific evidence to prove the case.
Compared to plaintiffs, defendants generally have a substantial early
advantage. Their financial resources are much greater. They can hire
counsel who are experienced in the defense of defective pharmaceuticals
against personal injury claims and who are well connected to governmen-
tal agencies. They have ready access to nearly all the safety data con-
cerning their product. All these advantages inured to Merrell's benefit in
the Mekdeci case. The company committed unlimited resources to
Bendectin's defense, hiring Lawrence E. Walsh and the firm of Davis
Polk & Wardwell as defense counsel. Moreover, after its experiences
with Thalidomide and MER/29, Merrell probably had as much experi-
ence as any firm in defending prescription drugs in court.
Notwithstanding these advantages, defendants may be confronted
with some first case problems similar to those of the first plaintiff. The
defendant, too, must confront the relative lack of evidence and the con-
siderable uncertainty that permeates such early litigation. The defend-
ant's legal staff most likely is not yet organized to mount a defense of the
particular product. And if the firm is insured, the case might be turned
over to the insurer's counsel who may lack the familiarity with pharma-
206. Id. at 1515.
207. Id. at 1514.
208. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in ordering a new trial. Id. at 1515. Comments by jurors after the case seem to
support this position. The London Times quoted two of the Mekdeci jurors as to their feelings
about Judge Hoffman's new trial order. One juror, Grover Ashcraft, said "I resent him (Hoff-
man) saying that we didn't know what we were doing. He's giving us a black eye." Davin
Light, US Judge Orders Debendox Retrial, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 18, 1980, at 8.
But another juror, Cora Newtz, agreed with the order. She did not believe the evidence
against Bendectin was sufficient: "All my daughters took Bendectin all the time they were
pregnant, and all their children are perfect." Id.
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ceutical defense and ease of access to the safety data that the defendant
presumably enjoys. In sum, like plaintiffs, defendants do not begin with
any particular expertise in litigating the product's safety. Indeed, in the
earliest stages of mass tort litigation, the defendants may not even appre-
ciate that they have something out of the ordinary on their hands. The
first suit is not necessarily like the teacher's first occasion for sanctioning
a wayward student at the beginning of the school year. The parties may
not know that this is the first of a large congregation of cases. Bendectin
had been on the market for nearly twenty years when litigation began,
and at the time of the Mekdeci suit it had been nearly a decade since the
Thalidomide disaster. It might well not have been immediately obvious
to Merrell, upon the initial filing of the Mekdeci case, that this was the
first of a series of cases.
In the case of Bendectin, however, Merrell's appreciation that it
faced a potential tidal wave of litigation must have come very early on.
It recently had experienced the Thalidomide and MER/29 episodes and
must have known it was a suspect firm in the eyes of many, especially the
plaintiffs' personal injury bar. Perhaps the first clear signal that Mekdeci
would be the first of many was the hiring of Melvin Belli. Mr. Belli's
stock-in-trade is widespread publicity. Even before Mekdeci came to
trial, he was searching out additional potential clients.209 By the time of
the trial, the stakes were known to be high. Like the plaintiffs, however,
the defendant was hampered by a relative lack of hard evidence on the
teratogenicity of Bendectin.
The trial court's ruling that the first Mekdeci verdict was the result
of compromise led to a new trial in the Winter of 1981. This time, the
result was a jury verdict for the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed,
claiming, in part, that they had been afforded inadequate representation
by their counsel. The Mekdeci's attorneys had repeatedly attempted to
withdraw, apparently for a combination of reasons, including their belief
that the case was not strong on the facts, their lack of financial resources,
and the difficulty of working with Mrs. Mekdeci. 210
As this history suggests, part of the Mekdecis' problem was that
their counsel were poorly prepared and underfinanced. The local attor-
neys were relatively inexperienced in this type of litigation and knew lit-
tle about Bendectin. The solution to the Medkecis' first plaintiff
problems would have been to invest resources in discovery and experts in
order to develop the case.211 But the Mekdecis' counsel were always
209. See infra note 217.
210. Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1516-19.
211. Because of the inevitable costs of discovery and expert witnesses, substantial re-
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badly undercapitalized. Indeed, funds became so tight that much of the
second trial was tried on the record of the first trial, without the benefit
of live expert witnesses. Only a last minute infusion of $25,000 from Mr.
Belli kept the second trial going.212
The Mekdecis repeatedly stated to the trial judge that in spite of
these difficulties, they wanted the second trial to go forward with existing
counsel. On appeal, however, they argued that the trial court had erred
by refusing to grant requests for continuance. Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment below, leaving the
Mekdecis with the cold comfort that if they felt they had been inade-
quately represented, their remedy was a malpractice suit against their
attorneys, not a new Bendectin trial.2 13
Counsels' desire to withdraw from the Mekdeci case was not moti-
vated entirely by funding problems and the difficulty of working with
Mrs. Mekdeci. They were also drawn by the prospect of "better"
claims,2 14 especially claims where the specific causation question 215
sources are required to develop any products liability case. Drug cases typically are even more
expensive to litigate because of the volume and variety of information that must be assimilated,
including the substantial amount of material generated during the process of regulatory ap-
proval of the drug.
212. Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1519. The inability of an initial set of plaintiffs' attorneys to
fund mass tort litigation has occurred in other cases. In the Agent Orange litigation, the
original team of plaintiffs' counsel ran out of funds, and after brief negotiations, a new set of
lawyers took control of the plaintiff steering committee by investing $250,000 each in litigation
expenses. In total, the second set of attorneys put up almost $1.5 million. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 877, 901 (1987).
213. Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1523.
214. By looking for a "better" case than Mekdeci, the lawyers were behaving like "repeat
players," thinking of this particular case as only one of many. See Galanter, Limits of Legal
Change, supra note 19, at 100. In hindsight, their judgment that this was not the best case to
try first appears to have been correct.
215. The cause-in-fact question in many such mass tort situations can be divided into two
parts, general and specific causation. General causation addresses the question of whether the
substance is capable of causing any injury. Specific causation addresses the question of
whether a particular plaintiff's injury was caused by exposure to the drug or product. A sub-
stantial number of Bendectin plaintiffs have lost on the specific causation issue because they
have been unable to show that the mother took Bendectin during the critical period of fetal
development.
There is, however, a more fundamental specific causation question in the Bendectin cases.
If the relative risk of a Bendectin-induced birth defect is shown to be less than 2, then a
plaintiff presenting no other causal evidence than the ingestion of Bendectin could be said to
have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Bendectin caused the specific birth
defect. The specific causation problems posed by toxic tort and mass tort cases have produced
a large literature on how the courts ought to deal with this question. See Richard Delgado,
Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 881 (1982); Harris, supra note 138, at 909; Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation
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would be less troublesome-apparently Mrs. Mekdeci had taken a large
number of drugs during pregnancy. 216 The lawyers were also drawn to
the prospect of more claims and the possibility that they could mobilize a
large number of Bendectin cases.217 In this vein, the appellate court in
Mekdeci noted:
In a statement that perhaps shed more light than intended on the at-
torneys' motivations in the Mekdeci case, [plaintiff's attorney Allen]
Eaton recounted numerous problems in the Mekdeci lawsuit and said,
"that being the case, we have a group of people-a group of attorneys
who have agreed that, in order to start afresh and develop the issues
and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985); David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System," 97
HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risk, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990); Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and
Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1990); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Cui.-KENT L. REv. 407 (1987). Because courts have usually
found for Merrell on the general causation question, except for the "time of ingestion" cases,
the specific cause issue is not well developed in these cases.
216. Belli was quoted by the London Sunday Times as saying, "Our client is too demand-
ing and too hard to work with. Her's wasn't that good a case, and we want to get on with the
200 other Debendox cases we are preparing." Edward Burke, The Brawl Over Bendectin,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 1, 12.
217. An advertisement placed in the San Francisco Chronicle by Melvin Belli in January





We have a number of these cases and we are trying one now in Federal Court, Flor-
ida. We need your help for epidemiological and statistical purposes. If you have any
information, please call or write:
Melvin M. Belli, Belli Building
San Francisco, CA. 94111 (415) 981-1849
Id. at 1. The same article in the National Law Journal quotes Douglas Peters, a lawyer re-
tained by Mrs. Mekdeci to represent her against her previous lawyers, as saying:
Here you had a bunch of lawyers sensing a very big case and sitting down and divid-
ing up the pie before there was any pie to divide. Then after trumpeting the case and
gathering in excess of 100 other Bendectin cases, things began to go wrong and every-
body scrambled to cut their losses.
Id. at 12.
The rush to mobilize clients is a recurring feature of many mass tort cases. Similar efforts
have been noted in the Agent Orange, Bhopal, Dalkon Shield, and asbestos litigation. Coffee,
supra note 212, at 886. As Coffee notes, in each of these situations the normal relationship
between client and attorney is reversed. The attorney is no longer the agent of the client. The
mass tort plaintiff, even more than the ordinary tort plaintiff, confronts substantial "agency
costs" that make it very difficult to control plaintiffs' counsel. Id. at 885; John C. Coffee, Jr.
Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 624, 628 (1980). As
Mekdeci suggests, this problem is especially acute in the early stages of a mass tort when
counsel have particularly strong incentives to behave opportunistically, pursuing their own
agendas rather than that of the client.
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properly, that the Koller case in our opinion represents perhaps the
cleanest case of all the cases and the clearest one. We have a nurse
here who ingested Bendectin, and only Bendectin. She ingested it dur-
ing the critical period. And little Anne Koller has no arms and she has
only a left leg which has a club foot on it. We figure this was a clear
case in order to litigate the issues properly.2 18
As the preceding discussion indicates, when a potential mass tort
arises, plaintiffs' lawyers quickly organize. Plaintiff litigation networks
have played an increasingly important role in mass tort cases.21 9 Rhe-
ingold notes there have been networks in the following areas: Swine Flu;
Dalkon Shield; Agent Orange; MER/29; Birth Control Pills; Asbestos;
DES; Ford Transmission; and of course, Bendectin.22 0 Moreover, there
is a substantial benefit to being a leader of the litigation network; an ad-
vantage that apparently was recognized by counsel for the Mekdecis.22 1
As Rheingold notes, "A mere 5% of the recovery in the thousands of
cases filed, and to be filed, dance like sugar plums in the heads of lead
counsel-to-be. 2 2 2 The Mekdeci case, then, was plagued not only by a
lack of prior mobilization, but also by concurrent efforts to mobilize
other cases.
Following Mekdeci, the next case did not go to trial until three years
later, in the spring of 1983.223 Then there was a twenty-one month hia-
tus before the Common Issues Trial, about which I shall say more below.
Over that period of time, lawyers representing plaintiffs made progress
toward mobilizing resources and coordinating activities, driven in large
part by the coordination of discovery imposed by the federal judiciary
under the Multi-District Litigation Act.2
24
(2) Merrell's Preventive Efforts
After Mekdeci, only one additional case came to trial on its own
without being either swept into the unified multidistrict discovery in
218. Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 711 F.2d 1510, 1518 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Koller
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 80-1258 (D.D.C. Jan 25, 1983)). The Mekdecis' counsel
asked the Mekdecis to agree to a continuance of their case so that Koller could go to trial first.
The Mekdecis refused. Letter from Michael Green to Joseph Sanders (Jan. 5, 1991) (on file
with author); Michael D. Green, Bendectin: A Case Study in Mass Toxic Substances Litiga-
tion 60 (Oct. 29, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
219. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Story, supra note 62, at 123; see generally Paul D. Rhe-
ingold, The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
Rheingold, Litigation Groups].
220. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 219, at 14.
221. See the court's comments in Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1516.
222. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 219, at 3.
223. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. 1986).
224. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West Supp. 1991).
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Ohio or delayed while the Ohio case proceeded. The one other case,
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,225 went to trial in May
1983.226 The one month Oxendine trial resulted in a plaintiff's verdict
for $750,000. The trial judge granted judgment n.o.v. *(or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict) in favor of Merrell, finding the verdict to be
against the great weight of the evidence. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals reversed, saying this was an abuse of discretion, and rein-
stated the verdict.227 On remand, Merrell filed a motion for a new trial
on the ground that one of the plaintiff's experts, Dr. Done, had testified
falsely at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge granted the
motion in February 1988.228 In August 1989 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals again reversed, ruling that the trial judge erred in
granting a new trial and reinstated the original verdict. Defendant's peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was denied in 1990,229 presumably drawing
the case to a close seven years after it was tried. 230 Currently, Oxendine
225. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. 1986).
226. Ma at 113. As the comments of one of the Mekdecis' lawyers indicate, see supra text
accompanying note 218, in the early years of litigation many plaintiffs' lawyers looked to
Koller as the best test case, in part because, unlike Mekdeci, Koller presented no uncertainty as
to whether some other drug taken during pregnancy could have caused the injury. But as
previously noted, Mekdeci was tried first. And in the meantime, Oxendine arose quickly. It
was filed and resolved within a matter of months. Koller, on the other hand, became com-
pletely bogged down after the trial judge removed plaintiff's counsel because of allegations
(later retracted) by plaintiff's counsel's secretary that the plaintiff had lied in stating she had
taken Bendectin, and because counsel had shared with the press several DERs the judge had
ruled were inadmissible at trial. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated, 472 U.S. 424 (1985). Subsequent appeals of the actions took several years,
ending in the United States Supreme Court. See id By the time the issue was resolved, the
Bendectin Cases had matured and Koller was but a footnote. For a description of these events
see David Lauter, Plaintiffs' Firm Removed From Bendectin Lawsuit, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24,
1984, at 4; David Lauter, Bendectin Trial Disintegrates: Allegations of Misconduct Mar 'Per-
fect Case, ' NAT'L L.J., Feb. 21, 1983, at 1. In August 1990 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed a dismissal of the Kollers' case against Merrell. Koller v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 528 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 19, 1990),
cert denied, I IIS. Ct. 1391 (1991).
227. Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1114.
228. The original trial judge had recused himself subsequent to the reversal of his judg-
ment n.o.v. On remand, a new judge granted the motion for a new trial. Oxendine v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 563 A.2d 330, 332 (D.C. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1121 (1990).
229. Id
230. As of midsummer 1991, however, the plaintiff had still not been able to collect on the
judgment. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that the trial court may
not enter an enforceable and appealable "final judgment" on the compensatory damages claim
while the question of punitive damages still remains to be tried. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Oxendine, 593 A.2d 1023, 1023 (D.C. 1991).
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is one of only three verdicts against Merrell that has not been overturned
by a trial or appellate court.231
Merrell's relentless efforts to overturn the Oxendine verdict were
driven in part by its desire to avoid an adverse judgment. But the efforts
also reflect the fact that Oxendine does not stand alone, but rather as one
of the Bendectin cases. The stakes in these appeals reach far beyond
Oxendine itself. Merrell is a "repeat player" playing for rules and out-
comes in future cases. 232 Oxendine blemishes a near-perfect record of
defense outcomes. It singlehandedly serves as an incentive for plaintiffs
to continue to litigate while acting as an important barrier to Merrell's
efforts to obtain summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment n.o.v.
based on collateral estoppel-type arguments in future cases.23 3 Even if
231. The second is Raynor v. Richardson Merrell, No. 83-3506, 1987 WL 8518, at *1
(D.D.C. Mar. 5, 1987). In Raynor, a jury returned a verdict of $300,000 against Merrell in
May 1987. As of November 1991, Merrell's post-trial motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new
trial were still pending before the trial judge. Letter from Glenn Forrester to Joseph Sanders
(Oct. 19, 1990) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Barry Nace, Plaintiffs' Attor-
ney in Raynor (Dec. 9, 1991). Given the D.C. Circuit's opinions in Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussed infra notes 331-39), and Ealy v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990), it is diffi-
cult to imagine that, absent new evidence as to the teratogenicity of Bendectin, the Raynor
verdict can survive an appeal. (Ealy is discussed infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.)
The third surviving plaintiffs' verdict is Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 41
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 1134 (D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1991). In September 1991
a jury in Corpus Christi, Texas returned a verdict for $3.75 million in compensatory and $30
million in punitive damages. Merrell has announced its intention to appeal. Id. As yet, there
is no appellate opinion in the case. Id
In addition to these three cases, there is a plaintiff's verdict in Blum v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 560 A.2d 212 (1989), that was overturned by a middle level appellate
court in Pennsylvania on the ground that the verdict was returned by an 11 person jury in
violation of the Pennsylvania constitution. Id The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted
an appeal, 590 A.2d 755 (1991), but as yet, there is no opinion.
232. See Galanter, supra note 19, at 99-100.
233. Collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) prevents a party from relitigating in a subse-
quent action one or more issues that have already been adjudicated. For collateral estoppel to
apply, an issue practically identical to the issue in the current action must have been fully and
fairly litigated in the original action, it must have been actually decided, and it must have been
necessary to the outcome of the litigation. 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1225 (2d ed. 1990). All of these criteria are typically
met with respect to the general causation issue in the Bendectin cases.
Traditionally, mutuality had to exist for collateral estoppel to apply; that is, both parties
had to be bound by the prior decision. However, mutuality is no longer always necessary. In
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court gave qualified ap-
proval to offensive, nonmutual estoppel. Id at 322. Offensive collateral estoppel is used by
plaintiffs who attempt to prevent a defendant from denying liability. In at least two cases, In re
Bendectin Products Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 (6th Cir. 1984), and Raynor v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986), Bendectin plaintiffs have attempted to use
offensive collateral estoppel (or summary judgment under a collateral estoppel-like analysis)
based on Oxendine. In each case the court refused, noting in Raynor that using offensive
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most cases are successfully defended, an occasional plaintiff success will
encourage other suits. Even a high batting average may spell doom for
the defendant. The General Counsel for one pharmaceutical company is
quoted as saying:
Even if we win almost every case against us, the few verdicts we lose
engender more suits, and make all the other suits more expensive and
more difficult to settle .... There has to come a point with a particular
product, even a good product, where you say, that's enough, and you
get out of the market.234
As the quote suggests, because Oxendine offers some hope for future
plaintiff victories, it also influences the settlement value of other cases. 235
It is clearly in the interest of the defendant to suppress settlement value
as much as possible. This is especially true in dealing with a congrega-
tion of cases. Evidence from the MER/29236 and asbestos cases237 sug-
gests that as a congregation matures, the settlement value can steadily
increase unless the defendant is uniformly successful. Rheingold reports
that for a "typical MER/29 case" settlements rose from approximately
$25,000 in the early period, to $75,000 in the mid-period, to $125,700
near the end.238 Adverse verdicts played an important role in this in-
crease. Merrell won most of the early cases in 1964 and 1965, but plain-
collateral estoppel would be particularly unfair to the defendant when there were inconsistent
jury verdicts outstanding. Raynor, 643 F. Supp. at 246.
Merrell, of course, has tried to invoke defensive collateral estoppel in numerous cases.
Parklane, however, says that collateral estoppel is inappropriate when there is "a series of
cases with inconsistent judgments." Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330. On the basis of this language,
Judge Rubin rejected Merrell's invocation of collateral estoppel in the Michigan Consolidated
Trial partly because of the Oxendine verdict. In re Bendectin Products, No. 85-0996, 1986
WL 20466, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 2, 1986).
Even if Oxendine did not exist, Merrell's use of defensive collateral estoppel would still
face formidable barriers, as most courts would probably conclude that the plaintiff had not
been given a full and fair chance to litigate the issue. See In re Bendectin Products Liab. Litig.,
732 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1990). Still, Merrell's chances of obtaining summary judg-
ment based on arguments that echo collateral estoppel would be better were it not for Ox-
endine. See Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l.Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1193 (Ist Cir. 1987) (defendant not
allowed to invoke defensive collateral estoppel where plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation had
been allowed to withdraw without forfeiting any rights after discovery and before trial).
234. Tamir Lewin, Pharmaceutical Companies Are Hardest Hit, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 10,
1985, § 3, at 1, quoted in Galanter, supra note 8, at 381.
235. The Oxendine verdict must have influenced Merrell's settlement offer in the consoli-
dated multidistrict action in Ohio, discussed infra notes 255-300 and accompanying text.
236. See Rheingold, supra note 62, at 137.
237. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL 265 (1985).
238. He defines a "typical case" as involving a man under 60 with no earnings loss, only
slight medical expenses, and strong medical proof of cataracts and hair and skin change. Rhe-
ingold, The MER129 Story, supra note 62, at 137.
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tiffs won several in 1966 and 1967.239 It seems apparent that these
victories increased the value of untried cases. 240
There is a final reason Merrell continues to fight the Oxendine ver-
dict. They may have come to believe, based on the outcome of more
recent cases, that a new trial based on the evidence available at the begin-
ning of the 1990s would result in a judgment for the defense. This cir-
cumstance reflects how Oxendine, like Mekdeci, presented Merrell with a
"first case" problem. Inevitably, if mass tort cases are tried while science
is still developing, early cases will be tried on different, less well devel-
oped facts than later ones. Nearly as inevitably, this will benefit one
party or the other. In the Bendectin cases, the plaintiffs appear to have
had the early advantage. By using every available means to obtain a new
trial in Oxendine, the defendant has sought to erase this advantage.
239. As of 1967, 11 cases had gone to trial. IaL at 133. A Westlaw search in Spring 1990,
using MER/29 as the search criterion, failed to discover any additional trials that resulted in
appellate opinions. The most recent case for which there is an appellate opinion is Martinez-
Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980). Not
surprisingly, the appeal concerned the statute of limitations. Id. at 318, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
240. Punitive damages also played a role in the settlement value of the MER/29 cases.
Because compensatory damages tended to be relatively small and because of Merrell's failure
to disclose information to the FDA, the litigation efforts were driven by the desire to obtain
punitive damages. While the plaintiffs were awarded punitives in only three cases (all three of
which were reduced or overturned on appeal), these awards drove up the settlement value of
other cases. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story, supra note 62, at 138. Rheingold cites two other
factors as having influenced the size of MER/29 settlements. First, the earliest cases that went
to trial or were settled were those in rural areas and smaller states where the expected value of
cases was lower. Id. at 132. Second, there were differences in the quality of plaintiffs' counsel.
Early in the litigation 33 attorneys representing MER/29 plaintiffs formed the MER/29
Group, whose purpose it was to disseminate information about ongoing litigation, to hire ex-
pert consultants and to conduct joint preparation of cases, primarily through a shared discov-
ery effort. Eventually 288 attorneys and firms joined the Group. Among the packages of
materials distributed by the Group were transcripts of previous trials, key documents that had
been discovered from Merrell files, depositions, and a "trial package" with suggested examina-
tion questions and examples of motions and briefs used in earlier trials. Id. at 123-24. Accord-
ing to Rheingold, attorneys who were not members of the Group made worse settlements than
attorneys who had the advantages of the Group's resources. Id. at 138. It is worth noting that
this effect carries over to the litigated cases; plaintiffs who lost earlier cases were disproportion-
ately represented by attorneys who were not members of the MER/29 Group.
The MER/29 settlement experience supports McGovern's "cyclical theory," see supra
note 42, at least in its early stages. Plaintiffs' counsel slowly developed information and strate-
gies that eventually allowed them to win most litigated cases. Coincidentally, this point was
reached at approximately the same time that Merrell's insurance was exhausted. This caused
Merrell to take over its own defense and actively seek settlement of all pending cases. Id. at
140. The number of cases rather quickly declined as depletion effects, accelerated by the stat-
ute of limitations, exhausted the number of potential cases. As we shall see, the Bendectin
cases had a different fate.
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B. The Caseload and Trial Load
Mekdeci and Oxendine marked the beginning of over a decade of
litigation concerning Bendectin. For a while, they appeared to be just the
beginning. Filings rose dramatically in the early 1980s, but then col-
lapsed. After the Common Issues Trial. Table 5241 presents the Bendec-
tin-related case filings in state and federal courts from 1977 to 1988.242
Bendectin trials have followed a pattern similar to case filings.
Through December 1991 there had been approximately thirty trials, in-
cluding two German cases, one Italian case, and several consolidated tri-
als-by far the most important being the Common Issues Trial in the
Southern District of Ohio which consolidated 818 cases, some involving
multiple plaintiffs. 243 All but a handful of the cases have been tried in
the federal courts, most removed there by the defendant under diversity
jurisdiction. Table 6244 reports on trials by year.245
There were two trials in 1985, eight in 1986, and eleven in 1987;
then the number of trials collapsed. While a few cases are still pending,
the stock of active potential cases is disappearing, due, in part, to Mer-
rell's aggressive efforts to bring litigation to a close. 246
241. Table 5 is found in Appendix A.
242. GAO, "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" QUESTIONED, supra note 87, at 35. In the table,
any case originally filed in state court, but removed to federal court is counted twice. Between
1977 and 1986 there were 261 such cases. If the double counting is eliminated, there were
1648 filings between 1977 and 1986. Merrell reports that as of mid-1989 there were a total of
1696 child plaintiff cases. See supra text accompanying note 86. Between 1974 and 1986 the
Bendectin cases constituted approximately 1.7% of the total products liability filings in the
federal courts. Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six" The Federal Courts Since
the Good Old Days, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 921, 941 [hereinafter Galanter, Life and Times of the
Big Six]. See TERRY DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LrrI-
GATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 41 (1988). By way of comparison, the enormous As-
bestos congregation comprised approximately 6.4% of all civil filings in federal courts in 1990.
19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 287 (Mar. 15, 1991).
243. The 30 trial figure includes a trial in Corpus Christi, Texas in September 1991 (Hav-
ner v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 41 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 1134 (D.
Tex. Oct. 11, 1991).
244. Table 6 is found in Appendix A.
245. The table reports every trial, including retrials of the same case, such as occurred in
Mekdeci. Because some cases are counted twice, and because some trials are consolidated
trials of a number of individual cases, the number does not accurately reflect the number of
cases that have actually gone to trial.
246. For instance, one of the most important recently-outstanding cases was a multi-plain-
tiff case in Michigan before Judge Rubin (who had presided over the Ohio Common Issues
Trial). In October 1989 Merrell filed a motion for summary judgment on the causation ques-
tion and also filed case-specific motions based on statute of limitations, lack of ingestion, or
timing of ingestion defenses in approximately 20 cases. Merrell also moved for discovery sanc-
tions because over half the plaintiffs had failed to respond to discovery requests. While many
of these motions were granted, Judge Rubin denied Merrell's motion for a summary judgment
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The key events in Bendectin's trial history are not difficult to spot.
The partial success in Mekdeci and the plaintiff's verdict in Oxendine
were followed by a dramatic rise in filings over the next several years.
Due to the common discovery procedures discussed below, however,
there were no further trials until 1985. The next trial after Oxendine, the
Common Issues Trial in Winter 1985 in the Southern District of Ohio,
was the single most important trial in the Bendectin litigation. The case
ultimately involved ovev 800 plaintiffs, and resulted in a defense verdict
on the question of whether Bendectin was a teratogen. As a consequence
of this verdict, new filings collapsed. However, the number of trials,
functioning as a lagging indicator of events, continued to rise for two
years before trials also began to decline in frequency. The relationship of
filings and trials through the 1980s is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2
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in January 1990. Merrell moved for reconsideration of the motion and a hearing was held in
March 1990. At that time, Judge Rubin proposed a mini-trial to ascertain whether the testi-
mony proffered by plaintiffs in opposition to the summary judgment motion would be admissi-
ble. Transcript of Proceedings at 22-23, In Re Bendectin Litig., No. 85-0996, 1986 WL 20466
(E.D. Mich. May 2, 1986) (Hearing on Motion). One possible interpretation of the judge's
statements at the hearing is that he was likely to hold the animal studies inadmissible. See id.
at 3. Within a few weeks of the hearing the remaining plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their cases
without prejudice. They have three years to refile. Letter from W. Glenn Forrester, attorney
for Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., to Joseph Sanders (Oct. 18, 1990) (on file with author).
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The full extent to which trials can be viewed as lagging indicators in
the Bendectin cases is further demonstrated in Figure 3. It presents the
number of in vivo and epidemiological studies published and the number
of trials begun in different time periods from 1962 to 1991. For the pe-
riod covered in this figure, 94% (47/50) of all in vivo and epidemiological
studies were published before 80% (24/30) of the trials had begun.
Figure 3
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Importantly, in the Bendectin Cases the declining number of filings
and trials has not been primarily a result of the exhaustion of potential
claims. A number of leading plaintiffs' attorneys, including Barry Nace
and Thomas Bleakley, took their cases out of the Common Issues Trial
and were prepared to proceed separately.2 47 In addition, there are many
potential plaintiffs who have not entered the fray. Estimates made at the
time of the Common Issues Trial were that the total number of Bendectin
247. In fact, most of the subsequent Bendectin litigation involved these cases. For these
cases, the impact of the outcome in the Common Issues Trial was indirect. As I shall discuss
below, the defense verdict in the Common Issues Trial was an important factor in the judicial
willingness to direct verdicts and enter judgment n.o.v. in later cases. See infra text accompa-
nying note 309-10.
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filings ultimately would be in the 15,000 range. These estimates were
based on relatively conservative estimates as to what percentage of poten-
tial plaintiffs (children with birth defects whose mothers had taken
Bendectin during a critical period of their pregnancy) would in fact raise
claims.248 The fact that far fewer cases have been ified is a consequence
of the lack of plaintiff success in the cases that have been tried. Funda-
mentally, the process has been one of judicial rationing of access to the
courts, beginning with the discovery and trial in Ohio.
C. Rationing Law
In the Bendectin Cases, the rationing process has occurred in two
stages: first, through the use of traditional procedural techniques to con-
serve judicial resources; second, through increasingly aggressive judicial
management of cases. In the following sections, I discuss these strategies
in turn.
(1) Procedural Rationing
Faced with the stunning volume of cases presented by mass torts
and the time it would take to try each case separately, commentators
have suggested various ways to expedite proceedings through the in-
creased use of mass discovery and mass trials.249 Several devices, includ-
ing the Multi-District Litigation Act,250 class actions under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 23"),251 and consolidation of
cases for trial under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rule 42") have been used in the Bendectin Cases. All of these propos-
248. Report of the Guardian Ad Litem at 6, In re "Bendectin" prods. Liab. Litig., 102
F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
249. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1039 (1986); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts:
Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); Rosenberg, supra note
215, at 849; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986); Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases:
Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 167 (1985); but see Roger Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent,
1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69 [hereinafter Trangsrud, Mass Trials].
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976); see DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LrrGATION: HAN-
DLING CASES BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1979). For an
analysis of the statute's impact on plaintiffs and defendants see Susan Olson, Federal Multidis-
trict Litigation: Its Impact on Litigants, 13 JUST. Sys. J. 341 (1988-89). In 1989 the MDL
Panel reported that since its inception in 1968 it had centralized 17,093 civil actions for pre-
trial proceedings. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 6-7 (1989).
251. See Mullenix, supra note 249, at 1045-46.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
als and devices are justified by their proponents on the basis of the ineffi-
ciency and costs involved in single plaintiff litigation.252 Whether or not
there in fact are large savings to be gained by using these devices is, to
some extent, an open question.253 What is clear is that these devices can
save a substantial amount of judicial time, and that judges will explore
various procedural devices that allow them to avoid spending months
and even years litigating a group of mass tort cases one at a time.25 4 For
example, Judge Rubin, the trial judge in the Common Issues Trial, calcu-
lated that the trial of all 1100 then existing Bendectin cases would take
182 judge years.25 5 Trying even 5% of the cases would consume over
nine judge years. It is not surprising, therefore, that the judiciary, espe-
cially at the trial court level, searches for ways to ration judicial re-
sources. The Bendectin Cases reflect this phenomenon.
Because the Common Issues Trial so aptly demonstrates coordina-
tion and rationing in mass torts, it is worth discussing in some depth.
The trial was the direct result of the consolidation of cases under Rule 42
and the transfer of cases to Ohio under the Multi-District Litigation Act
("Act" or "MDL statute").
The Act is a fundamental tool in the federal judiciary's efforts to
force coordination on parties. As a byproduct, it facilitates the mobiliza-
tion of plaintiffs' groups. The MDL statute was enacted in 1968. It calls
for the creation of a seven member Judicial Panel on Multi-District Liti-
gation ("Panel"). The members are United States District Court or
252. It has been said that mass tort cases lead to an exponential growth in transaction
costs as the number of parties increases. Richard Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics
of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 477 (1984). Whether this is in fact true for all
mass torts is debatable. It is distinct from the question whether savings can be realized by
consolidating individual cases into larger groupings by way of common discovery or class
actions.
253. For an argument that the savings are not always as large as advertized, see Trang-
srud, Mass Trials, supra note 249, at 79. For an effort to set forth a method for assessing the
effects of mass procedures, see MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF
MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES
(1988).
254. Judge Parker's efforts in the Eastern District of Texas to use collateral estoppel and
class actions to manage the very large asbestos caseload in that district serve as an example.
See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1986) (class action); Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1982) (collateral estoppel). For a
discussion by a commentator who has been intimately involved with managing mass tort cases,
see McGovern, supra note 20, at 442.
255. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1221
n.6. (S.D. Ohio 1985). Judge Rubin's calculation was based on his estimate that the average
trial would take 38 days. This figure in turn was based on the average time it had taken to try
the four cases (other than the Common Issues Trial) that had been tried at the time Rubin
wrote his opinion. Id. at 1221 n.5.
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Court of Appeals judges, no two from the same district. The Panel main-
tains a permanent staff in Washington and meets monthly. It monitors
district court cases that appear to be likely candidates for consolidation.
Claims may be consolidated by motion of the Panel itself or by approved
motion of a party to a claim. The Panel may issue a consolidation order
over the objections of all parties. 256 For the Panel to take action, four of
the seven members must concur. Civil actions may be consolidated
when: (1) they involve one or more common questions of fact, (2) they
are pending in different districts, (3) the transfer will be for the conven-
ience of parties and witnesses, and (4) the transfer promotes the just and
efficient conduct of the actions.257 Factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether consolidation would promote just and efficient conduct of
the actions include whether it will prevent duplication of discovery and
pretrial conferences and whether it will economize judicial efforts.258
As of July 1984, the Panel had used the MDL statute to transfer
seventy-eight air disaster cases and seventeen other mass disaster
cases.259 It had also transferred nine mass product defect cases, includ-
ing those involving Bendectin. 26° The Act, on its face, provides for the
consolidation of pretrial proceedings only. At the end of these proceed-
ings cases "shall be remanded by the panel... to the district from which
[they] were transferred" for trial.261 Notwithstanding this language,
both courts and commentators have asserted that transferee courts may
conduct a common trial in cases consolidated under the Act.262
Even as Mekdeci was being tried, the landslide of lawsuits was be-
ginning. In early 1982 the Panel began to assign cases to the Southern
District of Ohio. It selected Judge Carl A. Rubin to conduct the consoli-
dated pretrial discovery. 263 In May, a central component of the coordi-
256. In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Materials Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906,
910 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
257. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1991).
258. See Wilson W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotham, Complex Multidistrict Litiga-
tion-An Overview of28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 41, 45 (1979); Trangsrud,
Joinder Alternatives, supra note 22, at 803; Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Mul-
tidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1001 (1974).
259. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 22, at 803-04 nn.138-39.
260. Id. at 803-04 n.139. Other products involved in transfer orders include an aortic
heart valve, multipiece rims, an antibiotic called Cleocin, the Swine Flu vaccine, the Dalkon
Shield, plastic insulation, and helicopter engines. Id.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1991).
262. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 22, at 803-04 n. 139; Richard A. Chesley
& Kathleen Woods Kolodgy, Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex
Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 523-26 (1985).
263. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 489, 490
(J.P.M.L. 1982).
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nation objective was realized with the appointment by Judge Rubin of
five attorneys who would act as lead counsel and coordinate plaintiffs'
discovery efforts.264
Within the context of the Act, another word for coordination is cen-
tralization. In ordinary tort litigation, unaffected by multidistrict consol-
idation, the very fact that lawsuits are scattered throughout the land is
simultaneously one of the main weaknesses and strengths of private liti-
gation. It is a weakness because coordination is difficult, and because
some plaintiffs will not have the resources to pursue their claims.2 65 On
the other hand, this diversity is a strength. If it spreads plaintiffs thin, it
does the same to the defendants, who must fight on many fronts. More-
over, it spreads the risk. Prosecuting 800 single plaintiff cases instead of
one 800 plaintiff case is a type of insurance for plaintiffs as a group. One
large case places all of the plaintiffs' eggs in one basket.266
In November 1983 Judge Rubin took a large step toward centraliza-
tion. Proceeding under Rule 42, the judge consolidated all cases that had
been filed in Ohio for a common issues trial. Rule 42 is a particularly
potent weapon for forcing consolidation because plaintiffs do not have a
right to opt out of a common trial as they do under the MDL statute.267
Judge Rubin set a date of March 1, 1985 for all those who did not bring
their action in Ohio to choose whether to opt in or opt out of the Com-
mon Issues TriaL26 18 And on June 11, 1984 a jury was empaneled.269
264. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1216 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Bendenctin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 295 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
265. The contingent fee can relieve the individual plaintiff of the burden of direct litigation
expenses, but the system will operate only when the expected value of a case warrants the costs
that must be incurred in pursuing it. For the plaintiff with a less serious injury, such as a
minor cleft, it may be impossible to find an attorney willing to pursue the claim if that plaintiff
alone has to bear the entire cost of developing the case. Consolidation of discovery proceed-
ings under the Act makes it possible for many plaintiffs to pursue claims that they otherwise
could not afford.
266. In August 1982 Judge Rubin removed the foreign eggs. He ruled that claims by
British plaintiffs were barred under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In re Richardson-
Merrell, Inc,, 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1133-36 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (where United Kingdom was alter-
native forum and prospect of numerous additional actions on behalf of foreign plaintiffs was
likely absent dismissal, action was dismissed on forum non-conveniens ground). British plain-
tiffs had survived an earlier motion by defendant to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.
See Alexander v. Richardson-MerrelI Inc., 541 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Now,
however, no foreign national would be able to pursue a Bendectin case in Federal court.
267. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). See Trangsrud, Mass Trials, supra note 249, at 72.
268. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1216 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
269. Id.
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One week later, however, with an eye toward settlement, Judge
Rubin issued an order certifying the plaintiffs as a class under Rule 23.270
Merrell made a settlement offer of $120 million and the jury was dis-
missed.271 Taking into consideration potential future suits, Judge Rubin
divided the settlement class into two subclasses, those who had already
filed suit by June 18, 1984 and those who had not.272 The class was a
"non-opt-out" class. No individual plaintiff would be permitted to opt
out and continue private settlement negotiations or proceed to trial.
273
Every injured child and parent of a stillborn child exposed to Bendectin
would be bound by the settlement agreement.274
Judge Rubin's action did not meet with universal acceptance. Many
attorneys, including two members of the five-person lead counsel com-
mittee, opposed the settlement and therefore objected to the formation of
the class. 275 After failing to obtain a reversal of the class certification
order on direct appeal,276 they sought a writ of mandamus from the Sixth
Circuit to vacate the order establishing the class. The court recognized
that mandamus is an extreme remedy, but nevertheless granted the
writ.277 This ended any hope of settlement.
270. In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D. Ohio 1984). Rubin
found that the class met the four criteria of commonality, typicality, numerosity, and adequacy
of representation required by Rule 23. Id. at 241. For the argument that Rule 23 should be
used this way in mass tort cases, see Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases under
Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REv. 1143 (1983).
271. In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984). At the time of
the settlement offer, pending before Judge Rubin were 253 cases filed in the Southern District
of Ohio and 315 transferred by the Panel (in addition roughly 149 actions were pending in
state courts). Id. Had the settlement been consummated and distributed pro rata among the
existing plaintiffs under Rubin's jurisdiction, the per case settlement would have been slightly
in excess of $200,000.
272. In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. at 242.
273. In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d at 302. In addition, the certification
order purported to stay all state court discovery proceedings. Id. at 304.
274. These extreme measures reflect the frustration judges feel in trying to work out a
settlement in mass tort cases. Some have argued that Judge Weinstein's summary judgment
for defendants in the Agent Orange opt-out opinion reflects similar frustration and was moti-
vated in substantial part by his desire to protect the perceived reasonableness of the settlement
agreement between the defendants and the plaintiffs who did not opt out of the class action.
See Green, supra note 94, at 65.
275. See Bendectin Pact Creating Furor, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1984, at 1, 31-33.
276. See Schreier v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1984).
277. In re "Bendectin" Products Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d at 303, 307. The court found that
Judge Rubin had failed to establish any grounds for certification under either Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
(requiring a showing that separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adju-
dications) or Rule 23(b)(1)(B) (requiring a showing that there is a risk that a limited fund may
exist from which judgments can be satisfied). Id. at 305-06.
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Actions taken in the early years of a mass tort have the secondary
consequence of encouraging or discouraging the filing of new cases.
With a product such as Bendectin, for which over thirty million prescrip-
tions had been filled world-wide, it is extraordinarily difficult to estimate
the number of potential cases. 278 Indeed, in the Common Issues Trial,
Judge Rubin solicited the assistance of several experts in order to obtain
a reasonable estimate of the number of cases he could ultimately antici-
pate. The experts found it difficult to make a firm estimate, in part be-
cause there was no effective statute of limitations bar to future suits.
279
The experts' best guess was that future filings would be in the range of
5700 to 16,800 claims.280 Thus, a settlement with only the existing plain-
tiffs seemed particularly risky for Merrell. In the asbestos, Dalkon
Shield, and DES cases, initial settlements and jury verdicts set the going
278. Attempts to estimate the number of potential plaintiffs who would meet the two crite-
ria of a birth defect and a mother who ingested Bendectin during pregnancy have produced
very large numbers. Judge Rubin noted in the Common Issues opinion that if 30 million preg-
nant women had taken the drug and the birth defect rate is between 2% and 5% of all births,
then by chance (i.e., by causes other than Bendectin), there would be between 600,000 and
1,500,000 potential claimants. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
624 F. Supp. 1212, 1229 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
279. For a discussion of why this is so, see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
280. The experts estimated that there were between 115,000 and 168,000 potential claim-
ants and that 5% to 10% would actually raise claims, creating a range of 5750 to 16,800. See
Transcript of Proceedings, at 88-90 (Oct. 31, 1984), In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Benedec-
tin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (MDL No. 486). Among the
factors involved in a calculation are estimates of the number of injuries and estimates of the
number of injured people who will advance claims. The percentage advancing claims is influ-
enced by public knowledge that there is a potential claim, which in turn is influenced by the
steps courts and others take in advertising the right to claim.
In the Dalkon Shield case, for instance, the bankruptcy court made significant efforts to
publicize the right to claim. A survey of almost 1000 individuals conducted in 1984 asked
whether they had heard of a variety of products (including the Dalkon Shield, Bendectin,
asbestos, DES, and super-absorbency tampons), and if so whether they thought they the prod-
uct was hazardous to health. Of those surveyed, 80% thought asbestos was hazardous; 43%
thought the Dalkon Shield was. Only 10% or so thought Bendectin was a health hazard,
approximately 10% thought it was not a hazard, and 80% either had never heard of Bendectin
or did not know if it was hazardous. Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Notification Campaigns in
Mass Litigation: The Dalkon Shield Case, 13 JUST. Sys. J. 220, 231 (1988-89). Clearly, in
1984 public awareness of Bendectin was relatively low.
After the Common Issues Trial, plaintiffs' lead counsel requested reimbursement for out-
of-pocket discovery expenses, which tallied $750,000. Judge Rubin charged two thirds of the
costs to the Southern District cases, but also had to set a price for counsel in future cases who
might wish to acquire the materials. He set a fee of $600, by estimating that there would be
400 future cases where counsel would use the materials. To date, however, there have not been
nearly that many cases, presumably in part because the outcome of the Common Issues Trial
had a chilling effect on future litigation. See infra app. A., tbl. 5. Had the outcome been
different, there is reason to suspect the expert's estimates would, if anything, have been too low
and the number of claims would have run in the thousands, if not tens of thousands.
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rate for later cases. It usually does not avail the defendant to argue that
it never would have offered so much in earlier cases had it known there
would be so many later ones. Nor are existing plaintiffs in any position
to offer reliable indemnity against future claims or even unsettled existing
claims.281 By forming a non-opt-out class, and establishing a subclass of
future suits, for whom some percentage of the $120 million settlement
offer would be earmarked, Judge Rubin's proposed settlement insured
Merrell against the risk that by settling, it would encourage even more
new plaintiffs, who would tend to begin negotiations from the basis of the
earlier settlement.282
The Sixth Circuit's issuance of the writ of mandamus reflects the
constant tension that exists in mass tort cases between the desire to pro-
vide individualized justice and the desire to reach for aggregate resolu-
tions. Apparently, the Sixth Circuit felt that this settlement plan leaned
too far in favor of efficient, aggregate solutions. The consequence of the
Sixth Circuit's decision was that Judge Rubin resumed preparations for a
common issues trial on the question of general causation. A second jury
was empaneled in February 1985,283 and a new opt-in deadline was
set.284 A total of 818 cases were consolidated: 557 cases originally filed
in the Southern District of Ohio, and 261 opt-in cases. 285 Judge Rubin
took the unusual step of trifurcating the case. First, he would try the
issue of general causation: does Bendectin cause any defects? He then
would try liability issues and, finally, damages issues.286 This strategy
281. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 22, at 835.
282. Frank Woodside III, chief defense counsel in the Common Issues case noted:
One thing that we have attempted to obtain in settling the cases the way we have
settled them is to achieve a degree of finality so that the litigation does not pend for
20 years. Because you involve children, you have litigation that can go on for a long
time because you really don't have a statute of limitations.
Bendectin Pact Creating Furor, supra note 275, at 31.
283. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212,
1217 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
284. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 890, 891 (J.P.M.L. 1984).
285. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. at 1216
n.1. Judge Rubin reports in his later opinion, upholding the jury verdict in this case, that there
were an additional 368 cases assigned by the panel that did not opt in or were otherwise
disposed of. In total, then, he had jurisdiction over 1186 cases. Id.
286. The exact nature of the trifurcation and the forum in which each issue would be tried
was not clear when the trial began. Apparently the parties never fully considered how to
resolve the difficult question of specific causation that might arise if the jury were to find a
significant correlation between Bendectin and some birth defect, but a relative risk of injury
less than two. In this situation, based on the bare statistical evidence, no plaintiff would be
able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her defect had been caused by
Bendectin. See supra note 215.
In the event that the jury was to find for the plaintiffs on the causal and liability questions,
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had the potential for greatly streamlining the case, for if the defendants
won on the general causation issue there would be no need to continue
the trial.
Moreover, the strategy had the effect of preventing the plaintiffs
from trying their entire cause of action at one time, thus denying them
the opportunity that exists in unitary trials to bolster a weak case on
liability or causation with a strong case on damages.287 The only wit-
nesses permitted to testify at the trial were experts on the chemical com-
position, toxicology, and epidemiology of Bendectin (ten experts on
behalf of the plaintiffs and nine on behalf of the defendants). 288 Testi-
mony and evidence pertaining to individual plaintiffs was not permit-
ted.28 9 Indeed, Judge Rubin would not even allow individual malformed
plaintiffs in the courtroom during the trial, on the theory that to do so
would inevitably bring the question of damages into the trial as the jury
observed the plaintiffs' serious injuries. 290
Judge Rubin proposed a second innovation for this trial. Because of
concerns that the complexity of the scientific evidence might be too diffi-
cult for the average juror to understand he offered to use either a "blue
ribbon jury" (persons having the most formal education available in the
jury panel) or a "blue-blue ribbon jury" (persons knowledgeable in the
field). The offer was rejected by plaintiffs, and the case was tried to a jury
from the regular jury pool.291
Judge Rubin planned to return all cases referred under the MDL statute to the originating
district for the purpose of determining damages. He left open the procedures to be employed
with respect to cases originally filed in the Southern District of Ohio. They would be handled
either by impaneling separate juries for each plaintiff, or by determination of the court or a
special master. Pre-trial Order No. 1414, Mar. 5, 1984, In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig.,
102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (MDL No. 486).
287. It is partly on this ground that Trangsrud objects to the practice of splitting mass
trials:
[Trifurcation of issues] is not fair because it robs the jury of its traditional flexibility
in tort cases to balance uncertainties in the plaintiff's case on liability against
strengths in the plaintiff's case on damages. Trifurcation of issues also inevitably
leads to the sterile trial of technical issues related to causation divorced from the fact
of the plaintiff's injury and a full account of the defendant's role in the tragedy.
Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 22, at 80. Some would disagree with this analysis
and argue that all trials should be bifurcated so that the damage question does not contaminate
the logically prior liability and causation questions. Recall that the first Mekdeci jury verdict
was overturned precisely because it appeared to be a compromise verdict.
288. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. at 1218.
289. Id. at 1228.
290. Id. at 1222-24. On similar grounds, Judge Rubin restricted pretrial discovery to
Bendectin and at trial excluded all evidence concerning Thalidomide and MER/29. While
Merrell's history with these drugs might go to the issue of liability, it did not go to the question
of whether Bendectin caused birth defects. Id. at 1236, 1241, 1249.
291. Id. at 1217.
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Perhaps because of the trifurcation of the trial, the jury returned a
verdict for the defendants. 292 In a lengthy opinion Judge Rubin denied
plaintiffs' motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial.293 The Sixth Circuit
ultimately upheld the verdict over objections that Judge Rubin abused
his discretion in, among other things, trifurcating the trial,294 excluding
the plaintiffs from the courtroom, and excluding references to
Thalidomide and MER/29. 295 In April 1985, in light of the jury verdict
and Judge Rubin's declaration that he had completed his duty, the Panel
remanded the claims of eighty-three plaintiffs who had not opted into the
Common Issues Trial.296
At a theoretical level, the verdict in the Common Issues case is just
another jury verdict, binding on the parties to the case but of no particu-
292. In a laboratory experiment, using a toxic tort trial stimulus, Horowitz and Bordens
found that juries hearing a unitary trial were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff
(85%) than were juries that heard bifurcated trials (68%). Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S.
Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAw
& HUM. BEHAV. 269, 277-78 (1990). This tendency was strongest when the bifurcated trial
juries heard the general causation testimony first. If these juries did find for the plaintiff,
however, their compensatory damages awards were significantly larger. Id.
293. See In re Richardon-Merrell, Inc., "Bendectin" Prods. Litig., 624 F. Supp. at 1249.
294. The plaintiffs may have been somewhat prejudiced by the fact that one of the lead
counsel had suggested a bifurcated proceeding early in the case. Id. at 1249.
295. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 314-17, 321-25 (6th Cir. 1988). The appellate
process was delayed by litigation concerning whether Judge Rubin had jurisdiction over claims
by two foreign nationals who had originally filed in Ohio state court. These plaintiffs alleged
that Merrell had violated the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and that this violation consti-
tuted a "rebuttable presumption of negligence." Merrell argued that removal to federal court
was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because the allegation raised a federal question. The trial
court agreed, but was reversed in Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 766 F.2d 1005,
1006 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit's decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a 5-4
opinion. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
This ruling ultimately affected all Ohio resident plaintiffs. Merrell was a Delaware corpo-
ration, but had its principal place of business in Ohio. Therefore it was, for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction, a citizen of both states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988). On the basis of the
Supreme Court's Thompson decision, Judge Rubin proceeded to remand all cases brought by
Ohio residents in Ohio state court that had been removed to his court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
on the ground that they, too, had stated causes of action based on violations of the FDCA.
Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 297. For the same reason, he also dismissed without prejudice all
claims brought by Ohio plaintiffs who had originally filed in Ohio federal court. Id.
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit held that only those Ohio plaintiffs (13 cases) who
had not attempted to establish federal question jurisdiction through a cause of action based on
the violation of the FDCA were entitled to have their claims dismissed without prejudice. Id.
at 297-98. The remainder, who had claimed federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, were properly in federal court and, therefore, bound by the Common Issues verdict.
Id.
296. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 715, 716 (J.P.M.L. 1985). The court
denied remand of six actions and vacated an order to transfer six new cases to Judge Rubin's
court. Id.
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lar precedential consequence for other parties, not even those plaintiffs
who were part of the common pretrial proceedings and then opted out.
This theoretical level perceives each case as an isolated event, legally un-
contaminated by other suits, and it completely misses the importance of
the Common Issues TriaL The verdict produced a complete reversal of
fortunes for the parties. The claims of over 800 plaintiffs had been dealt
a death blow, and remaining plaintiffs now faced what amounted to an
adverse finding of fact-subsequent trial and appellate judges referred to
the Common Issues Trial's outcome when discussing whether the plain-
tiffs could prove that Bendectin causes birth defects.297
The defendant enjoyed an equally profound reversal of fortunes.
From an offer of $120 million to settle the case, it now moved to stay
Judge Rubin's dismissal and remand order. The defendant hoped to
sweep the board clean by using the Common Issues Trial to prevent fu-
ture plaintiffs from arguing that Bendectin was a teratogen. 298 The de-
fense had gone on the offensive.
Nevertheless, trial of the Bendectin Cases had barely begun. 299
Many of the most seriously injured plaintiffs had opted out of the Com-
mon Issues Trial.3° The existence of Oxendine made it unlikely that the
defendant would succeed with any collateral estoppel arguments and also
297. Eg., Hull v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 700 F. Supp. 28, 29 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
298. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., slip op. (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 6, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
299. See infra app. A, tbl. 6.
300. Class actions are, in part, a public good. Benefits accrue to members of the group (all
plaintiffs) regardless of their individual efforts. Olson notes that in such situations, because
those with the most at stake will invest the most in the common good, there is a tendency for
the " 'exploitation' of the great by the small." MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 29 (1968). Members with greater
stakes in the outcome (the great) will make larger investments (in, for instance, pretrial discov-
ery) than those with smaller stakes (the small). Those with smaller claims are able to free ride
on the investment of those with larger claims.
This exploitation may occur even if there is no bargaining among plaintiffs. Bargaining
may exacerbate this problem. To the degree there are limited assets to be shared, the plaintiffs
will compete for shares of the defendant's assets. Here, the large stakes plaintiffs almost cer-
tainly will be in a minority, and may well be subjected to efforts by the majority to squeeze the
range of recoveries. There will be pressure to hold down the maximum recoveries to raise the
minimum recoveries. Coffee, supra note 212, at 916.
As a consequence of these processes, it is not surprising that many of the opt outs in mass
tort cases are the large stakes players. These include plaintiffs who have the more serious
injuries and who have claims that are large enough to justify separate prosecution. They also
include plaintiffs' attorneys representing a number of clients who, aggregating across all cf
their claims, have a large enough pool of claims to justify trying individual cases. Such a
division apparently occurred in the Bendectin Cases. As this discussion indicates, mass tort
cases present substantial issues of distributive justice. For a set of proposals as to how to
manage mass tort cases so as to minimize distributional problems, see id. at 918-30.
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indicated that plaintiffs might well succeed in a unitary trial. The judici-
ary, however, was not to remain passive. As the Bendectin Cases ma-
tured, a new type of rationing was about to begin.
(2) Substantive Rationing
Throughout the life cycle of a congregation of cases the judiciary
responds to the experts and their evidence. Trial judges are the most
closely involved. The majority of their responses occur at the micro level
of evidentiary and procedural rulings, permitting or prohibiting various
initiatives by the parties. 301 Usually, however, the trial judge also must
make larger decisions concerning who to permit to testify, what evidence
and instructions to give the jury, whether the case ultimately should go
to the jury, and if it does, whether the verdict should stand. These more
macro judgments are especially likely to be appealed. In the process of
justifying or rejecting what has been done below, appellate opinions
shape the future direction of a congregation of cases. Like all judicial,
and other, decisions within the congregation, appellate opinions are not
isolated, atomistic events. They, too, exhibit stages of development and
are best understood within the context of the collection of cases. In this
section I briefly discuss the trial court opinions and then turn to an anal-
ysis of the Bendectin appellate opinions. Here, we examine a different
type of rationing, not through the use of procedures to streamline but
through the use of substantive decisions to dispose of cases on their mer-
its. As the congregation matures, the courts move from procedural to
substantive rationing. 302
a. Trial Court Opinions
Using both Westlaw and Lexis searches, I have uncovered a total of
fifty-eight trial court opinions concerning Bendectin, almost all of which
301. I hope to explore these micro decisions in a subsequent paper through an analysis of
Bendectin transcripts.
302. This shift suggests an interesting question: Under what circumstances will courts
employ substantive rationing? We might hypothesize that courts will resort to substantive
rationing only when procedural rationing has failed to achieve the desired result.
For example, in the mass torts that are precipitated by a single cataclysmic event such as
an airplane crash, multidistrict discovery and the consolidation of cases for trial are sufficient
to assure reasonably prompt and consistent outcomes within the congregation of cases. In
such a scenario, substantive rationing is unnecessary even for the occasional case that escapes
the procedural net.
If this hypothesis is correct, we should expect substantive rationing in relatively few in-
stances. In the final section of this Article, I elaborate on the circumstances in which we
should anticipate substantive rationing.
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are from federal district courts.303 Table 7304 summarizes the district
court opinions. 30 5
In the table, I have coded the subject matter of each opinion (col-
umn 4) and designated it substantive or nonsubstantive (column 5). The
key to the codes is found at the bottom of the table.306 Nonsubstantive
opinions involve: discovery motions; motions to bifurcate or trifurcate a
trial; questions of federal jurisdiction, statute of limitations, and forum
non conveniens; and decisions concerning inclusion or exclusion from the
multidistrict proceedings. Substantive opinions involve: questions con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence; motions for summary judgment,
directed verdict, or judgment n.o.v.; motions to exclude physicians or
pharmacists as defendants; and findings concerning the merits of the
plaintiff's case.
Drawn on the basis of information from Table 7, Figure 4 presents
two indicators that illustrate how the Bendectin litigation matured over
time. For each year between 1982 and 1990 it indicates the percentage of
trial court opinions dealing with substantive issues and the percentage of
opinions that were "final" in the sense that, unless overturned on appeal,
the case was to end with that decision. In the early years of litigation,
nonsubstantive issues tend to dominate case congregations. In the
Bendectin cases, a substantial number of procedural issues arose because
of the consolidation of cases in the Common Issues TriaL Additionally,
several courts faced venue issues raised by claims of foreign nationals.
Presumably, the foreigners and their attorneys preferred to litigate in
American courts because they assumed their damage recoveries would be
larger here than abroad. After some earlier opinions allowing them a
cause of action, the foreign claimants eventually were barred under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.30 7 Finally, there was the recurring
303. The opinions are from thirty-six different cases and multidistrict rulings of the Joint
Panel on Multi-District Litigation (labeled MDL-JPML). Note that two of the cases are con-
solidated actions (labeled MDL-Ohio and MDL-Michigan).
304. Table 7 is found in Appendix A.
305. Not every Bendectin opinion is included in Table 7. Memorandum opinions, denials
or grants of certiorari, and the like are excluded. They are listed in appendices H-I. The table
does not include opinions that are neither published nor reported on Westlaw or Lexis.
306. Note that, in the case of summary judgments, directed verdicts, and judgments n.o.v.
(codes 4, 5, and 6), where possible I have given the basis of the motion as well. For example, in
the fifth case, Koller, the motion for a summary judgment was based on a claim that the
plaintiff could not show general causation.
307. A key opinion is Judge Rubin's decision that foreign nationals would be barred from
the multidistrict litigation, but that, in return, Merrell would have to consent to being sued in
Great Britain. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
Judge Rubin was particularly concerned that allowing foreign nationals to litigate in Ohio
would flood the courts with litigants:
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issue of federal jurisdiction. Merrell occasionally asked to have a court
rule that the joinder of a local physician or pharmacy was done fraudu-
lently solely in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction.308
In more recent years an increasing percentage of opinions have dealt
with the cases on their merits. 309 This progression from nonsubstantive
Defendant argues that to allow these foreign plaintiffs access to American courts on
the bare nexus that a product was developed and tested in this country, when it was
manufactured and sold abroad by a foreign corporation, would flood this country
with cases in which its own interest is minimal and the United Kingdom's great. We
find this argument highly persuasive from both a practical and theoretical viewpoint.
Id at 1135.
Judge Rubin's concern over the potential flood of litigants reflects the federal judiciary's
ongoing interest in managing mass tort caseloads as efficiently as possible. Here, of course,
efficiency is measured from the federal judiciary's perspective. From the point of view of plain-
tiffs, American attorneys, and Merrell, it would have been more efficient to try all cases in
Ohio.
, 308. E.g., McFeggan v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1987 WL 9332, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 7, 1987); Shelhamer v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1987 WL 10702, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
May 11, 1987).
309. 1986 appears to be a slight aberration in this trend. In part, this may be understood
as a reaction to the conclusion of the Common Issues Trial. Cases that had been transferred to
to substantive opinions is a key element of the maturation of the congre-
gation of Bendectin cases. By 1987, most nonsubstantive legal questions
had been resolved, and cases were being decided on the merits. The fact
that fewer and fewer cases addressed procedural questions310 also signi-
fies that relatively few new cases were entering the stream and that deple-
tion was underway. Figure 4 indicates that as the percentage of
substantive opinions rises in a case congregation, so too does the percent-
age of final dispositions.
Finally, an examination of the last three or four years of trial court
opinions indicates that Merrell's motions for summary judgement, di-
rected verdict, and judgment n.o.v. have increasingly been granted. This
trend is, in large part, a response to appellate court opinions concerning
Bendectin. It is to those appellate opinions that we now turn.
b. Appellate Court Opinions
I have found a total of thirty-six appellate opinions concerning
Bendectin. This figure includes both published opinions and unpublished
opinions available on the legal databases. The thirty-six opinions repre-
sent twenty-eight cases. Table 8311 lists the opinions in chronological or-
der.3 12 As one would expect, the volume of appellate opinions has lagged
behind the trial opinions, peaking in 1988.
Most of these opinions did not follow a trial on the merits below,
and those that did tend to have come relatively later in the series, again
indicating the maturation of the Bendectin congregation. 313 The early
nontrial cases involved one of two issues: jurisdictional questions, or the
inclusion of defendants other than Merrell. The jurisdictional questions
usually involved foreign national plaintiffs hoping to find an American
forum. As noted earlier, all eventually were excluded on forum non con-
veniens grounds. The non-Merrell defendant cases involved pharmacists
or treating physicians against whom there was no specific claim except
that they were in the chain of distribution.
The nontrial opinions of the last two or three years have been much
more likely to involve substantive questions. They address questions
Ohio for discovery but then opted out of the Common Issues Tial, had been on hold awaiting
the outcome of that case. They now were transferred back to their original jurisdictions and
allowed to proceed.
310. From 1988 to the present, only two opinions have not involved motions for summary
judgment, directed verdict, or judgment n.o.v.
311. Table 8 is found in Appendix A.
312. Again, memorandum opinions and the like have been excluded from the table.
313. See infra app. A, tbl. 8, col. 3.
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such as whether the plaintiffs have shown specific causation, 314 whether
they have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Bendectin
causes defects, and whether they have presented a qualified expert on the
causation issue. Since 1987, all but three315 of the opinions have been
final dispositions, yet another sign of the maturation and impending old
age of the Bendectin congregation.
Most of the nontrial opinions are relatively short and deal only with
the specific issue under review. The opinions that followed full trials are
substantially longer and often review the evidence presented at trial.
These opinions reveal more fully the appellate courts' reactions to the
body of fact and law that has developed as the congregation of cases has
matured. There are nine such opinions.316 Table 9317 presents informa-
tion about these nine cases. One notable feature of these cases is that all
except the Common Issues Trial involved a limb defect injury.318 While
there are epidemiological studies that have found significant correlations
between Bendectin and congenital heart defects, pyloric stenosis, and
oral clefts, there appears to be no published epidemiological study that
has found a statistically significant correlation between Bendectin inges-
tion and limb defects. Nevertheless, these cases have gone farthest
through the appellate process, presumably because they involve the most
serious injuries and the largest potential damage awards. Physically, psy-
chologically, and perhaps financially, these tend to be the most devastat-
ing injuries for the child and his or her parents.319 For a contingency fee
lawyer, they are the cases most worth pursuing, the cases whose expected
value justifies the high costs involved in pursuing recovery.320
314. A common example involved plaintiffs with limb deformities who could not show
that Bendectin caused their particular injuries because the mother did not ingest the product
during the critical period when limb buds were forming.
315. One of these three opinions, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Oxendine, 593 A.2d
1023 (D.C. 1991), is not final in the sense that the appellate court has refused to allow the
plaintiff to collect compensatory damages until her punitive damages claim has been settled.
Id. at 1030.
316. Most trials that have gone to verdict have produced at least one appellate opinion.
As far as I can determine, only three of the American trials have not led to an appeal, each
having ended in a defense judgment, by either jury verdict, directed verdict, or judgment n.o.v.
317. Table 9 is found in Appendix A.
318. See infra app. A, tbl. 9, at col. 2.
319. There is something especially horrific about a visible limb reduction defect that in
some ways sets it apart from other defects. The financial burden created by such defects varies
depending on the seriousness of the injury. For seriously deformed children the cost of care
can be quite high. For those less seriously injured, however, the out of pocket financial cost
may be less than it is for some other injuries, such has heart defects.
320. See Coffee, supra note 212, at 881.
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The more recent trials, those that occurred in 1987-1988, resulted in
plaintiffs' verdicts. As noted earlier, however, as of this writing only the
Oxendine verdict has survived the entire appellate process.3 21 In several
cases, the trial judge directed the verdict or entered judgment n.o.v.
Most remarkably, in recent cases appellate courts have reversed jury ver-
dicts on which the trial judge has entered judgment. Over time, the ap-
pellate courts have taken a very aggressive posture toward the Bendectin
Cases. 322 The following discussion examines this trend within the con-
text of a case congregation analysis.
All Bendectin cases pose the same general causation issue. Viewing
the litigation from the congregation perspective, one would expect that
over time the courts would come to a more complete understanding of
the facts of the cases. A question to be asked about case congregations is
whether, at some point, courts are prepared to act on that understanding
and make substantive determinations in individual cases based upon
knowledge drawn from the congregation as a whole. With respect to
Bendectin, the answer is yes.
321. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
322. This assertion, especially as it refers to substantive rationing, applies most clearly to
appellate opinions following jury verdicts. When ruling on summary judgment motions, ap-
pellate courts have exhibited much greater reluctance to cut off plaintiffs' claims based merely
on the courts' understanding of the Bendectin science. For example, in DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), a scientifically sophisticated opinion,
the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of Merrell that was based on the trial court's
conclusion that the evidence offered by plaintiff's only expert was inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 because it was not reasonably relied on by experts in the relevant field.
The appellate court objected to the sketchy record upon which this ruling was based:
Following Merrell Dow's lead, the district court did not point to specific deficiencies
in the data utilized by Dr. Done and while it cited Rule 703, it made no record-
supported, factual finding that Dr. Done had relied upon data experts in the field
would have considered unreliable .... In only two brief sentences of its opinion did
the district court address Dr. Done's statistical analysis of the available epidemiologi-
cal evidence ....
... [I]ts cursory ruling that Done's testimony was inadequate under Rule 703
does not comply with the standard set forth in Japanese [Electronics] Products Liti-
gation [723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983)], as it was not predicated upon a record-sup-
ported, factual finding that Done relied upon identified data not regarded as reliable
by experts in the field.
Id. at 944, 953.
Nonetheless, the court noted in conclusion:
[E]ven if Dr. Done's epidemiological analysis is found to be admissible, the DeLucas
are entitled to get to trial only if the district court is satisfied that this analysis to-
gether with any other evidence relevant to the causation issue would permit a jury
finding that Amy's birth defects were, when measured against the appropriate burden
of proof, caused by her mother's exposure to Bendectin.
Id. at 959.
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I have analyzed the way each appellate opinion approaches the evi-
dence on Bendectin. In Table 9 each opinion is coded as exhibiting a
legalistic, scientific, or legal-scientific approach to the pharmacological
and epidemiological evidence presented at trial. An opinion is coded le-
galistic if it: (1) reviews the jury verdict and trial judge determinations
using a set of legal formulas concerning admissible evidence, the burden
of proof, judicial discretion, and the allocation of tasks between judge
and jury; and (2) does not look behind the statements of qualified experts
to assess the merits of the experts' opinions. An opinion is coded scien-
tific when a court adopts an aggressive, proactive posture toward the evi-
dence and the experts who presented it. These scientific opinions exhibit,
to varying degrees, three characteristics: (1) the court places weights on
the various types of evidence (in vitro, in vivo, or epidemiological); (2) the
court examines and makes a substantive assessment of the evidence upon
which an expert or set of experts have based their opinions; and (3) as a
part of this assessment the court emphasizes formal scientific criteria of
probative value, especially peer review and publication in refereed
journals. 323
As the Bendectin congregation has worked its way through the legal
system, opinions have become more scientific, 324 and the courts have
323. There is a deeper sense in which an opinion can be "scientific." There is a fundamen-
tal difference between the process of explanation engaged in by scientists and the process of
attribution. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 68-83 (2d ed.
1985). As Hamilton notes, the search for a causal explanation involves an inquiry into the
cause of an unexpected or puzzling effect. The outcome is a causal inference, and the key
processing rule is a covariation principle. The process of attribution, on the other hand, in-
volves a determination as to whether some effect can be assigned to a cause such that the cause
is liable for sanctions. The outcome is a responsibility judgment and the key processing rule is
whether someone "could have done otherwise." V. Lee Hamilton, Intuitive Psychologist or
Intuitive Lawyer? Alternative Models of the Attribution Process, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOc.
PSYCHOL. 767, 768 (1980). The opinions I have coded "scientific" are not fully scientific in
this deeper sense. They still are about the business of attributing responsibility and they some-
times blur the explanation-attribution distinction. It is fair to say, however, that the opinions I
have coded "scientific" are in fact more scientific in the explanation sense than are most appel-
late opinions. Scientists, presumably, will feel comfortable with these opinions. Within the
legal community, however, they seem to create a sense of unease.
324. More specifically, appellate opinions have become more scientific when they involve a
jury verdict for the plaintiff. In cases where the jury found for the defense, the courts have
issued relatively legalistic opinions rejecting a number of plaintiffs arguments as to reversible
error at trial. One such case is Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 893 F.2d 1149 (10th
Cir. 1990). Even in Wilson, however, the court's position was not purely legalistic. In re-
sponding to the plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in denying their motion for
judgment n.o.v. or a new trial, the court said:
Merrell Dow presented expert testimony, which was not contradicted by the Wil-
sons' experts, that of the approximately forty epidemiological studies of Bendectin,
none has shown a statistically significant association between ingestion of the drug
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shown less willingness to leave factual determinations to the jury.325 Fi-
nally, with the development of a body of cases assessing the merits of the
evidence, at least one appellate court (and two trial courts ruling on sum-
mary judgment motions) 326 have reverted to a legalistic analysis, but a
legalistic analysis with a twist. In these cases, the courts did not review
or assess the evidence. They simply accepted the earlier appellate assess-
ment of the evidence as a matter of law. I have coded these opinions
legal-scientific. The following passages demonstrate each of the three
types of opinion.
(i) Oxendine
The clearest example of a legalistic appellate opinion is Oxendine.327
The court in Oxendine reversed the trial judge, who had granted judg-
ment n.o.v. and ordered a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict
for the plaintiff was against the great weight of the evidence. The appel-
late court relied heavily on Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 328 a case
involving the question whether paraquat exposure causes pulmonary fi-
brosis. It favorably quoted the following passage from that opinion:
Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to resolve
the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link
low level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On ques-
tions such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical and
epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such a link
exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony.329
and incidence of birth defects generally or limb defects in particular. This lack of
epidemiological proof for the Wilsons' claims is particularly significant in light of
recent decisions of federal courts of appeals granting judgment n.o.v. for Merrell
Dow based upon the absence of epidemiological evidence showing a causal relation-
ship between Bendectin use and birth defects ....
Although the Wilsons called several experts who testified in support of their
claims, Merrell Dow presented at least sufficient expert testimony to create a conflict
in the evidence, and perhaps even enough to sustain a directed verdict under the
reasoning of Brock, Richardson, and Lynch.
Id. at 1154-55 (citations omitted).
325. Randall Terrell originally drew this pattern to my attention, and I am strongly in-
debted to his insight.
326. The two are Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal.
1989), and Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 736 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. 1990). Still,
trial courts have not uniformly accepted the lead of Richardson, Brock, and Ealy by finding as
a matter of law that Bendectin is not a teratogen. See, e.g., Barton v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., No. C85-0028J, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8010, at *2 (D. Utah May 31, 1990) (directed
verdict affirmed, though court emphasized importance of jury trials in Bendectin cases because
of complex factual causation questions).
327. Oxendine v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 518 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
328. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
329. Id. at 1534, quoted in Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1104.
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The Oxendine court concluded its review of the trial with the fol-
lowing observation:
Although the trial in this case was long and the evidence complex, the
issue before the jury was a straightforward one: did Bendectin cause
appellant's birth defects? Expert witnesses testified at length on both
sides of that issue. Not surprisingly, their testimony revealed a disa-
greement as to how the epidemiological and other data should be inter-
preted. "The case was thus a classic battle of the experts, a battle in
which the jury must decide the victor." 330
The Oxendine opinion, standing as it does at the beginning of the
Bendectin congregation, is a clear example of a legalistic opinion. As the
congregation matured, more scientific opinions began to emerge.
(ii) Richardson
If the Common Issues Trial is the most important trial in the
Bendectin Cases, the most important appellate opinion is Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell.331 Unlike Oxendine, in Richardson the court af-
firmed a trial court's grant of judgment n.o.v. 3 32 As in all the opinions
coded "scientific," the Richardson court exhibited an unwillingness to
accept expert opinion without examining its scientific underpinnings:
333
330. Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535).
331. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
332. Judge Jackson granted judgment n.o.v. on the basis of Merrell's epidemiological evi-
dence. He concluded, "the literature on Bendectin, individually and in the aggregate, fails to
demonstrate Bendectin's teratogenicity to a scientifically acceptable degree of accuracy."
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 649 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D. Mass. 1986).
333. An early appellate opinion to take a scientific approach to the data is Lynch v. Mer-
rell-Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987). Although Lynch did not follow a trial-the trial
judge had granted Merrell's motion for summary judgment-it did contain a lengthy discus-
sion of the data. Typical of the opinion was the court's discussion of the proffered testimony of
Dr. Shanna Swan:
The plaintiffs also offered the opinion evidence of Shanna Helen Swan, a holder
of a 1963 doctorate in statistics from the University of California at Berkeley. Swan
had served from 1969 to 1975 as senior biostatistician in a Kaiser Health contracep-
tive drug study; been associate professor of mathematics at California State Univer-
sity, Sonoma, from 1974 to 1979; directed between 1979 and 1981 the training
program in biostatistics and epidemiology at the School of Public Health of the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; and, while remaining in this school, has been since
1981 the chief of the Methodology and Analysis Unit, Epidemiology and Statistics,
Department of Health Services of the State of California.
Swan's opinion as to causation was based upon her reanalysis of data collected
between 1970 and 1978 by the Metropolitan Atlanta Congenital Defects Program.
This data had been previously analyzed by four members of the Center for Disease
Control .... [The researchers found "weak" but not causal relationship between
the use of Bendectin and amniotic bands and concluded that the study "excluded" a
risk of limb reduction from the use of Bendectin.
Swan testified in the multi-district litigation in Cincinnati, and the district court
here took note of her testimony as it was excerpted by the defendant .... Compar-
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The question whether Bendectin causes limb reduction defects is
scientific in nature, and it is to the scientific community that the law
must look for the answer. For this reason, expert witnesses are indis-
pensable in a case such as this. But that is not to say that the court's
hands are inexorably tied, or that it must accept uncritically any sort
of opinion espoused by an expert merely because his credentials render
him qualified to testify. .... 334
Next, the court distinguished among various types of evidence. In
vitro and in vivo evidence was relegated to no more than a secondary role
when compared to epidemiological studies:
These three types of studies then-chemical, in vitro, and in vivo-
cannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that Bendectin
caused the birth defects at issue in this case. Studies of this kind, sin-
gly or in combination, are not capable of proving causation in human
beings in the face of the overwhelming body of contradictory epidemi-
ological evidence. Perhaps mindful of this, the last type of evidence
considered by Dr. Done consisted of the epidemiological studies.
When such studies are available and relevant, and particularly when
they are numerous and span a significant period of time, they assume a
very important role in determinations of questions of causation. 335
Third, the court judged the probative value of evidence, in part by
the rules science would use to make such a judgment-whether the re-
sults have been published in a refereed journal and whether they have
been subjected to peer review: "Only by recalculating the data was Dr.
Done able to obtain what he deems a statistically significant result.
Moreover, the studies rejected by Dr. Done had been published in peer-
reviewed scientific journals, while Dr. Done has neither published his
recalculations nor offered them for peer review." 336
Informing the court's approach to the evidence was its own recogni-
tion that Richardson did not stand alone, but rather was part of a congre-
gation of cases. On this basis, the court rejected its own previous analysis
in Ferebee of the proper posture of courts to conficting scientific
evidence:
ing the Bendectin-users' children to the genetically-disadvantaged children, she con-
cluded that there was a risk of limb reduction associated with Bendectin, and she was
apparently willing to testify that Bendectin in fact causes limb reduction.
Swan's study has never been refereed or published in a scientific journal or else-
where. We are informed of it only by the defendant's excerpts. On the basis of what
we have, it could not form the foundation for an expert opinion challenging the sci-
entific consensus and making the issue of causation a factual question to be decided
by the jury.
Id. at 1194-95 (citation omitted).
334. Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829.
335. Id. at 830.
336. Id. at 831.
January 1992]
The Richardsons, however, direct attention to our decision in Fer-
ebee v. Chevron Chemical Co ..... We think reliance thereon is mis-
placed here .... Ferebee stands for the proposition that courts should
be very reluctant to alter a jury's verdict when the causation issue is
novel and "stand[s] at the frontier of current medical and epidemiologi-
cal inquiry." If experts are willing to testify to causation in such situa-
tions and their methodology is sound, the jury's verdict should not be
disturbed.
The case before us, however, is not like Ferebee. Indeed, we are at
the other end of the spectrum, a great distance from the "frontier of
current medical and epidemiological inquiry." And far from a paucity
of scientific information on the oft-asserted claim of causal relationship
of Bendectin and birth defects, the drug has been extensively studied
and a wealth of published epidemiological data has been amassed, none
of which has concluded that the drug is teratogenic. Uniquely to this
case, the law now has the benefit of twenty years of scientific study,
and the published results must be given their just due.337
In spite of this language, Richardson might be thought of as an early
scientific opinion. The court was not fully confident of its separate analy-
sis of the evidence. It presented a significant excerpt from the testimony
of Dr. Done, one of the plaintiffs' key experts, designed to demonstrate
that even if the court were to accept plaintiffs' expert testimony at face
value, the plaintiffs' experts themselves were unable to conclude that
Bendectin more likely than not causes birth defects:
Dr. Done himself conceded the import of this literature when he
agreed on cross-examination that "in connection with the animal stud-
ies.... because so many substances are teratogenic in animals, before
you can make a conclusion that a substance is teratogenic in humans,
you must look to the human data." Dr. Done also acknowledged the
necessity of a statistically significant association between the drug and
its effect in human populations ....
Dr. Done further admitted that no one who has published work
on Bendectin has concluded that there is a statistically significant asso-
ciation between Bendectin and limb reduction defects of the type at
issue in this case.338
Based on this analysis of Dr. Done's testimony the court of appeals con-
cluded that his opinion concerning the teratogenicity of Bendectin lacked
an adequate foundation and was therefore inadmissable.
339
(ii) Brock
The court in Brock v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals34o exhibited no
such uncertainty about the reallocation of tasks between judge and jury:
337. Id. at 831-32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
338. Id. at 830-31.
339. Id at 831-32.
340. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vrol. 43
MASS TORTS
This case is one of a series of many cases filed against Merrell-
Dow by parents of children with birth defects allegedly caused by the
ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. Academic commentators
have dubbed this case and others like it "mass toxic torts." This repre-
sents a growing realization among academics, lawyers, and judges that
cases such as this present special problems and challenges to tradi-
tional ideas regarding the role of the jury as a decision maker.
Under the traditional approach to scientific evidence, courts
would not peer beneath the reasoning of medical experts to question
their reasoning. Confronted, as we now are, with difficult medical
questions, courts must critically evaluate the reasoning process by
which the experts connect data to their conclusions in order for courts
to consistently and rationally resolve the disputes before them.
341
As in Richardson, the court was particularly concerned with the fact
that Brock was one of a long string of cases. The Brock court, however,
added a further justification for a scientific approach to the data. It ar-
gued that courts should be more willing to intervene because inconsistent
jury verdicts are particularly undesirable in situations where the same
facts are tried over and over:
Moreover, in mass torts the same issue is often presented over and over
to juries in different cases, and the juries often split both ways on the
issue. The effect of this is to create a state of uncertainty among manu-
facturers contemplating the research and development of new, and po-
tentially lifesaving drugs. Appellate courts, if they take the lead in
resolving those questions upon which juries will go both ways, can re-
duce some of the uncertainty which can tend to produce a sub-optimal
amount of new drug development. 34 2
(iv) Ealy
Once a body of cases assessing the merits of the evidence has devel-
oped, courts may adopt a legalistic analysis that no longer reviews evi-
dence, but accepts earlier appellate assessments of the evidence. The
quotation from Junius at the beginning of this essay captures the essence
of this phenomenon: "What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine.
343
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, 344 is a case in this tradition. In Ealy, as in
Brock, the appellate court took the particularly aggressive step of revers-
ing a trial court judgment entered on a plaintiff's verdict. Unlike Brock,
however, the Ealy court justified this action not by directly attacking the
341. Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted).
342. IA at 310.
343. DEDICATION TO THE ENGLISH NATION, supra note 1, reprinted in FAMILIAR QUO-
TATIONS at 1001.
344. 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
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plaintiff's experts or their evidence but by legalistically arguing that it
was following the earlier Richardson opinion:
We find that this case is squarely within the binding rule articu-
lated in Richardson: an expert opinion that Bendectin is a human ter-
atogen which caused the plaintiff's birth defects is without scientific
foundation under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 in the face of "a
wealth of published epidemiological data" to the contrary. Accord-
ingly such expert opinion is inadmissible. Because we discern no mate-
rial difference between the evidence presented in Richardson and that
presented in this case, we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion
for judgment n.o.v.
Because Richardson provides a binding legal precedent governing
the admissibility of expert opinion on the ability of Bendectin to cause
human birth defects, the Ealys can only avoid that decision by showing
that the record here is materially different from that in Richardson.
We find no such difference. 345
Although the language of the opinion appears to hold out the poten-
tial that the plaintiffs might present new or additional data to avoid the
precedential effect of Richardson, as a practical matter this is impossible.
No in vitro or in vivo study will overcome the body of existing epidemio-
logical evidence. And since Bendectin has not been on the market since
1983, there appear to be no significant data sets remaining that could cast
new light on its teratogenic effects. As a matter of law, Bendectin does
not cause birth defects.
c. A Defense Bias?
These Bendectin opinions followed in the wake of and were clearly
influenced by Judge Weinstein's similarly "scientific" finding for the de-
fense in the Agent Orange opt-out opinion. 346 The Brock case divided the
Fifth Circuit along apparently political lines.3 47 In light of these two
circumstances, a natural question is whether what I have called substan-
345. Id. at 1160-62. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 90-55397, 1991
WL269803 (9th Cir. 1991), was decided too late to be discussed in this article. Daubert is a
legal-scientific opinion affirming a summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiffs'
inability to show Bendectin caused the plaintiffs' defects.
346. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
811 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
347. When the Fifth Circuit ruled en banc against granting a rehearing of the case, the
eight judges who voted against a rehearing had been appointed by Presidents Nixon and Rea-
gan, while five of the six judges who dissented had been appointed by President Carter. The
other dissenter, Judge Higginbotham, wrote separately, indicating that he would go even far-
ther than the majority in crafting a rule for the judicial scrutiny of expert testimony. John
Endicott, Toxic Tort Litigation in the Fifth Circuit: Rulings on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 349 (Aug. 8, 1990).
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tive rationing is part of a general drift within the federal judiciary toward
a more conservative, prodefendant position.348 Such a trend may of
course play a role in these opinions, but there is reason to believe that the
use of substantive rationing is more than a partisan phenomenon. Within
the Bendectin Cases, not all the judges issuing scientific or legal-scientific
opinions are known conservatives or Republican appointees. The Ealy
opinion, for example, was authored by Judge Mikva, who at one time
was a liberal Democratic congressman from Illinois.
More to the point, perhaps, is the question whether similar decisions
will be issued, but favoring plaintiffs rather than defendants. There are
reasons to think that such an outcome is unlikely. 349 From the plaintiffs'
point of view, the Bendectin Cases are an example of an unsuccessful
mass tort congregation. The plaintiffs have routinely met with defeat,
but because of the large number of separate actions the litigation has
continued for several years. "Successful" mass tort cases will usually
have a different career. In such cases it is frequently the case that by the
time the courts have come to a conclusion as to the proper substantive
outcome of the congregation, the defendant has been overwhelmed by
the litigation. Bankruptcy is a different form of legal rationing-one that
supersedes both procedural and substantive judicial rationing. Neverthe-
less, if substantive rationing is the product of the forces described in this
Article, we should expect that on occasion it may be used to the plain-
tiffs' advantage.
In this regard it is worth noting a recent effort on the part of two
federal district court judges from Ohio and Texas to consolidate all as-
bestos cases. Among other actions taken, the Ohio judge issued an order
setting a hearing date for September 1990 in Cleveland to allow the par-
ties to nearly 60,000 outstanding asbestos claims to address the proposed
348. See generally Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 2.
349. One example, perhaps, is Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1982), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the defendant could not
raise a state-of-the-art defense in an asbestos products liability case. The New Jersey court was
quickly forced to retreat from this position. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 N.J. 429, 479
A.2d 374 (1984). In distinguishing Beshada, the court in Feldman stated that, "[t]he rationale
of Beshada is not applicable to this case. We do not overrule Beshada, but restrict Beshada to
the circumstances giving rise to its holding." Id. at 455, 479 A.2d at 388. One possible inter-
pretation of this statement is that Beshada came after a substantial amount of asbestos litiga-
tion in which the defendants had tried and failed to make a state-of-the-art defense. By
denying the defendants this line of defense in asbestos cases, the court was engaged in substan-
tive rationing. Such rationing was inappropriate in cases such as Feldman that raised a rela-
tively new factual question: whether defendants could have known that large doses of
tetracycline could discolor the teeth of infants and young children. I wish to thank Michael
Green for pointing out the relevance of Beshada to the argument in the text.
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certification of a class in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, which would enable the court to:
Declare and apply federal common law that establishes as a matter of
law that asbestos-containing insulation products capable of producing
dust on use, application, or removal are inherently dangerous in ac-
cordance with the governmental ban and the findings of all federal
agencies that have addressed the question; and that such products were
marketed without an adequate warning and were therefore, defective
and unreasonably dangerous.350
The order, issued after a meeting in August 1990 at the Federal Judicial
Center, was reviewed and approved by eight other federal judges, includ-
ing Judge Weinstein who is overseeing the Manville Personal Injury Set-
tlement Trust.351 This effort would have settled all but the specific
causation and damages questions in almost all asbestos litigation. This is
additional evidence that the pressures created by a congregation of cases,
and not party bias, are the primary forces moving courts toward substan-
tive rationing.
VI. The Larger Context
Thus far, the argument has focused on the specifics of the Bendectin
Cases. In the previous section I discussed a particularly interesting judi-
cial reaction to a case congregation: substantive rationing. In this last
section I move beyond the Bendectin Cases to discuss more general cir-
cumstances that produce this type of judicial behavior. I conclude with
some thoughts on how the judicial response to case congregations may,
in turn, affect all tort law.
A. Substantive Rationing and the Judge-Jury Relationship
Substantive rationing as evidenced in the Bendectin Cases, and per-
haps soon to be seen in the asbestos cases, is the ultimate form of what
Galanter calls an outcome stabilization effect. 352 The effect, however, oc-
curs in a way unanticipated by either Galanter's congregation theory or
McGovern's cyclical theory of mass torts.353 In their models something
like market forces operate over time to bring stability to the caseload and
to case outcomes. The uniform outcome imposed through the use of sub-
stantive rationing is different.354 In large part, this type of outcome stabi-
lization seems to be a reaction to the jury trial as an institution.
350. In re National Asbestos Litigation, No. 1:90 CV 11,000 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 1990)
(consolidation order), quoted in 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 360-61 (Aug. 15, 1990).
351. Id. at 361.
352. Galanter, Case Congregations, supra note 8, at 389-90.
353. See McGovern, supra note 20, at 482.
354. In Calabresi's terms, it is more like specific deterrence-you cannot bring this type of
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Substantive rationing, especially in tort law, reflects distrust of juries
and the desire to have clear rules governing the legal consequences of
certain facts. It shrinks, as much as possible, the grey area of tort en-
compassed by the phrase "a mixed question of law and fact." The effort
is the judicial equivalent of negligence per se rules, but in the Bendectin
Cases the rule is one of no negligence per se. The Bendectin appellate
judges who have thus restricted the jury's role are heirs to Holmes' view
of the jury and the judge-jury relationship. 355 In an 1899 article Holmes
commented:
I confess that in my experience I have not found juries specially in-
spired for the discovery of truth. I have not noticed that they could see
further into things or from a saner judgment than a sensible and well
trained judge. I have not found them freer from prejudice than an
ordinary judge would be .... I do not believe that the jury have any
historic or a priori right to decide any standard of conduct.
356
And in The Common Law, he expressed his hope regarding the ultimate
allocation of duties between judge and jury:
When a case arises in which the standard of conduct, pure and simple,
is submitted to the jury, the explanation is plain. It is that the court,
not entertaining any clear views of public policy applicable to the mat-
ter, derives the rule to be applied from daily experience, as it has been
agreed that the great body of the law of tort has been derived. But the
court further feels that it is not itself possessed of sufficient practical
experience to lay down the rule intelligently. It conceives that twelve
men taken from the practical part of the community can aid its judg-
ment. Therefore it aids its conscience by taking the opinion of the
jury.
But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be
imagined that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury
forever?357
The answer for Holmes was no. In the well known case of Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad v. Goodman 358 he had an opportunity to turn his thoughts
into law in the context of a railroad crossing case:
When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a
place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is
clear of the track .... In such circumstances it seems to us that if a
driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he
must stop and get out of his vehicle .... It is true... that the question
lawsuit-than general deterrence-given a set of general legal rules, you are unlikely to win
this suit if you do bring it. GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-130 (1970).
355. The following discussion is based upon materials in GEORGE CHRISTIE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 158-64 (1983).
356. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV.
443, 459 (1899).
357. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123 (1881).
358. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
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of due care very generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a
standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid
down once for all by the Courts.3 59
As students of tort law know, Holmes' effort to ration substantive
law failed. The "once for all" rule of stop, look, and listen lasted less
than a decade, dismantled by Benjamin Cardozo in Pokora v. Wabash
Railway Co. 360 In a roughly similar case on the facts, Justice Cardozo
declared that
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they
are taken from the facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre
is an uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Be-
sides being uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes even
dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or
curve, he will learn nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk
beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in motion, the
hidden train may be upon him.
Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in
framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is
the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of
which the standards have emerged361
Needless to say, Holmes and Cardozo were speaking of standards of
care, while the Bendectin judges are speaking of the causal question. The
Holmes-Cardozo exchange deals with a relatively more normative ques-
tion, while the Bendectin courts are dealing with a relatively more objec-
tive one. They share, however, a concern with which facts can give rise
to liability. Like Holmes, the judges in Richardson, Brock, and Ealy con-
cluded that on certain given facts there is no room left within which the
jury may operate. Pokora, however, stands as a warning that in a com-
mon-law system facts constantly challenge rules. If Holmes had some-
how hoped that eventually each fact situation would have its own
pigeonhole and that eventually judges, having considered each, would
determine whether it was a "liability" hole or a "nonliability" hole,
Pokora suggests that there are too many pigeonholes to make this a prac-
ticable enterprise for all of the law of torts.
The debate about the acceptability of jury verdicts and the judici-
ary's obligation to intervene continues. Most frequently, it has been de-
bated in situations where the primary evidence of liability is based on
laboratory research and epidemiological studies. Charles Nesson, for ex-
ample, has argued that Judge Weinstein may have erred in taking the
359. Id. at 69-70 (citations omitted).
360. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
361. Id. at 104.
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Agent Orange opt out case from the jury solely on the basis of adverse
epidemiological evidence. 362 Others have disagreed with this conclusion
and have argued that judicial intervention is essential to control verdicts
that appear to depart from "rational efforts to reconstruct reality. '3
63
From a wider perspective the dispute is not about juries per se, but
about discretionary fact finding by judge or jury. When judges sit as fact
finders they too can arrive at outcomes that depart from rational efforts
to reconstruct reality. Note, however, that Holmes couched his thoughts
in terms of a learning process. The judge should determine the standard
of care, or perhaps find the facts, when nearly identical situations have
been confronted repeatedly. According to Holmes, the pressure to ration
law in this way is especially strong when the court finds "the jury oscil-
lating to and fro, and will see the necessity of making up its mind for
itself."' 364 The threat of inconsistent outcomes is always a cost of al-
lowing any case to go to the jury. As Nesson notes, "[t]he force of this
consideration depends on one's assessment of the system's capacity to
rationalize inconsistent verdicts in terms of credibility of witnesses, abil-
ity of lawyers, variations among juries, and similar considerations. '365
Such rationalizations may prove to be most difficult where congregations
of cases present the same factual question. Inconsistent verdicts by one-
shot juries lacking the benefit of the learning process that a congregation
of cases provides may seem offensive to a judiciary that, as a collective
entity, has tried the same question many times. Therefore, we are espe-
cially likely to observe substantive rationing as a congregation ma-
tures. 366 This is all the more true when the central factual question is
362. Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REv. 521, 526, 537-58 (1986) [hereinafter Nesson, Factfinding at the
Frontier]. In part, Nesson's concern arises from his distinction between verdicts based on "a
determination of what actually happened" and verdicts that are only "statements about the
evidence." Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptabil-
ity of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. Rv. 1357, 1361 (1985). Under this view, outcomes based solely
on epidemiological studies are statements about the evidence and ought not overcome jury
verdicts that may be based on a determination of what actually happened.
363. Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the 'Acceptability of Verdicts' Thesis, 66
B.U. L. REV. 541, 562 (1986).
364. HOLMES,, supra note 357, at 123.
365. Nesson, Factfinding at the Frontier, supra note 362, at 537. See, eg., Dempsey v.
Addison Crane Co., 247 F. Supp. 584 (D.D.C. 1965). In Dempsey, two plaintiffs injured in the
same crane accident had their nonjury cases tried separately and experienced opposite out-
comes. In an attempt to explain this outcome, the court was happy to be able to report that
"the evidence in the two actions was not the same." See id. at 589. In Bendectin cases tried
since 1985, however, the evidence on the question of general causation has been basically the
same.
366. Concern with inconsistent jury verdicts is part of the reason the trial court in Lynch
v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856, 862 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.
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one of general causation, and therefore, by definition, the identical issue
is posed time after time. Substantive rationing of law is a response to
being repeatedly presented with the same fact pattern and having to de-
termine whether the correct outcome is liability or nonliability. As the
following discussion illustrates, this phenomenon is not restricted to the
law of torts.
B. Substantive Rationing in the School Desegregation Cases
In the several cases leading up to Brown v. Board of Education,367
the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in large part on the
basis of a factual determination that the separate schools being run by the
state were not equal.368 In the four cases comprising Brown, the plaintiffs
presented social science testimony designed to prove that separate
schools caused psychological harm to black children.369 Chief Justice
Warren responded to this evidence with the following statement:
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the
time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that state mandated segregation
has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of
black children] is amply supported by modern authority. '"370
Defendant school boards, however, continued to attack this factual
assertion, arguing that separate may not be worse, educationally or psy-
chologically. In this congregation of cases, as in the Bendectin Cases, the
challenge soon fell on deaf ears. Appellate courts refused to hear experts
on the issue, rejecting the testimony as a factual attack on Brown. 3 71 One
expert for a school district made the following comment in the face of
this substantive rationing by the courts:
The legal doctrine is cast in concrete, and that's been one of my frus-
trations. It's as though the evidence is really immaterial .... I re-
member in one case I was talking with the judge from the witness box,
and questioning some of the testimony in Brown. He asked me, "Are
1987), collaterally estopped the. plaintiffs from making their case on the merits. See also Brock
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 874 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir.) (noting that inconsistent jury
verdicts suggest that appellate courts should resolve such questions), modified, 884 F.2d 166
(5th Cir. 1989).
367. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
368. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 640-41 (1950); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351-
52 (1938).
369. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 315-45, 480-507, 700-47 (1976).
370. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
371. See, e.g., Jackson Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Evers, 357 F.2d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 1966); Stell v.
Savannah-Chatham County Bd. Educ., 318 F.2d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 1963), cert denied sub
nom. Gibson v. Harris, 376 U.S. 908 (1964).
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you questioning the facts of Brown?" And I said "Yes," and he said,
"Well, that's not admissible for you to be doing that.
372
Again, of course, the parallel should not be overdrawn. Ultimately, in
the school desegregation cases courts simply did not care whether segre-
gated schools psychologically harmed or benefitted minority students.
Presumably, in the Bendectin Cases the courts still care whether the drug
causes birth defects. But in both situations, the rationing response of the
courts must be understood, in part, as a natural consequence of the fact
that they were adjudicating cases that came relatively late in a congrega-
tion of similar cases. In the school desegregation cases and in the
Bendectin Cases, substantive rationing is the ultimate rationing weapon.
VII. Conclusion: Case Congregations and the Interaction of
Macro and Micro Processes
This Article began by noting Henderson and Eisenberg's assertion
that all of products liability law is changing in a prodefendant direction
and that the Bendectin opinions are an example of this process.373 Their
data indicate that the single most important component in increased de-
fense success in products liability cases is an increased ability to win on
pretrial motion, a type of judicial rationing. 374 Henderson and Eisenberg
explicitly leave for a later article their thoughts as to why this "quiet
revolution" is occurring. 375 Implicit in their discussion, however, is the
argument that large scale, macro changes are occurring within the law of
torts, causing the judiciary to adopt a more prodefendant position.
This Article's micro level analysis, which attempts to explain case
outcomes in terms of the internal dynamics of the Bendectin Cases as a
congregation, can be viewed as a rival hypothesis to the thesis that the
change in the courts' attitude toward Bendectin suits is to be understood
as part of a larger judicial retreat from proplaintiff positions. From this
perspective, the future research agenda should include efforts to deter-
mine whether what we have observed in the Bendectin Cases is merely a
cohort effect (a difference to be found between all products liability cases
decided in 1985 and all such cases decided in 1990), as opposed to a
history effect (evidencing the maturation of the Bendectin congregation).
In this sense, macro and micro explanations may be seen as rival hypoth-
eses for the findings.
372. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 36, at 430.
373. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 491.
374. Id. at 531, 548.
375. Id. at 482.
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There is, however, another more useful perspective, one that inte-
grates rather than divides. Macro research on large scale patterns of
change that excludes an analysis of the micro processes that generate
those patterns often leads to incomplete, disembodied theories of legal
change.376 Theories of micro processes enrich our theories of larger
processes by placing them within the context of individual human
action.377
From this latter perspective, the present Article suggests that the
large-scale change reported by Henderson and Eisenberg can be under-
stood, at least in part, as a product of the growth of mass torts and the
micro processes generated within individual congregations of cases. That
mass torts have changed the law is now beyond doubt. As noted earlier,
they have raised a new set of causal conundrums and forced us to engage
in a new round of theorizing about the causal question. 378 They have
raised new issues with respect to damages.379 By causing growth in some
parts of the tort caseload, they have helped precipitate another round of
legislative "tort reform. ' 380 They have reinvigorated the search for alter-
natives to the traditional tort system.381 This Article suggests that they
may also have influenced the judiciary's approach to tort law by creating
incentives for both procedural and substantive rationing.3 82
The Bendectin Cases alone would not have such an effect, but mass
torts in general have become the primary growth area of tort law, consti-
tuting an increasingly larger part of the total caseload.383 Their impor-
tance in terms of the judicial time they consume is even greater than is
suggested by their percentage of the overall caseload. Each mass tort is a
376. Sanders, supra note 46, at 241.
377. JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 18-23 (1990).
378. See Rosenberg, supra note 215, at 855-59.
379. MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 5-31 (1987).
380. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 89, at 212.
381. See STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989)
(surveying contemporary attempts to reform tort law and advancing several new proposals).
382. The Fifth Circuit, home of Brock has perhaps been most aggressive in applying sub-
stantive rationing to cases that are not part of a congregation. See, eg., Christophersen v.
Allied Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd en banc, 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.
1991). In Christophersen, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant ofsummaryjudg-
ment for the defendant against a claim that the plaintiff' had not been adequately warned of the
cancer causing potential of chemicals and other materials used in the manufacture of nickel-
cadmium batteries. The district court had granted summary judgment after reviewing the
qualifications of plaintiff's sole expert witness and the factual basis of that expert's opinion on
causation. Id at 364.
383. Galanter, Life and Times of the Big Six, supra note 242, at 937; Deborah Hensler,
Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 479, 480-83, 495-96 (1987).
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congregation, subject to similar pressures to ration legal resources. 384
Moreover, there are types of cases rarely thought of as mass torts that
exhibit some, or even most, of the features of mass torts. Specifically,
many products liability design defect cases, another growth area of tort
law,38 5 present the courts with the same problems: repetitive trial of sim-
ilar facts; substantial consumption of time; and the likelihood of inconsis-
tent jury verdicts. 386 These problems are part of the congregational
effects that caused "scientific" opinions like Richardson, Brock and Ealy
to be written. In the Bendectin Cases, the problems have driven the judi-
ciary to play an even more active role in rationing law than suggested by
Galanter's congregation theory. Outcome stabilization has come not
through the market forces of litigation but through the central planning
of the federal judiciary.
In sum, this Article confirms the insights of Emerson and Galanter,
that the analysis of litigation from a perspective other than that of the
individual, atomized case offers us a new and better understanding of
case processing and case outcomes. The Bendectin congregation does
exhibit many of the features hypothesized by Galanter, and thereby dem-,
onstrates the value of this line of analysis. But it holds out the potential
to do even more. The analysis of this and other congregations may pro-
vide a new window into the way in which, over time, individual decisions
of lawyers and judges create fundamental shifts in the common law.
384. The mass inoculation cases (DTP, Polio, and Swine Flu) provide one example. In
these cases, courts became increasingly reluctant to allow cases to go to the jury. E.g., Johnson
v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986) (trial court erred in submit-
ting issue of polio vaccine manufacturer's liability to jury). Ultimately, legislative rationing
occurred in the form of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-I to -34 (1988).
385. Design defect cases appear to have risen over time as a percentage of all products
liability cases. Compare 3 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 84-85 (1977)
(reporting that 39% of all products liability cases were design defect cases) with ALLIANCE OF
AM. INSURERS, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1985 (1985)
(finding that defective design was the applicable theory in 75% of the cases).
386. Products liability warning defect cases can also result in the repetitive trial of similar
facts, with the attendant potential for inconsistent verdicts. In fact, some of the most impor-
tant mass tort case congregations, such as asbestos and the polio vaccine, are litigated as warn-
ing defect cases. For a critique of this approach, see James A. Henderson & Aaron Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 265 (1990). With respect to these and other warning cases, Henderson and Twerski
"urge that judges engage more aggressively in both lawmaking and law-applying." Id. at 326.
January 1992] MASS TORTS













2. Khera 1975 Rats
3. Gibson 1975 Rats
4. Gibson 1975 Rabbits
5. McBride 1981 Chicken
Eggs
6. Hend- 1982 Monkeys
rickx (8)
7. Hend- 1983 Monkeys
rickx (9)
8. McBride 1984 Rabbits
9. Hend- 1985a Monkeys
rickx (11)
10. Hend- 1985b Monkeys
rickx (12)
11. Tyl 1988 Rats
Exp/Con Defect Dose Auth
N Drug Effect? Type Dose Resp Conc.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
36/13 Do No - (100) No No
22/10 Di No - (100) No No
38/14 B3 Yes Other' 6 Yes No
88/39 Do No - (100) No No
90/30 Di Yes Otherb 10 No No
36/24 B3 No - (30) No No
22/10 Py No - (80) No No
45/15 B2 Yes Other' 15 No No
45/15 B2 No - (150) No No
252/96 Di Yes Otherd  - Yes Yes
12/0 B2 Yes Heart 7 ? Maybe
20/0 B2 Yes Heart 7 ? Maybe
48/8 Do Yes Limb, 20 Yes Yes
Skeletal
74/12 B2 Yes Heart 7 No Yes
69/21 B2 No - (13) No No
116/53 B2 Yes Skeletal 200 Yes No
Death
Information Reported (by column number):
(1) Year in which the research was published.
(2) Animals studied: white rats, rabbits, chicken eggs, or monkeys.
(3) Number of mothers in the experimental and control groups.
(4) Drug tested:
Di = dicyclomine hydrochloride
Do = doxylamine succinate
Py = pyridoxine hydrochloride
B2 = two ingredient Bendectin (doxylamine succinate and pyridoxine hydrochloride)
B3 = three ingredient Bendectin.
(5) Did the use of the drug appear to be related to some teratogenic effect?
(6) Type of effect: heart, limb, skeletal, death, other (see below).
(7) Minimum dose at which effect was observed. Dosages are expressed in mg/kg/day except in
study 3. Where there was no observed effect this column reports (in parentheses) the maximum
dose rate in the experiment. For purposes of comparison, the therapeutic dose for pregnant
women was 2 to 4 tablets a day, each tablet containing 10mg of each ingredient. The dose for a
woman weighing 60kg (132 lbs.) taking 4 tablets per day is .67mg/kg/day per Bendectin ingredi-
ent. Unlike the rest of the studies, Study 5-the 1981 McBride Study-involved injecting
dicyclomine hydrochloride (or a saline solution for the controls) into Leghorn chicken eggs.
(8) Was there a dose-response relationship?
(9) Author's conclusion as to whether the drug tested has teratogenic effects?
Other Effects (Column 6):
a. Contracted tendons.
b. Focal hematomas.
c. Kidney pelvic dilation, subcutaneous hematomas.
d. Gastroschisis, deformed foot, micromelia, exencephaly.













































Year Type Focus on Level of
of Studya Bendectin Stat. Anal.b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1963 Cohort No 1
1963 Cohort Yes 1
1963 Other Yes 1
1963 Cohort No 2
1964 Other Yes 1
1964 Case No 2
1965 Cohort No 2
1970 Other No 1
1971 Case No 2
1976 Cohort No 3
1977 Cohort No 1
1977 Cohort Yes 5
1977 Case No 1
1977 Case No 1
1978 Cohort Yes 1
1979 Case No 3
1980 Cohort Yes 4
1980 Other Yes 1
1981 Cohort No 3
1981 Cohort Yes 3
1981 Case Yes 3
1981 Cohort Yes 1
1981 Case Yes 4
1981 Case Yes 3
1981 Cohort Yes 5
1982 Case Yes 5
1982 Other Yes 1
1982 Cohort Yes 4
1983 Case Yes 4
1983 Cohort Yes 4
1983 Cohort No 3
1983 Case Yes 4
1984 Cohort Yes 3
1984 Case Yes 3
1985 Case Yes 4
1985 Case Yes 4
1985 Cohort No 3
1989 Cohort Yes 3
1991 Case No 4
a. Type of Study (Column 2):
Case = Case-Control study
Cohort = Cohort study
Other = A study that is neither of the above.
b. Levels of Statistical Analysis (Column 4):
1 = None
2 = Chi-square only
3 = Chi square and confidence interval
4 = Chi-square, confidence interval and something additional but no regression analysis.
5 = 3 or 4 plus a multiple regression analysis to control for co-variants.























































































Whether or Not Studies Focus on Bendectin by Whether They

















X2 = 10.52, df= 1, p <.01, N= 39
Table 4
Whether or Not Studies Report More Than a Chi-Square by

















X2 = 18.14, df= 1, p <.001, N= 39.
Table 5
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Table 7 (Continued)
55. Barton 1990 No Hung 5(10) S D D Y Limb
56. DeLuca 1990 No No 4(10 & 11) S D D Y Limb
57. Whelan 1990 No No 4(11) S D D Y ?
58. Lee 1991 Yes No 4(11) S D D Y Limb
Issues (Column 4):
(0) = Other
(1) = Forum non conveniens
(2) = Federal jurisdiction
(3) = Complaint fails to state a cause of action (Note-this might be one of several causes of
action.)
(4) = Summary Judgment
(5) = Directed Verdict
(6) = JNOV/New Trial
(7) = Dismissal of pharmacist or physician defendant
(8) = Statute of Limitations
(9) = Specific causation-timing of ingestion
(10) = Failure to prove general causation by a preponderance of the evidence
(11) = Failure to present any qualified expert at trial on the general causation question, summary
judgment (this is case 22,30)
(12) = Motion for bifurcation, trifurcation
(13) = Collateral Estoppel
(14) = Transfer of cases in and out of consolidated litigation
(15) = Multiple
NOTE: Codes written like 4(10) indicate the type of ruling and the reason why that ruling was
made: thus, in the example, a summary judgment was granted or denied based on an argument that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove general causation.
Particularities of Posture (Column 4 superscript annotations):
a. Request to remove to Ohio, location of Merrell.
b. Declares U.S. courts forum non conveniens for British claimants and others who survived a
similar motion in Alexander (1).
c. Discovery allowed from Merrell companies abroad.
d. Class certification.
e. Lead counsel asking for money for discovery materials.
f. Plaintiffs move to return to state court because Defendant's petition for removal was tardy.
g. Suit by military personnel against government barred.
h. Plaintiff moves for offensive collateral estoppel on causation question/ loses; Defendant phar-
macy moves to dismiss/ wins; Defendant Merrell moves for summary judgment on punitive
damages and fraud count/ wins.
i. Defense motion to allow statistical evidence in only if it is statistically significant (.05%) granted.
j. Quashed deposition.
k. Motion by Plaintiff to examine notes of a juror after verdict for Defendant.
1. Plaintiff's motion to remand to state court granted. Defendant claims Plaintiff added pharma-
cies to destroy complete diversity, and Defendant argues this was done without hope of recovery
against them.
m. Mother's derivate action time barred.
n. Defendant makes 8 pretrial motions: (1) Exclusion of Thalidomide-denied with caution; (2)
inadmissibility of early Jinks' epidemiology studies later repudiated by Jinks in print in JAMA-
denied with caution; (3) warning on UNISOM (which has doxylamine) not to be used by preg-
nant women-denied; (4) admissibility of published epidemiological studies-denied in advance
of testimony showing their relevance and probativeness; (5) exclusion of other Bendectin related
birth defects-denied; (6) exclusion of DERS and in vitro studies-sustained as to DERs not rat
studies; (7) exclusion of deposition on Bunde-Bowles, sustained as it isn't used by Defendant;
and (8) exclusion of evidence on the cessation of bendectin production-sustained.
o. Objection to way jury was selected.
p. Motion to reconsider denial of new trial. Court now allows Plaintiff to photocopy jury notes and
examine them further.
q. Motion by Defendant for summary judgment on punitive damages and fraud claim.
r. Defense motion to discover mother's medical records-sustained.
s. No evidence mother ever took Bendectin-25 years before filing suit.
t. Defendant asks for summary judgment-sustained as to punitive damages, but not as to causa-
tion.
u. Motion to reconsider summary judgment rejected.
v. This opinion granted defendant a summary judgment in Daubert and Schuller v. Merrell Dow.
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Issue on Appeal (Column 4):
(1) = Forum non conveniens
(2) = Federal jurisdiction
(3) = Complaint fails to state a cause of action. (Note-this might be one of several causes of
action.)
(4) = Dismissal of pharmacist or physician defendant
(5) = Statute of Limitations
(6) = Specific causation-timing of ingestion
(7) = Failure to prove general causation by a preponderance of the evidence
(8) = Failure to present any qualified expert at trial on the general causation question, summary
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J.D. Budroe et al., A Study of the Potential Genotoxicity of Methapyrilene
and Related Antihistamines Using the Hepatocyte/DNA Repair Assay,
135 MUTATION RES. 131 (1984).
M. Guntakatta et al., Development of a Mouse Embryo Limb Bud Cell
Culture System for the Estimation of Chemical Teratogenic Potential, 4
TERATOGENESiS, CARCINOGENESIS, & MUTAGENESIS 349 (1984).
J.R. Hassell & E.A. Horigan, Chondrogenesis: A Model Developmental
System for Measuring Teratogenic Potential of Compounds, 2 TER-
ATATOGENESIS, CARCINOGENESIS, & MUTAGENESIS 325 (1982).
S. A. Newman, Lineage and Pattern in the Developing Vertebrate Limb, 4
TRENDS GENETICS 329 (1989).
J.Y. Renault et al., Limb Bud Cell Culture for In Vitro Teratogen Screen-
ing: Validation of an Improved Assessment Method Using 51 Compounds,
9 TERATOGENESIS, CARCINOGENESIS, & MUTAGENESIS 83 (1989).
L.G. Roberts et al., Embryo-Maternal Distribution of Basic Compounds




In Vivo Studies Bibliography
(Numbers in parentheses at the end of each citation refer to the order
of the studies in Table 1)
J.P. Gibson et al., Teratology and Reproduction Studies with an An-
tinauseant, 13 TERATOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 439 (1968).
(1)
John Gibson, Teratology Study with a New Antinauseant Formulation in
Rabbits, Project Report T-75-12 (4), Dep't of Pathology and Toxicology,
Merrell-Nat'l Lab. Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Cincinnati, Ohio.
(1975) (unpublished study) (on file with author). (4)
John Gibson, Teratology Study With a New Antinauseant Formulation in
Rats, Project Report T-75-13, Dep't of Pathology and Toxicology, Mer-
rell-Nat'l Lab. Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Cincinnati, Ohio. (1975)
(unpublished study) (on file with author). (3)
A.G. Hendrickx et al., Evaluation of Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Non-
human Primates: Double-Blind Study in Cynomolgus Monkeys, 32 TER-
ATOLOGY 191 (1985). (10)
A.G. Hendickx et al., Evaluation of Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Non-
human Primates: Ventricular Septal Defects in Prenatal Macaques and
Baboon, 32 TERATOLOGY 179 (1985). (9)
A.G. Hendrickx et al., Embryotoxicity Studies on Bendectin in Cy-
nomolgus Monkeys (Macaca Fascicularis) (Abstract), 25 TERATOLOGY
47 (1982). (6)
A.G. Hendrickx et al., Cardiac Embryotoxicity Studies on Bendectin in
Macaques (Abstract), 27 TERATOLOGY 49 (1983). (7)
K.S. Khera, Teratogenicity Study in Rats Given High Doses of Pyridoxine
(Vitamin B6) During Organogenesis, 31 EXPERENTIA 469 (1975). (2)
W.G. McBride, The Effects of Dicyclomine Hydroxochloride on the De-
velopment of the Chick Embryo, 9 IRCS MED. Sci. 471. (1981), Merrell
& Co. Studies (1971). (5)
W.G. McBride, Teratogenic Effect of Doxylamine Succinate in New Zea-
land White Rabbits, 12 IRCS MED. Sci. 536 (1984). (8)
R.W. Tyl et al., Developmental Toxicity Evaluation of Bendectin in CD
Rats, 37 TERATOLOGY 539 (1988). (11)
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Pamela Aselton & Hershel Jick, Additional Follow-Up of Congenital
Limb Disorders in Relation to Bendectin Use, 250 JAMA 33 (1983). (30)
Pamela Aselton et al., Pyloric Stenosis and Maternal Bendectin Exposure,
120 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 251 (1984). (33)
Pamela Aselton et al., First-Trimester Drug Use and Congenital Disor-
ders, 65 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 451 (1985). (37)
Philip Banister, Congenital Malformations: Preliminary Report of an In-
vestigation of Reduction Deformities of the Limbs, Triggered by a Pilot
Surveillance System, 103 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 4466 (1970). (8)
Carl Bunde & D.M. Bowles, A Technique for Controlled Survey of Case
Records, 5 CURRENT THERAPEUTIC RES. 245 (1963). (2)
Michael Clarke & David Clayton, Safety of Debendox, LANCET, March
21, 1981, at 659. (21)
Jose Cordero et al., Is Bendectin a Teratogen?, 245 JAMA 2307 (1981).
(23)
J.F. Correy & N.M. Newman, Debendox and Limb Reduction Deformi-
ties, 1981 MED. J. AusTL. 417 (1981). (22)
T.J. David, Debendox Does Not Cause the Poland Anomaly, 57 ARCH.
DIs. CHILD 479 (1982). (27)
Diana Elbourne et al., Debendox Revisited, 92 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 780 (1985). (36)
David J. Erickson, Risk Factors for Birth Defects: Data from the Atlanta
Birth Defects Case-Control Study, 43 TERATOLOGY 41 (1991). (39)
Brenda Eskenazi & Michael Bracken, Bendectin (Debendox) As a Risk
Factor for Pyloric Stenosis, 144 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 919
(1982). (26)
J.F. Farrar & I.J. Mackie, A Survey of Possible Causes of Congenital Mal-
formation, 2 MED. J. AUSTL. 793 (1964). (6)
D.M. Fleming et al., Debendox in Early Pregnancy and Fetal Malforma-
tion, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 99 (1981). (20)
General Practitioner Research Group, General Practitioner Clinical Tri-
als: Drugs in Pregnancy Survey, 191 PRACTITIONER 775 (1963). (4)
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G.T. Gibson et al., Congenital Anomalies in Relation to the Use of Doxy-
lamine/Dicyclomine and Other Antenatal Factors: An Ongoing Prospec-
tive Study, 1981 MED. J. AusTL. 410 (1981). (25)
J.S. Golding et al., Maternal Anti-Nauseants and Clefts of Lip and Palate,
1983 HUM. TOXICOLOGY 63 (1983). (29)
G. Greenberg et al., Maternal Drug Histories and Congenital Abnormali-
ties, 1977 BRIT. MED. J. 853 (1977). (13)
D.W.G. Harron et al., Debendox and Congenital Malformations in
Northern Ireland, 281 BRIT. MED. J. 1379 (1980). (18)
Hershel Jick et al., First-Trimester Drug Use and Congenital Disorders,
246 JAMA 343 (1981). (19)
E. Klees, Early Pregnancy Toxicosis Treated with Lenotan, 44 MED.
WELT 204 (1964). (5)
L.J. le Vann, Congenital Abnormalities in Children Born in Alberta Dur-
ing 1961: A Survey and a Hypothesis, 89 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 120 (1963).
(1)
Janet McCredie et al., Doxylamine/Dicyclomine/Pyridoxine and Congen-
ital Limb Defects, 140 MED. J. AUSTL. 525 (1984). (34)
J. Michaelis et al., Teratogene Effekte Yon Lenotan? (Does Lenotan Have
Teratogenic Effects?), 23 DTSCH. ARzT. 1527 (1980). (17)
J. H. Michaelis et al., Prospective Study of Suspected Associations Between
Certain Drugs Administered During Early Pregnancy and Congenital
Malformations, 27 TERATOLOGY 57 (1983). (31)
Lucille Milkovich & Bea van den Berg, An Evaluation of the Teratogenic-
ity of Certain Antinauseant Drugs, 125 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
OGY 244 (1976). (10)
Allen Mitchell et al., Birth Defects Related to Bendectin Use in Preg-
nancy: I Oral Clefts and Cardiac Defects, 245 JAMA 2311 (1981). (24)
Allen Mitchell et al., Birth Defects in Relation to Bendectin Use in Preg-
nancy: II. Pyloric Stenosis, 147 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 737
(1983). (32)
Suzette Morelock et al., Bendectin and Fetal Development: A Study at
Boston City Hospital, 142 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209
(1982). (28)
Matilda Nelson & John Forfar, Associations Between Drugs Administered
During Pregnancy and Congenital Abnormalities of the Fetus, 1971 BRIT.
MED. J. 523 (1971). (9)
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N.M. Newman et al., A Survey of Congenital Abnormalities and Drugs in
a Private Practice, 17 AusTL. N.Z. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 156
(1977). (11)
Kenneth Rothman et al., Exogenous Hormones and Other Drug Expo-
sures of Children with Congenital Heart Disease, 109 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 433 (1979). (16)
Samuel Shapiro- et al., Antenatal Exposure to Doxylamine Succinate and
Dicyclomine Hydrochloride (Bendectin) in Relation to Congenital Malfor-
mations, Perinatal Mortality Rate, Birth Weight, and Intelligence Quo-
tient Score, 128 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 480 (1977). (12)
Patricia Shiono & Mark Klebanoff, Bendectin and Human Congenital
Malformations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151 (1989); Erratum 41 TERATOLOGY
250 (1990). (38)
S.O. Smith et al., An Epidemiological Study of Congenital Reductions and
Deformities of the Limbs, 31 BRIT. J. PREVENTIVE & SOC. MED. 39
(1977). (14)
Richard Smithells & Sheila Sheppard, Teratogenicity Testing in Humans:
A Method Demonstrating Safety of Bendectin, 17 TERATOLOGY 31
(1978). (15)
G. Warneke, Die Behandlung des Schwangerschafterbrechens mit Le-
notan (The Treatment of Vomiting in Pregnancy with Lenotan), 17 MED.
MSCHR. 691 (1963). (3)
J. Yerushalmy & Lucille Milkovich, Evaluation of the Teratogenic Effect
of Meclizine in Man, 93 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 553 (1965).
(7)
Sally Zierler & Kenneth Rothman, Congenital Heart Disease in Relation
to Maternal Use of Bendectin and Other Drugs in Early Pregnancy, 313




The number preceding each data base corresponds with the number ap-
pearing in Column 6 of Table 2. The numbers in parentheses at the end
of each data base reference refer to the number of the study using this
database as it appears in Table 2. For example, data base number 1 was
used by studies 12 (Shapiro) and 38 (Shiono).
United States
1. Collaborative Perinatal Project, 50,282 child pairs from 12 hospitals
throughout the United States. (12), (38)
2. Boston City Hospital, 3222 eligible mothers. February 1977
through October 1979. (28)
3. Boston University School of Medicine and Harvard Medical School
case control study. Drawn from 22 participating centers in 3 re-
gions: (1) Boston (initiated in March 1976); (2) Pennsylvania
(March 1977); and (3) Toronto (January 1979). 1565 malformed
infants. (24), (32)
4. Harvard School of Health, Department of Epidemiology. Subjects
chosen from all residents of Massachusetts born alive with severe
congenital heart disease and with controls randomly selected from
all available birth certificates filed with the Massachusetts Division
of Health Statistics. (16) (between 1973 and 1985), (35) (between
April 1, 1980 and March 31, 1983).
5. John B. Pierce Foundation Laboratory and the Departments of Ep-
idemiology and Public Health and Obstetrics and Gynecology, Yale
University School of Medicine. (Mothers of infants from 5 urban
hospitals in central Connecticut-between November 18, 1974 and
November 17, 1976). (26)
6. Northern California Kaiser Permanent Birth Defects Study (Patients
from Kaiser Health Plan-also called Child Health and Develop-
mental Studies (CHDS), 1974 to 1977. (7), (10)
7. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (GHC-PS) (subjects
were patients in Seattle). Data put on computer files by the Com-
mission on Professional and Hospital Activities-Professional Activ-
ity Study (CPHA-PAS) in Michigan. (19), (30), (33), (37)
8. Metropolitan Atlanta Congenital Defects Program (MACDP) sur-
vey of birth defects "since 1967" from hospitals within the 5 central
counties of the metropolitan Atlanta area. (23), (39)
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9. Merrell Department of Medical Research. 18 groups (21 physi-
cians) from California, Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, On-
tario, and Quebec. (2)
United Kingdom
10. General Practitioners Research Group, patients of physician mem-
bers in U.K. (4)
11. University of Edinburgh Department on Child Life and Health, Ed-
inburgh Scotland. (9)
12. The Annual Report of the Registrar General (Northern Ireland),
1966-1973, and Health and Personal Social Services Statistics, for
Northern Ireland, 1974-1976. (18)
13. Birmingham Research Unit of the Royal College of General Practi-
tioners, Birmingham. 22,977 women (14,684 in Scotland and 8293
in England), 620 of whom were Debendox exposed. (20)
14. The Oxford Record Linkage Study. Infants delivered between 1965
and 1974 to women in Oxfordshire and West Berkshire. (29)
15. The Office of Population Consensus & Surveys (OPCS) pilot study
(London). (13)
16. University of Leicestershire. 40,000 perinatal births in Leicester-
shire. (21)
17. University of Leeds. Scan of RX records from Leeds and Liver-
pool. (15)
18. Cardiff Births Survey (CBS), (Cardiff and Aberdeen), 86,283 births
between 1965 and 1979. (36)
19. Reported cases of Poland Anomaly in Britain between 1890 and
1977. (27)
Australia
20. University of Tasmania, Department of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology. All deliveries in Tasmania.
(11) (from 1953 to 1975), (22) (from 1975 to 1980).
21. Infants born alive in New South Wales or the Australian Capital
Territory between 1970 and 1981. (34)
22. Queen Victoria Research Foundation. Patients attending Queen
Victoria Hospitals in Adelaide, Australia "since 1975." (25)
23. Sutherland District Hospital, Carinbaugh, Australia. Eleven
mothers whose babies were abnormal and were born in September
and October, 1961 and 98 similarly situated mothers with normal
babies. (6)
[Vol. 43HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
January 1992] MASS TORTS 409
Canada
24. University of Alberta. 33,874 births in Alberta in 1961. (1)
25. Pilot Surveillance System-Department of National Health and Wel-
fare, Ottawa Ontario, Births in 4 Canadian Provinces (New Bruns-
wick, Alberta, Manitoba, and British Columbia) were surveyed. (8),
(14)
Germany
26. DFG Study, 21 hospitals in West Germany. (17), (31)
27. 94 women with emesis gravidarum (nausea in pregnancy). (3)
Not Certain
28. Klees Study, 30 cases of hypermises gravidum. (5)
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Alexander v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
(1)
Ambrosini v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 84-3483, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8036 (D.D.C. July 12, 1989). (49)
Barton v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. C85-0028J, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8010 (D. Utah, May 31, 1990). (55)
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1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1990). (42)
Bohrer v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 122 F.R.D. 217 (D.N.D.
1987). (25)
Cadarian v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.
Mich. 1989). (50)
Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 15 Phila. 389 (Common Pleas Ct. of
Phila., 1987). (30)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.
Cal. 1989). (48)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.
Cal. 1989). (51)
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 131 F.R.D. 71 (D.N.J., rev'd,
911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). (56)
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, 1987 WL 15512 (D.D.C.
1987). (35)
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, 1987 WL 18743 (D.D.C.
Oct. 1, 1987), rev'd, 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
370 (1990). (37)
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, 1988 WL 64933 (D.D.C.
June 13, 1988). (43)
Engel v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. CIV-83-1189E, 1987
WL 4769 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1987). (31)
Hagaman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 84-2202-S, slip op.
(D. Kan. July 1, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie). (18)
Hagaman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 84-2202-S, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6124 (D. Kan. June 26, 1987). (33)
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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12184 (D. Kan. Dec. 2, 1987). (38)
Hagaman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 84-2202-S, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 1988). (41)
Hagen v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
(45)
Heath v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Cal. 1986). (17)
Hull v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Fla.
1988). (47)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 533 F. Supp. 489
(J.P.M.L. 1982). (2)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.
Ohio 1982), aff'd sub nom. Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727
F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984). (4)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 97 F.R.D. 481 (S.D. Ohio
1983). (6)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 582 F. Supp. 890
(J.P.M.L. 1984). (7)
In re "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL #486), 102 F.R.D. 239
(S.D. Ohio 1984). (8)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 588 F. Supp. 1448
(J.P.M.L. 1984). (9)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 606 F. Supp. 715
(J.P.M.L. 1985). (10)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.
Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.
1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). (11)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), slip op. (S.D. Ohio Oct.
17, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). (12)
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (MDL #486), slip op. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). (14)
In re Bendectin Cases, No. 85-0996, 1986 WL 20466 (E.D. Mich. May 2,
1986). (16)
In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
(52)
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 80-1258, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan.
25, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). (5)




Lanzilotti v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 82-0183, 1986 WL
7832 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1986). (19)
Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 84-2228GB, 1991 WL 166316
(W.D. Tenn. 1991). (58)
Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117 (D.
Idaho 1990). (54)
Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986). (23)
McFeggan v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2784 (N.D. Ill. April 7, 1987). (29)
Monahan v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., No. 83-3108-WD, 1987 WL 90269 (D.
Mass. Dec. 18, 1987).
Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 85-1504, slip op. (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 27, 1985 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). (13)
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(15)
Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 85-1504, slip op. 1986 WL
9724 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1986). (22)
Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986).
(20)
Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3506, 1987 WL 8518
(D.D.C. Mar. 5, 1987). (27)
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C.
1986). (24)
Rosen v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 82-0513, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2236 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1987). (28)
Rosen v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 82-0513, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6585 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1987). (34)
Rosen v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 82-0513, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7440 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1987). (36)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.
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St. Amand v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 140 Misc. 2d 278, 530
N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). (40)
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[VoI. 43
January 1992] MASS TORTS 413
Vines v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 86-3228 (RCL), 1988 WL 93454
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519 N.E.2d 370 (1988). (12)
Chambers v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 Ohio St. 3d 123, 519
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DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir.
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Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984). (3)
Dralle v. Ruder, 148 Ill. App. 3d 961, 500 N.E.2d 514 (1986), rev'd, 124
Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988). (11)
Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988). (18)
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990). (30)
Herring v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 896 F.2d 1383 (D.C. Cir.
1990). (31)
In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). (5)
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App. 1986). (9)
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 563 A.2d 330 (D.C.
App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1121 (1990). (26)
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989). (21)
Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 229 N.J. Super. 230,
551 A.2d 177 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). (22)
Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 766 F.2d 1005 (6th
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). (7)
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
(10)
Urland v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 822 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir.
1987). (14)
Vines v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 88-7264, 1989 WL 105491 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 31, 1989). (27)
Watson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 769 F.2d 354 (6th Cir.
1985). (8)
Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir.
1990). (28)
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Appendix H
Memorandum Opinions
(not included in data analysis)
Bordick v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 853 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1988) (table
disposition, aff'd).
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 886 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.
1989) (table disposition, reh'g en banc denied).
Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 520 Pa. 588, 551 A.2d 215 (1988) (ta-
ble disposition, appeal granted).
Dralle v. Ruder, 505 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1987) (table disposition, appeal
allowed).
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 469 U.S. 915 (1984) (cert. granted).
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 474 U.S. 808 (1985) (motion of re-
spondents to retax costs denied).
Obiago v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., No. 90-C-1056, (La. June 29, 1990) (writ
denied).
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1121 (1990)
(cert. denied).
Schreier v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.
1984) (table dispositon, appeal dismissed).
Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 474 U.S. 1004 (1985)
(cert. granted).




(not included in data analysis)
Summary Judgments Granted to Merrell Dow
Diaz v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. L-082085 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. April 28, 1989).
Hagle, (November 1989) (summary judgment for defendant on merits).
Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 84-2228 GB (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 30,
1991).
Monohan v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 83-3108-WD (D.
Mass. Dec. 18, 1987) (court relied on Lynch v. Merrell Nat'l Lab.).
Summary Judgments Denied Merrell Dow
DePyper v. Navarro, No. 83-303-467NM (Civ. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich.
Mar. 10, 1990), rev'd, No. 116390 (Mich. Ct. App. June 21, 1991).
Mangels v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. R-83-3272 (D. Md. Aug. 17,
1987).
Plaintiff Verdicts (Jury or Judge)
Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1027 (Pa. Ct. C.P. May
12, 1988) (unpublished opinion).
Defendant Verdicts (Jury or Judge)
Bityk v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. C-302-225 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles County 1987).
Buell, (June 1988) (judgment for defendant on merits).
Butterweck, (Jan. 1986) (W. Germany, judgment for defendant on
merits).
Cordova v. Philips-Roxane Laboratories, Inc., No. 432656 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Santa Clara County 1985) (appeal withdrawn).
Francione, (March 1990) (Italy, judgment for defendant on merits).
Hill v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. C83-74TB (W.D. Wash.
1988) (appeal withdrawn) (also known as Washington Consolidated).
Kottwitz, (W. Germany, Jan. 1986) (judgment for defendants on
merits).
Maryland Consolidated (Johnson, Kelley, Mangels), (Md. federal court,
mistrial, cases dismissed by plaintiffs June 10, 1988).
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Rudell v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 85-0115-CV-W-5
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 1987).
Wiles, (Cal. federal court, Nov. 11, 1987) (defense verdict by judge).
Wilson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 85-C-540-E (N.D. Okla. Dec.
14, 1987).
